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Key points
1. The post-Soviet area, along with the countries of the Middle East, North 
Africa and Western Europe, have become one of the main global „export-
ers” of Islamic militants. This is not the first time Muslim emigrants from 
former USSR states have participated in armed conflicts outside of their 
states’ borders (it has mainly been the Central Asian militants fighting in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan). However, it is only during the civil war in Syria 
that it has become a mass phenomenon. This is particularly visible in the 
case of the Caucasus. Currently on the territory of Syria, and to a lesser 
extent of Iraq, there are several thousands of foreign fighters from the post-
Soviet states. They either join the local militant groups or they create their 
own ones, which are often up to several hundred strong, have commanders 
of their own and play an important role in the local jihad ecosystem.
2. The causes of the war migration from the former USSR states to the Middle 
East have their roots in the dynamic changes taking place inside Islam in 
the post-Soviet area: primarily the growth of Salafism and militant Islam, 
as well as the internationalisation and globalisation of the local Islam. The 
deep political, economic, social and ideological changes which Muslims 
underwent after the collapse of the USSR, led to the creation of a specific 
group within them, for which Islam in its radical form became the main 
element of their identity. Homo sovieticus, without fully eradicating his So-
viet part, became Homo jihadicus – who not only identifies himself with the 
global Ummah, but is also ready to leave his country and join jihad beyond 
its borders in the name of the professed ideas.
The departures are being directly caused by the events in the Middle East 
sparked by the Arab Spring (closely followed by the post-Soviet Muslims) and 
the durable character of the war in Syria. The decisions to leave are aided by 
the poor socio-economic situation in the countries of origin and repressions 
against Salafists, primarily in the Central Asian states, Russia and Azerbaijan. 
Other factors are also important, including: large-scale propaganda by Jihad-
ists (mainly on-line), the special meaning Syria – and more broadly the Levant 
– has for Islam, the close ties between the Caucasus and Syria and between the 
Central Asia and Turkey, and finally the ease of access to the conflict zone.
3. Despite the alarmist forecasts disseminated by the governments and media 
of the post-Soviet states, in the short-term perspective the departures of 
Jihadi volunteers for the Middle East (and the likelihood that they will not 
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return) is stabilising the countries of origin, since its result is the exodus 
of the most radical individuals. This phenomenon is de facto in accordance 
with the interests of the authorities. The case of the Northern Caucasus, 
where the departure of some of the militants and shift of the stream of re-
cruits to Syria contributed to establishing a relative stability during recent 
years, is symptomatic.
4. The impact of the phenomenon of volunteers departing to jihad in Syria and 
Iraq will not necessarily lead to a rise in security threats in the post-Soviet 
area in the long-term perspective, either. Many signs show, that at least 
for a major part of those leaving, it is a permanent migration – even were 
the conflict to end, they will not return to their homeland, but will rather 
move on to another hotspot in the Muslim world. Increasing numbers of 
militants who are taking their families to Syria with them implies exactly 
that. The precedent which illustrates this phenomenon are the militants of 
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), who at the turn of 1990’s and 
2000’s migrated from Central Asia to Afghanistan, and later on to Paki-
stan’s Waziristan, where they joined the global jihad. Despite the fact that 
the possibility of them returning is constantly being raised, it has never 
materialised. Regardless of this, the issue of militants fighting abroad will 
be certainly utilised by the authorities as a scare factor in both internal 
politics (as an excuse to limit civil rights or to combat the opposition) and in 
geopolitical power play (for example by Moscow to justify the need of closer 
security ties with particular states, or in its relations with the West), just 
as it has been in the case of the IMU and the Afghan threat for Central Asia.
5. The security challenges related to the participation of citizens of former 
USSR countries in jihad in the Middle East can increase only should serious 
destabilisation occur in one of the post-Soviet states (for example Uzbeki-
stan or Russia). This could mean some of the militants would indeed return, 
while the experience and contacts with international terrorism which they 
gained, could make them more dangerous than at present. Currently, how-
ever, this scenario seems far from likely: it seems impossible to stabilise 
the situation in the Middle East over the coming years, the perspective of 
collapse of one of the post-Soviet states is not evident, and, finally, the main 
enemy of the international Jihadists is not Russia or one of the former USSR 
states, but rather the Middle Eastern regimes (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, 
Iran etc). Furthermore, the returning Jihadists cannot count on wide sup-
port inside from their countries’ societies, which are rather critical of the 
demands of the radicals.
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6. There is a current trend in the region’s countries (and beyond the region) 
which is present in both politics and the media as well as the analytical re-
ports focused on the post-Soviet area to overplay the threat stemming from 
volunteers travelling to jihad in Syria in Iraq. This trend consists in exag-
gerating the Islamic threat in the former USSR states in general, and those 
associated with Salafism and militant Islam in particular. The apocalypti-
cal forecasts regarding Islamic radicalism in the post-Soviet area, despite 
the media attention they gain and their political utility, have never been 
proven to match the reality on the ground, especially in the case of the Cen-
tral Asian region. In almost all of the post-Soviet states, Islamic radicalism 
does constitute a problem, including in the security dimension. It is, how-
ever, a marginal phenomenon – only a minute part of the socio-political 
reality in this area, and one of many Islam-related problems, which sig-
nificantly vary not only between particular countries, but also regionally 
within them.
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introduction
The aim of this report is to examine a phenomenon underway since 2011 which 
involves the departure of volunteers from the post-Soviet area (the Caucasus, 
Central Asia, the Volga region, Azerbaijan, Crimea) to Syria and Iraq, where 
they participate in the civil war on behalf of various Jihadi formations, includ-
ing Islamic State. The subject of analysis is the origin of the above phenom-
enon, its forms and scale as well as the probable consequences for the states 
which these militants originate from. The report also contains a descriptive 
part dealing with particular units, leaders, data about the size and ethnic com-
position of the militant formations, routes and means of getting to Syria, re-
cruitment methods etc.
It is not enough to simply describe the militant groups active in the Middle East 
to understand the phenomenon being analysed and to verify the actual threats 
which it poses to the post-Soviet area. A close examination of the social, re-
ligious and political background they originate from, and within which they 
should be classified is necessary, as well as the overall situation with Islam, 
including Islamic radicalism, in the post-Soviet states, and the challenges as-
sociated with this issue. Therefore this publication is both a description of the 
phenomenon of the travels to jihad, as well as an attempt at a general reflection 
on the situation of Islam in the former Soviet Union.
Almost a quarter of a century has passed since the fall of USSR and the situ-
ation in the former Soviet republics differs, at times diametrically. Despite 
this, it seems appropriate to draw a distinction between the volunteers from 
the post-Soviet states and the militants from other Muslim countries. The 
immense Soviet heritage, the common usage of Russian as a lingua franca be-
tween different ethnicities, and the presence, in various forms, of all the for-
mer USSR states in Russia’s field of influence (political, informational etc.), 
mean that the post-Soviet area can still be viewed as a distinctive geopoliti-
cal and civilisational sub-region. Proof of this can be seen in the existence of 
an informal network of Salafis from the former USSR states, which is based 
on the community of the Russian language and a similar cultural code, and 
inside which a constant flow of people, ideas and information occurs. The 
phenomenon of post-Soviet militants in Syria and Iraq itself can serve as 
a further example. These militants, as with the Salafis in the former USSR 
states, create a community distinguishable from those of volunteers from the 
other Muslim states, and one way in which it expresses itself is through the 
establishment of separate militant groups.
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The characteristics and complexity of Islam, as well as the multitude and am-
biguity of the terms present in the academic publications regarding the mod-
ern currents of this religion, create the need to introduce stipulative defini-
tions which will be used in this report to describe the various aspects of the 
situation of Islam. Amongst the most important ones are:
salafi islam – a religious current in Sunni Islam inspired by the “pure” Islam, 
i.e. the one which was practiced in the first decades of its existence. Salafism 
calls for a return to the roots, it consists of far-reaching legalism and a rejec-
tion of those traditions which don’t have a basis in the Koran or the Hadith. 
Salafism as a current and phenomenon is very heterogeneous: it can have both 
an apolitical and peaceful character (Salafi communities concentrated on the 
religious life) as well as a political and militant one (the struggle, including by 
means of armed conflict, for the establishment of an Islamic state).
islamic fundamentalism – a political current in Islam which came to life af-
ter the Muslim world’s contacts with the West, it is Muslims’ reaction to mod-
ernisation and westernisation. It holds that religious factors have priority over 
secular ones and encompasses the notion of creating an Islamic state as well as 
basing the legal system on the Koran. Islamic fundamentalism is present both 
in Sunni and Shia Islam. In the case of Sunni fundamentalism, it is possible to 
track the roots of many fundamentalist movements to Salafi Islam, hence the 
two contemporary oftentimes overlap.
Militant islam/islamic radicalism – pursuing an armed and/or terrorist 
struggle in the name of the professed faith, in order to achieve political goals 
(in most cases this equates to establishing an Islamic state).
In this report the term “Wahhabism”, which has a highly negative connota-
tion in the post-Soviet discourse on Islam, is not used. The term is utilised in 
propaganda to stigmatise any independent Islam (in practice this means any 
form of Islam not related to the official one), especially Salafism. It is often 
juxtaposed in opposition to the so-called “traditional Islam” (associated with 
the official and folk Islam, in some regions also with Sufism). In reality Wah-
habism is a currently existing historic school of interpretation of the Islamic 
law and an 18th century socio-religious movement which laid the foundations 
for Saudi Arabia.
The names of groups and organisations appearing in the report will be trans-
literations from the original with included translation. In case of the militants 
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fighting in Syria and Iraq, as well as their leaders, their nom de guerre (Arabic: 
kunya) will be used and, if possible, their actual names will be provided.
The report is based on a broad-spectrum of sources: from academic research 
and analytical reports, through press publications, materials from news agen-
cies and field studies conducted by the authors, to materials produced by the 
post-Soviet militants themselves. The latter materials, due to their character, 
often change their Internet addresses, are being blocked or embedded on fo-
rums, some of which require prior registration – all of which often makes their 
subsequent verification difficult.
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i. FroM the return to Faith to jihad: salaFisM 
and Militant islaM in the post-soviet area
The primary reasons of the mass influx of volunteers from the former USSR 
states to Syria and Iraq lie in the dynamic growth of Islam which took place 
in the post-Soviet area following the collapse of the USSR. The rapid revival 
of religious life which took place there, led not only to a rise in the number of 
devout Muslims, the spread of religious practices etc, but also to the creation of 
numerous Islamic organisations, currents and groups, including those which 
were actively engaged in political life. After decades of separation from global 
Islamic life, Muslims living in the post-Soviet area once again became a part 
of the global Muslim community. This activated the turbulent process of the 
clash between the new Islamic tendencies, ideas and currents. Two processes 
in the post-Soviet Islam are key to understanding the phenomenon of the exo-
dus to Syria and Iraq: the rise of Salafism, which created the necessary ideolog-
ical foundation, and of militant Islam, which generated individuals and entire 
milieus possessing significant combat experience and ready to participate in 
armed struggle in the name of Islam.
1. soviet and post-soviet islam
In the Soviet Union practising Islam was obstructed and during some periods 
it was even combated. Official Islamic institutions did exist1, but they were 
closely associated with the state and were under constant surveillance by 
the security apparatus. Their main role was to control Muslim communities 
and they did not thus serve the purposes typical for religious institutions. 
The communist authorities were not capable of fully liquidating Islamic 
practices2, but their fight against Islam was effective enough to sever the ties 
between the Soviet Union’s Muslims and the rest of the Islamic world (which 
was going through dynamic changes), to completely dismantle the system of 
religious education3 and to hinder public religious practices. All of this led to 
1 Spiritual Boards of Muslims – in Ufa for the European part of the USSR and Siberia, in 
Makhachkala for the Northern Caucasus, in Baku for the South Caucasus and in Tashkent 
for Central Asia and Kazakhstan. 
2 In some areas Islam was practised in secret during the entire existence of the USSR. Exam-
ples of this include the Chechen Sufi brotherhoods or Islam in the rural areas in Tajikistan 
or the Uzbek part of the Fergana Valley. 
3 In the case of Islam, which as a religion constitutes also a complete legal framework, it was 
of significant importance. In the USSR the system of Islamic education was liquidated. In 
Central Asia only one madrasa in all of the USSR existed (the Mir-i Arab madrassa in 
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a reduction of the former religious customs, only some of which survived as 
folk/cultural traditions.
These conditions in the context of the fall of the USSR, the influence of Pe-
restroika, and the deep crisis of the Soviet society, led to the first Islamic in-
stitutions independent of the government starting to form. They constituted 
a de facto new, non-traditional (in the Soviet understanding) kind of Islam, 
which searched for external inspiration (but often also referred to the old lo-
cal traditions and customs). The fall of the USSR made it possible to study in 
Islamic educational centres abroad, enabled the influx of foreign religious lit-
erature etc. In a short time span it imported to the post-Soviet area the ideo-
logical disputes which were present in the Islamic world for most of the twen-
tieth century. Also “traditional” Islamic currents (for example Sufism) gained 
new followers and evolved, while their adherents and preachers were forced to 
adapt to the new, post-Soviet reality. Combined with the general renaissance of 
religion in the former USSR states, it led to the simultaneous creation and par-
allel development of various, often conflicting, Islamic currents, groups and 
institutions (amongst them the so-called Spiritual Boards of Muslims, political 
parties, Salafi communities, social organisations, Sufi brotherhoods, militant 
and/or terrorist groups). Aside from Salafism and militant Islam which are de-
scribed later on, it is possible to isolate the following currents/forms of Islam 
present in the post-Soviet area: cultural Islam, folk Islam, official Islam, Su-
fism and the Islamic fundamentalism.
The least active form of Islam is cultural Islam, which formed during the USSR’s 
existence. Its essence is the identification of the professed faith with ethnicity 
– the perception and self-perception of the representatives of particular eth-
nic groups (for example Kazakhs, Azerbaijanis or Turkmens) as Muslims by 
definition, regardless of whether they practise Islam or possess any religious 
knowledge. Despite Islam’s intensive growth, cultural Muslims are dominant 
amongst the followers of Islam on the post-Soviet area (similarly to “cultural 
Christians”, for example ethnic Armenians or Russians)4.
Folk and official Islam are also a continuation of Soviet Islam. Folk Islam is an 
unintellectual Islam, yet not one lacking ritual, thought this is often limited to 
Bukhara), but its alumni should rather be viewed as being state officials than clerics. Adeeb 
Khalid, Islam after Communism. Religion and Politics in Central Asia, Berkeley 2007, p. 110. 
4 Cara Aitchison, Peter Hopkins, Mei-Po Kwan, Geographies of Muslim Identities. Diaspora, 
Gender and Belonging, Hampshire 2007, pp. 141-165.
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the unreflective practice of particular religious customs and commandments, 
such as celebrating the most important Muslim holidays, circumcision, not 
eating pork, the cult of the holy sites etc. In Soviet times folk Islam was the ba-
sic form of Muslim religious worship5. After the fall of the USSR it did undergo 
some evolution and gained additional elements, for example the possibility of 
attending the pilgrimage to Mecca, more frequent participation in prayers etc.
Official Islam is a more complex form of Islam, with an intellectual base of 
its own. It is the Islam propagated by the official Muslim clerical apparatus, 
linked with the state authorities (and is often even created and institutionally 
controlled by the latter). In the post-Soviet settings these are called “Spiritual 
Boards of Muslims” (for example of Dagestan, Georgia or Kyrgyzstan); they are 
the heirs of similar institutions which functioned in the USSR and Tsarist Rus-
sia. The essence of official Islam is its subservient relation to the state authori-
ties, rather than belonging to a particular branch or current of Islam. In some 
countries (for example in Georgia and Azerbaijan) both Sunni and Shia com-
munities are formally governed by the same board, while in the eastern part 
of the Northern Caucasus these institutions are dominated by the Sufi broth-
erhoods. The representatives of official Islam are usually hostile towards any 
forms of Islam independent from them, especially towards Salafism6.
Sufism – a mystical current in Islam – is also present in the post-Soviet area. 
It is externally expressed by the activities of the Sufi orders. Sufism empha-
sises the need of a non-rational, mystical discovery of God, as well as the im-
portance of tradition and spiritual leaders, who act as intermediaries between 
man and God. Additionally, the Sufi orders were an important element of the 
social structure and traditionally participated in the political life. Sufism is 
particularly well developed in Chechnya, Dagestan, southern Kazakhstan, the 
Fergana Valley and Tajikistan. Amongst the most important Sufi orders active 
in the former USSR area are: Qadiriyya (Chechnya), Naqshbandi (Dagestan, 
Central Asia), Yasawiya and Kubrawiya (Central Asia)7.
Politically engaged, fundamentalist Islam has also established itself in the 
post-Soviet area. Its first occurrence was the establishment of the Islamic 
5 Ibid.
6 Np. http://www.zakon.kz/4577601-agentstvo-po-delam-religii-rk-kto-takie.html
7 Maria Elisabeth Louw, Everyday Islam in Post-Soviet Central Asia, New York 2007, 
pp. 42-62, and http://www.caucasus-survey.org/vol1-no2/downloads/The-politicization-
of-Sufism-in-Chechnya.pdf
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Renaissance Party (IRP) at the summit of Soviet Muslim intellectuals in June 
1990 in Astrakhan. The party’s main goal was to synchronise legislation with 
sharia. In the later period the IRP itself did not play any significant role, yet for 
many of its members it was an important formative experience8. The occur-
rences of Islamic fundamentalism also include the events in the Uzbek part 
of the Fergana Valley in 1990, when the Islamist organisation Adolat (Justice) 
took over the power at the local level and tried to restore public order by en-
forcing compliance with basic sharia rules (the fight with alcoholism and pros-
titution). Despite Adolat’s attempts to hold negotiations with the authorities, 
the organisation was viewed as serious threat and the authorities ultimately 
forcefully liquidated it9.
Currently the main occurrence of Islamic fundamentalism in the post-Soviet 
area is the activity of the Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT – Liberation Party) organisation10. 
Hizb ut-Tahrir is formally a political party whose aim is to re-establish the Ca-
liphate and which decries the use of violence. Despite the Hizb ut-Tahir’s goal 
being rather radical, the organisation itself as well as its methods fit within 
the political spectrum, as can be seen in the fact that it functions legally inside 
the European Union and United States, and for an extended period of time its 
headquarters was located in London (currently in Beirut)11. In the post-Soviet 
area Hizb ut-Tahrir enjoys considerable popularity amongst Muslim commu-
nities, but everywhere except for Ukraine and Georgia it is illegal and mem-
bership in it is punishable12. The persecutions of HT members result in many 
of them (usually during their stay in prison) becoming radicalised and joining 
8 Some of its branches (first of all the Tajik IRP) and individual activists (for example Dagest-
an’s Abbas brothers and Magomed Kebekov) did play an active role in the political processes 
taking place after the fall of the Soviet Union. 
9 Adolat’s leaders invited in April 1991 the then leader of the Uzbek SSR Islam Karimov to 
show him their achievements in establishing public order based on sharia and to propose 
the transfer of experience to the rest of the country (all while recognising Karimov’s au-
thority). The meeting took place in December 1991. Karimov, already the president of inde-
pendent Uzbekistan, was intimidated by the rising role of Islam, and as soon as he strength-
ened his position, he ordered liquidation of Adolat by force, including brutal repressions of 
its followers. More in: Stanisław Zapaśnik, „Walczący islam” w Azji Centralnej. Problem 
społecznej genezy zjawiska, Wrocław 2006, p. 80.
10 The other organisations play a marginal role (for example Takfir wal Hijrah) or have limit-
ed area of operations (for example Tablighi Jamaat in Kyrgyzstan which declares it is apo-
litical and yet actively pursues influence among the political elite). 
11 http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/info/
12 http://anhor.uz/society/v-uzbekistane-raskrili-religiozno-ekstremistskuyu-organizaci-
yu-hizb-ut-tahrir or http://news.tj/en/news/trial-seven-alleged-hizb-ut-tahrir-activists-
starts-khujand
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the ranks of militant Islamic organisations13 which paradoxically are hostile 
towards Hizb ut-Tahrir, as it criticises jihad and uses peaceful methods14.
2. salafism in the post-soviet area
Salafism is the most important and the most dynamically growing current 
of independent Islam in the post-Soviet area. It is an extreme current inside 
Sunni Islam, its characteristics include far-reaching puritanism and legalism 
(all actions must be justified by the Koran and Hadith), as well as a rejection of 
traditions, i.e. superfluities to the pure, primary Islam, which the Salafis re-
fer to. Salafism is negatively or even hostilely viewed by the authorities of the 
post-Soviet states, and similarly it is in conflict with both the traditional folk 
Islam15 and official Islam16.
The rise of Salafism in the post-Soviet area was possible due to several factors: 
a partial reintegration of this area with the Islamic world, the emergence of re-
ligious leaders educated abroad and possessing the necessary religious knowl-
edge, and also fast and simple access to the information on Salafism. Salafism’s 
growth was also facilitated by several social factors: the identity crisis of the 
post-Soviet societies, the lack of a real and available religious alternative17, the 
poor socio-economic situation, the weakness of the state and, finally, the injus-
tice and corruption of the authorities. At the level of individual and small local 
communities, Salafism works as an instant remedy for some of these problems. 
Post-Soviet Salafism is therefore a result of the internal social processes and 
authentic considerations, rather than of an external inspiration. It is a form 
of substituting the mechanisms of state and society, neither of which function 
properly in the post-Soviet reality. It is also important to bear in mind how 
13 Statements of the IMU members, who formerly where Hizb ut-Tahrir members and served 
prison sentences for that can serve as proof of this. After being released they joined the 
IMU. Based on materials published by the IMU, available at: http://www.jundurrahmon.
biz/index.php/filmlar
14 Based on statements of Tahir Yuldashev in IMU’s release Obrashcheniya 1, available at: 
http://www.jundurrahmon.com/jundulloh_filmlar/rus_tili/obrashenie_1.avi 
15 First of all with Sufi Islam, extremely severe conflict (often in the form of violence and ter-
rorist attacks) can be seen in Dagestan. For example the murder of the Sufi Sheikh Said 
Afandi Chirkawi in August 2012. 
16 Official Islamic institutions, endorsed by the authorities, exist in all the former USSR states. 
17 Official Islam still remains under the strict control of the authorities, which in post-Soviet 
settings means that the official Islamic institutions are engaged in anti-Salafist propagan-
da, surveillance of independent groups and the corruption linked with organising the pil-
grimages to Mecca (the cost of the pilgrimage reach several thousand dollars). 
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attractive Salafism (which is often viewed as the pure, most orthodox Islam) is 
for converts and individuals returning to faith (almost all post-Soviet Muslims 
can be treated as such). This results in a general rise in Salafism’s importance 
worldwide (including in Europe).
In the post-Soviet area Salafism constitutes an amorphous, decentralised and 
multi-sided religious movement. It is a grassroots movement without a single 
leadership, although leaders who gather followers around themselves do exist. 
Salafism does not automatically translate into militancy – the view on armed 
jihad is one of the main rifts among the internally divided and diverse post-So-
viet Salafists. No single social profile of a Salafist exists – both the educated and 
wealthy and the uneducated and poor, residents of large urban agglomerations 
and villagers are Salafists. One can derive only two main criteria of systemati-
sation of the Salafists: the view on jihad and the so-called “folk Salafism”. Some 
of the post-Soviet Salafists (concentrated around militant organisations, such as 
the Caucasus Emirate) hold that jihad is a duty, while the majority hold that the 
current settings do not meet the requirements set in the Koran for the neces-
sity of jihad18. The second criterion is the degree of knowledge of Salafism itself. 
While some of the post-Soviet Salafists are fluent in Russian (which is the lan-
guage of communication of Salafists in the post-Soviet area), and try to enrich 
their religious knowledge19 and actively engage in ideological disputes (including 
ones within the Salafi community), the so-called folk Salafists profess a simpli-
fied version of Salafism, which is superficial and lacking the intellectual dimen-
sion. Its adherents are above all focused on the external signs of Salafism (long 
beard, trousers not covering the ankles etc.), and not on its theological aspects. 
Neither of these criteria are exact, since many variations exist – for example 
both educated and folk Salafists can be supporters of waging jihad.
It is hard to pinpoint the exact number of Salafists in the post-Soviet area, 
however it can be estimated at around several hundred thousand people. This 
makes them a minority amongst the post-Soviet Muslims, but there are a few 
regions where they dominate20. In such regions Salafists often have their own 
mosques, in other places they pray at homes (more rarely, in Hanafi, Sunni 
mosques). In cities where there are Salafi communities (even though they 
there are still a minority amongst the local Muslims) Salafi organisations and 
18 Jihad in Syria is different in this regard – see chapter II.
19 For example: http://salaf-forum.com/
20 Some areas of Dagestan, Pankisi Gorge in Georgia.
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institutions are active. Such centres of Salafism include Moscow, St. Petersburg 
and Makhachkala – in other cities Salafists act in a more informal manner. De-
spite relatively small numbers, Salafism is a dynamically growing movement 
(there are more young people among Salafists), whose followers actively utilise 
new technologies to proselytise21.
The reaction of the authorities to occurrences of Salafism in the post-Soviet area 
is generally negative. In some countries (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan)22 it is forbidden 
by law, in others (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan) 
Salafists are persecuted with mixed intensity as potential/alleged terrorists23. 
Only in two states of the region does Salafism not meet with a negative reac-
tion from the authorities – in Ukraine (Crimean Tatars) 24 and in Georgia (Pankisi 
Gorge). The persecutions from the authorities usually lead to results opposite to 
those desired: instead of discouraging potential Salafists, they cause the radical-
isation of entire Salafi communities. At times (for example in Kazakhstan) this 
even results in terrorist activity being undertaken by them. It is also important 
to bear in mind that the issue of threats stemming from radical Islam is being 
instrumentally utilised by the governments of these states to strengthen their 
position, combat opposition, retain a firm grip on society and to legitimise all of 
the above actions on the international arena25.
the radicalisation of salafists in Kazakhstan
The unprecedented series of terrorist attacks that took place in Kazakhstan 
in 2011 and 2012 serve as a vivid illustration of the process of radicalisation 
of Salafists due to actions taken by the authorities, as well as of the conse-
quences of this. Salafism was burgeoning in Kazakhstan, in the south of 
the country and also its western part, where ties with the Salafists from 
Dagestan are visible. Kazakh Salafists were subject to persecution from the 
authorities (it is hard to determine whether it was planned state policy or 
merely the exploits of the local law-enforcement officers). This resulted in 
them migrating (for example the emigration of 200 Salafists to the Czech 
21 For example Salafi internet sites, such as: http://salafportal.ws/ or http://саляф.рф), social 
media (for example http://vk.com/club10146481 and http://vk.com/salafteam) etc. Even 
some Salafi publishing houses exist, for example: http://www.ummah.ru
22 For example: http://tajikta.tj/news/detail.php?ID=6108
23 See the box below “The radicalisation of Salafists in Kazakhstan”. 
24 The situation has changed diametrically after the annexation of Crimea by Russia. 
25 It is especially true in the case of Uzbekistan. 
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Republic in 200926 or the appearance of Kazakh volunteers in the ranks 
of the IMU and IJU – the Islamic Jihad Union27). The situation changed at 
the turn of 2010 and 2011. At first the Salafists used their contacts with 
the representatives of the Caucasus Emirate to ensure that waging jihad 
in Kazakhstan was compliant with sharia (which shows their extensive 
legalism)28. On 17th of May 2011 they conducted the first suicide attack on 
the headquarters of the National Security Committee (KNB) in Aktobe (the 
first terrorist attack in Kazakhstan)29. During the next year a number of at-
tacks aimed at the security forces took place in Kazakhstan (mainly in the 
western part of the country, but also in the vicinity of Almaty) resulting in 
a death toll of at least 4030.
The attacks were not perpetrated by any terrorist organisation but by the 
local, radicalised Salafists, who acted in an atomised, grass-roots manner. 
Nevertheless, the international Islamic terrorist organisations did attempt 
to exploit the events in Kazakhstan for their benefit. Soon after the first at-
tack a previously unknown organisation Jund al-Khilafah (the Soldiers of 
the Caliphate) took responsibility for it, and threatened to launch new at-
tacks31. All evidence available, however, suggests that Jund al-Khilafah was 
a virtual entity, created by the Islamic Jihad Union acting on the behalf of 
al-Qaeda, in order to take advantage of the wave of attacks for propaganda 
purposes32. The Kazakh government was capable of quickly stabilising the 
situation by mass arrests and convictions of individuals suspected of ter-
rorism (about 500 people). In the long term perspective one can observe 
Astana’s engagement of official Islamic structures in form of the Spiritual 
Board of Muslims of Kazakhstan (SBMK) and the utilisation of peaceful 
26 http://www.rferl.org/content/Kazakh_Salafis_Face_Deportation_From_Czech_Repub-
lic/1380886.html
27 http://www.sehadetzamani.com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=2498
28 Sharia inquiry on the Ingush website of the Caucasus Emirate: http://hunafa.com/2010/09/
fatva-o-dzhixade-protiv-kazaxstanskoj-policii/ and http://hunafa.com/2011/03/vopros-o-
zakonnosti-voennyx-dejstvij-v-kazaxstane/
29 http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1305649920
30 Further in: Józef Lang, Kazakhstan is combating Islamic terrorism, OSW Analyses, 17.10.2012, 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2012-10-17/kazakhstan-combating-isla-
mic-terrorism
31 http://ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=36968
32 The organisation was led by Abu Moez (Moezeddine Garsallaoui), a Swiss citizen of Tuni-
sian descent, linked with al Qaeda – http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/10/
jund_al_khilafah_emi.php
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Salafi leaders who are respected throughout the Russian-speaking sphere33. 
This turned out to be an effective (since then there have been no terrorist 
attacks in Kazakhstan) but uncommon practice in the post-Soviet area.
3. Militant islam after the fall of the ussr
Militant Islam in the post-Soviet area underwent through a long evolution – 
from the participation of organisations with a declared Islamic character in 
the local armed conflicts which took place after the collapse of the USSR, to 
the modern, internationalised Islamic terrorist organisations. An important 
aspect of this phenomenon was its gradual internationalisation and globalisa-
tion, the most vivid example of which is the participation of post-Soviet Mus-
lims in the jihad outside of their countries’ borders – at first in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, and then in Syria and Iraq.
The first conflicts where militant Islam appeared were the wars in Tajikistan 
and Chechnya. Both of these conflicts are often portrayed as a struggle be-
tween Islamic militancy and the state (especially the war in Tajikistan), yet 
despite the presence of Islamic organisations, religion did not play a significant 
role in them. It was treated rather instrumentally, as an important part of the 
ethnic identity (Chechnya) or as idea which could unite the anti-government 
opposition members and serve as a reference to the legend of Afghan mujahi-
din (Tajikistan). The conflicts, however, did play a key role in the establish-
ment of militant, radical Islam in the post-Soviet area. In other words, it was 
the Islamic factor that was superimposed on the above conflicts (two of many 
which took place after the fall of the USSR), and it were these wars that enabled 
the establishment of radical Islamic militancy, not the other way around.
The civil war in Tajikistan34, one of the sides in which was the Tajik Islam-
ic Revival Party, was for the most part not an ideological conflict but rather 
a regional clan struggle for power in the newly established state, sparked off 
by a set of social, political and economic factors. Nevertheless, it was the first 
conflict in the post-Soviet area in which Islamic radicals had participated. The 
33 An example of this is Rinat abu Muhammad al Kazakhstani (Rinat Zaynulin), an Almaty-
based Salafi preacher, who is popular in the whole Russian-speaking sphere. Zaynullin is 
against waging jihad on the post-Soviet area, and while fundamental in his message, is sup-
portive towards the government, http://salaf.kz/?p=870
34 The war started in 1992 and ended in 1997. It was the bloodiest conflict in the post-Soviet 
area, resulting in the death of about 100,000 people and generating 1.2 million refugees. 
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latter included both post-Soviet militants – such as the fugitives from the Uz-
bek Fergana Valley under the command of Juma Namangani – and foreign ones 
– primarily the unit led by Khattab, a former Saudi foreign fighter in Afghani-
stan, who recognised that the war in Tajikistan did not have a strictly Islamic 
character and so left for Chechnya35.
After the end of the civil war in Tajikistan, Central Asia witnessed events 
showing the establishment of authentic radical Islamic militancy in the region. 
These were the establishment of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in 
1998 by the fugitives from the Fergana Valley and veterans of the Tajik civil 
war, as well as the so-called “Batken crises” (in 1999 and 2000)36, caused by the 
IMU. Despite its name, the IMU had Islamic radicals in its ranks not only from 
Uzbekistan, but from the entire region. Its goal was the establishment of an 
Islamic state in Uzbekistan. This movement is recognised as a terrorist organi-
sation and from the beginning of its existence it has had strong ties with the 
Afghan Taliban (which provided it with a safe haven in the northern Afghani-
stan) and al-Qaeda. In 2001 the IMU fought on the side of the Taliban against 
the Northern Alliance and the US forces in Afghanistan. During the war the 
movement suffered heavy casualties and was forced to flee to the Pakistani 
tribal areas (mainly to Waziristan).
The first Chechen war (1994-1996), which received much more international 
coverage than the conflict in Tajikistan, also did not have a religious character. 
It was a war for national independence in which Islam (mostly not of a funda-
mental, but rather Sufi kind) played a secondary role. It served above all as an 
addition to the national ideology and, to some degree, as a platform allowing 
for the support (mainly financial) of the Muslim world to be secured. Similar-
ly the presence of a few foreign volunteers (for example the above mentioned 
Khattab) was positively viewed by the Chechen leaders, who treated Islam in-
strumentally, and whose main goal was the independence of Chechnya.
35 Based on Khattab’s memoirs, available at: https://ia601209.us.archive.org/0/items/TheMem-
oriesOfAmirKhattabTheExperienceOfTheArabAnsarInChechnya/Memories.pdf
36 IMU militant raids on the Kyrgyz Batken province, and in 2000 further fighting took place 
on the territory of Uzbekistan. The declarative goal of the militants was to initiate an Islam-
ic revolution in the Fergana Valley, though seizing the Uzbek exclave of Sokh. The fighting 
took place in mountainous terrain. The IMU’s forces were about 300 strong in 1999 and 
about 600 strong a year later. Both of the raids ended with defeat for the IMU, and they re-
sulted in the IMU being permanently resettled to the Afghan cities of Kunduz and Mazar-i 
Sharif, at that time controlled by the Taliban. 
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Militant Islam gained its political significance during the inter-war period 
(1996-1999), when Chechnya was a quasi-independent state (not controlled by 
Moscow, but lacking recognition on the international arena). At that time two 
parallel, yet at times overlapping, processes took place. On one hand some of 
the Chechen politicians and warlords (mainly those gathered around Shamil 
Basayev and Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev), due to both ideological reasons and po-
litical calculations, started to voice radical Islamic slogans, propagating the 
transformation of Chechnya into an Islamic state and the “liberation” of Dag-
estan from the Russian yoke. They cooperated with both foreign fighters and 
missionaries, as well as with Dagestani radicals (such as Bagauddin Kebedov, 
Adallo Aliyev and others). On the other hand the fundamentalist slogans be-
came a cover for the actions of numerous criminal groups, which operated on 
a large scale in chaos-torn Chechnya, and whose activities were supported by 
the Russian intelligence services, which aimed to discredit the Chechen inde-
pendence movement. When in 1997 Aslan Maskhadov, a secular politician rep-
resenting the national independence ideology, was elected president, he tried 
to curb the influence of the radicals and combat the criminal gangs, but his 
power was too weak to achieve these goals.
The activities of the Chechen and Dagestani radicals, as well as the presence of 
organised crime gave Moscow the excuse to initiate the second Chechen war 
(autumn of 1999). Its direct causes were the incursion of Chechen and Dagest-
ani militants on Dagestan, and a series of terrorist attacks in Russia (Moscow, 
Buynaksk, Volgodonsk), which were most probably organised by the Russian 
security services37. The Chechen forces were crushed within several months 
and forced to turn to guerrilla warfare. Over the following years Islamic radi-
cals began to take the lead in the fighting, while the conflict in the Northern 
Caucasus morphed from the Chechnya-only struggle for national independ-
ence to the jihad that lasts to this day and which encompasses other republics 
of the region (Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria etc.). The culmination 
of the ideological evolution of the militancy was the liquidation of the Chechen 
Republic of Ichkeria and establishment of the Caucasus Emirate in 200738.
37 Such a scenario was revealed by the former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko, who was 
killed by Russian intelligence services in 2005 in London. 
38 More on the above mentioned evolution in: Maciej Falkowski, Chechnya: Between a Cauca-
sian Jihad and ‘hidden’ separatism, OSW Point of View, January 2007, http://www.osw.waw.
pl/sites/default/files/punkt_widzenia_13.pdf and Wojciech Górecki, No change in the Rus-
sian Caucasus. The Winter Olympics amid a local war, OSW Studies, January 2014, http://
www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/praceosw-47-rosyjski_kaukaz_ang-net.pdf 
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The existence of a miniature Islamic quasi-state in the central part of Dagestan 
is also often regarded as a case of militant Islam in the 1990s – the so-called 
Kadar zone (several Dargin villages in the Buynaksk district, including Kadar, 
Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi). In reality the origins of establishing “free Islamic 
territory”, the introduction of sharia and the expulsion of the representatives 
of the Dagestani authorities from those villages, lie in the social problems (cor-
ruption, limits set on entrepreneurship, the persecution of inhabitants), which 
many believed could be solved by Islamic fundamentalism. The inhabitants of 
the Kadar zone resorted to armed struggle only after being attacked by the 
Russian army in September 199939.
On the eve of the civil war in Syria, post-Soviet radical Islamic militancy was con-
centrated around two forces – the Caucasus Emirate (IK) in the Northern Caucasus 
and the Central Asian Islamic radicals gathered in the Islamic Movement of Uz-
bekistan and Islamic Jihad Union40, fighting in Pakistan and Afghanistan41.
the caucasus emirate
According to the militants’ propaganda, the Caucasus Emirate is an Islamic 
state, currently occupied by Russia. In reality it is a virtual entity which 
in the ideological dimension unites the clandestine Islamic militancy ac-
tive in the Caucasus. It is headed by an emir; until April 2015 this was Dag-
estan’s Aliaskhab Kebekov aka Ali Abu Muhammad, who was killed in 
a special operation by the Russian security forces in Buynaksk, Dagestan. 
IK is a network organisation comprised of loosely associated autonomous 
guerrilla groups (operating within particular vilayats – virtual territo-
rial divisions). Besides representatives of various ethnicities present in 
the Caucasus, IK has in its ranks volunteers from other parts of Russian, 
including ethnic Russians who have converted to Islam42. At several times 
the Caucasian militants perpetrated terrorist attacks inside Russia. The 
militants also actively engage in propaganda, mainly through the use of the  
39 More in: Enver Kisriev, Islam i vlast’ v Dagestane, Moscow 2004.
40 Organisation created as a result of a split in the IMU in 2004. 
41 More on the IMU and IJU in: Józef Lang, The radical Islamic militants of Central Asia, OSW 
Report, November 2013, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/report_the-radical-is-
lamic-militants.pdf 
42 For example the well-known Salafi leader – Said Buryatsky (Alexandr Tikhomirov), ethni-
cally half Russian, half Buryat, convert to Islam, who at first advocated against the jihad in 
the Caucasus, but later joined the IK militants and was killed in 2010 in Ingushetia. 
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Internet43. As a result of the brutal antiterrorist measures undertaken by 
the Russian security services and Chechnya’s president Ramzan Kadyrov’s 
units, as well as the schism which took place on the turn of 2014 and 2015 
(renouncing loyalty to the emir and a substantial part of the combat groups 
swearing an oath to the leader of Islamic State), the Caucasus Emirate is 
currently in a severely weakened state.
the islamic Movement of uzbekistan and the islamic jihad union
Radical Islamic militants from Central Asia are concentrated around two 
international terrorist organisations – the Islamic Movement of Uzbeki-
stan created in 1998, and the Islamic Jihad Union, which split from the IMU 
in 2004. After the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001 the IMU 
resettled to the Pakistani tribal areas, where it regained its strength and in-
tegrated into the network of Islamic terrorist organisations present there. 
Both of these organisations possess terrorist infrastructure (leadership, 
rear elements, training camps etc.) in Pakistan’s Northern Waziristan44, 
they are actively engaged in armed combat on the side of the Taliban in 
northern Afghanistan45, and in the past have attempted to conduct ter-
rorist attacks in the United States and Europe46. Contrary to most Islamic 
terrorist organisations, the IMU does not have a unified religious ideology, 
and amongst its members there are also Islamic radicals who do not adhere 
to Islam’s fundamentalist currents47.
As a result of the civil war in Syria on-going since 2011, the influx of recruits 
to the IMU and the IJU has significantly decreased, yet these organisations 
still remain a serious security threat48.
43 Examples of this are websites such as: http://hunafa.com/, http://vdagestan.com/ or the 
targeted at Western audience Kavkaz Center website – http://kavkazcenter.com/eng/ 
44 As a result of the military operation of Pakistani forces underway since the summer of 2014 
and aimed at combating the foreign fighters in the Northern Waziristan, some of the IMU’s 
and IJU’s infrastructure was destroyed. Members of these organisations are also relocating 
in large numbers to Afghanistan’s Kunduz province, leading to a deterioration in the secu-
rity situation in this province. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-next-round-of-
the-tug-of-war-over-kunduz/
45 The Taliban, as a Pashtun movement, were incapable of operating successfully in the north-
ern parts of Afghanistan, inhabited mostly by Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmen. The IMU’s en-
gagement on the side of the Taliban resulted in a significant deterioration in the security 
situation in the previously peaceful north of the country. 
46 http://www.rferl.org/content/uzbekistan_united_states_obama_islamic_movement/ 244 
-80474.html
47 More in: The radical Islamic, op. cit.
48 As can be seen for example in the IMU’s attack on Karachi airport on 8th of June 2014. As a re-
sult of the attack 36 people were killed, and the airport itself severely damaged. http://www.
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Regardless of its goal of establishing an Islamic State in the Caucasus and a live-
ly interest in jihad worldwide, until recently it was impossible to include the 
Caucasus Emirate in the global Jihad movement. Despite ideological proximity 
with other Jihadi movements (in Afghanistan or in the Arab world), the war in 
Caucasus had a local character – the Caucasian militants (especially Chechens) 
did not participate in armed conflicts in the other parts of the world, while 
foreign fighters were rarely present in the Caucasus49.
The Central Asian Islamic radicals gathered in the IMU and IJU chose a different 
path – both of these organisations integrated into the international terrorist net-
work in Afghanistan and Pakistan. While their leaders were still the militants 
from Uzbekistan, and their declared goal remained the establishment of an Is-
lamic state in Central Asia, these organisations lost their Central Asian character 
and focused on fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan on the side of the Taliban and 
al-Qaeda (treating Central Asia only as a source of recruits, rather than a theatre of 
operations). Their role as a training centre for foreign Jihadists is especially impor-
tant – prior to the civil war in Syria the IMU and IJU were the main Islamic terror-
ist organisations recruiting Islamic radicals from Europe and the pioneers of such 
actions conducted on a large scale (both of these organisations also attempted to 
conduct terrorist attacks in Western Europe50). The IMU and IJU were also active 
in producing Jihadi propaganda targeted at Islamic radicals in Europe – at its peak, 
as many as several hundred volunteers from Europe fought in their ranks, pre-
dominantly Germans (both German citizens – migrants from Muslim countries, 
and ethnic Germans who had converted to Islam)51.
All of the above factors enabled the post-Soviet area to become a recruitment 
ground for the Jihadists in Syria and Iraq. The changes taking place in this area 
during the last twenty five years resulted in the reintegration to the Islamic 
world of at least a part of post-Soviet Muslims, hence also their participation in 
reuters.com/article/2014/06/11/us-pakistan-militants-idUSKBN0EM14L20140611 and http://
jundurrahmon.biz/index.php/text/bayonot/456-karochi-tayyoragohiga-bolgan-fidoiy-
amaliyot-borasida-bildirish
49 For example the volunteers from Kazakhstan are an exception to this. http://tengrinews.
kz/crime/kazahstanets-osujden-v-dagestane-v-sostave-diversionno-terroristicheskoy-
gruppyi-255570/
50 In 2007 in Germany and in 2010 in several countries of Western Europe. An Albanian Islam-
ic radical inspired by the attack perpetrated by the IMU inside Frankfurt airport in 2011, 
while IJU trained Mohammad Merra killed 7 people in Toulouse in 2012. More in: The radi-
cal Islamic, op. cit.
51 In total around 200 Germans. Besides Germans citizens of France, Holland, Spain, Switzer-
land, the United Kingdom and several other European states were also present. Ibid.
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the processes and currents present in the Islamic world, including the radical 
ones associated with jihad. Additionally, the armed conflicts which took place 
after the fall of the USSR generated a peculiar group of individuals possessing 
combat experience, and in some cases (militancy in the Caucasus, the IMU), also 
radical Islamic beliefs. They not only served as a source of potential recruits, but 
mainly as a cultural role model of the modern post-Soviet jihad – this also ena-
bled the phenomenon of mass departures of volunteers to Syria and Iraq.
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ii. origins oF the inFlux oF volunteers to syria
The phenomenon of post-Soviet Muslims going abroad to participate in jihad 
is not a new one, but in the past it mainly involved the citizens of the Central 
Asian states and Azerbaijan, with Afghanistan and Pakistan being chief war-
migration destinations (a small number of militants also volunteered for jihad 
in the Northern Caucasus). Hundreds of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, 
and to a lesser extent also Turkmens and Azerbaijanis, since the late 1990’s have 
left their countries to participate in jihad, mainly, in the ranks of the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (currently departures to Syria are more frequent)52. 
A number of Russian Muslims (mainly Tatars and inhabitants of the Northern 
Caucasus, but also ethnic Russians who have converted to Islam) also joined the 
ranks of the IMU, al-Qaeda and the Taliban, yet this phenomenon never became 
large scale53. Excepting individual cases, Muslims from the Northern Caucasus 
and Georgia did not participate in the conflicts outside of their homelands (an 
exception to this rule was participation in 1992-1993 of the volunteers from the 
Northern Caucasus in the Abkhazian-Georgian war on the side of Abkhazia, 
though it was not the religion, but solidarity with the Caucasian brethren that 
served as the motivation). Now, though, the militants from the Northern Cauca-
sus clearly dominate (both in terms of numbers and their position in the hierar-
chy54) amongst the post-Soviet Jihadists in Syria and Iraq.
The phenomenon of mass departures (counted in the thousands) of the post-
Soviet Muslims for the jihad (see the next chapter for statistics) calls for an 
attempt to answer what the reasons are for this phenomenon. Varying socio-
political circumstances in each of the former USSR states and regions, as well 
as differing, at times diametrically, motivations guiding the volunteers leaving 
for jihad, make it impossible to create a single, typical profile of a post-Soviet 
Jihadist. Nevertheless, it is possible to produce a catalogue of the general condi-
tions and personal motivations which lie behind both the described phenom-
enon and the departures of individual volunteers.
52 For further information about volunteers from the Central Asian states fighting in Afghan-
istan and Pakistan, as well as on the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan see: The radical Is-
lamic, op. cit. 
53 Eight citizens of the Russian Federation fighting in Afghanistan on the side of the Taliban 
prior to 2001 were held in the Guantanamo Bay prison. The most famous Russian prisoner 
was Ayrat Vakhitov aka Salman Bulgarsky of Tatarstan. After spending several years in 
Russia (2004-2013) he joined the jihad in Syria. 
54 For example the high-rank of Omar Shishani (Tarkhan Batirashvili) in the ranks of Islamic 
State – he is the organisation’s top military commander in Syria.
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1. ideological reasons
The primary cause, without which the described phenomenon could not come 
to exist, is the development and growth of the Salafi communities in the post-
Soviet area, as well as their internationalisation and globalisation. The pro-
cess, described in greater detail in the previous chapter, led to the establish-
ment of strong, autonomous Salafi communities in all areas of the former USSR 
inhabited by Muslims. Despite this, everywhere, except for the Pankisi Gorge 
in Georgia and Crimea prior to the Russian occupation, Salafists face more or 
less harsh repressions from the state structures55. The movement is developing 
dynamically – furthermore, in most cases it happens on an endogenic basis, 
without substantial external financial or organisational support56. In some re-
gions, such as Dagestan or Pankisi, Salafism is even becoming the main Islamic 
current amongst the younger generation.
With regard to the volunteers departing for the jihad in Syria and Iraq, the 
key role was played by the evolution of identity which those communities un-
derwent – from the Soviet-system based identification with one’s ethnic group 
to the sense of belonging to the Ummah – the global Muslim community. Lo-
cally acting communities, with a mindset which does not extend beyond their 
countries’ or region’s borders, mainly due to the availability of modern com-
munication technologies, transformed (in the ideological, not organisational 
dimension) into a network, operating above all in the former USSR, but to some 
extent also in the entire Islamic world. That did not mean they entirely shed 
their Soviet mentality, but that they rather intertwined it with the sense of 
community with the world of Islam. This change in self-identification enabled 
the creation of a peculiar group among the post-Soviet Salafists. For the mem-
bers of this group, belonging to the Islamic world includes the need to partici-
pate in the jihad wherever they deem it to be justified. This Homo jihadicus is 
a link between the global radical Islam and the post-Soviet Muslim communi-
ties. Considering themselves to be part of the Islamic world, they can navigate 
inside the Islamic terrorist international. Simultaneously, retaining their So-
vietness, they can effectively influence the post-Soviet Islamic communities, 
55 The scale and strength of repressions is different in all of the post-Soviet states and varies 
during different periods. Also some of the legislation discriminating the Salafists are diffi-
cult or even impossible to enforce (for example effective blocking of Internet services). 
56 Such ideological, financial and organisational support did take place in the 1990s, when 
Salafi activists from outside of the former USSR were active in the post-Soviet area. Cur-
rently, even if such actions do take place, they play a marginal role. 
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with whom they still have a common cultural code. It was the establishment 
of the phenomenon of Homo jihadicus which directly enabled the volunteers 
departing to Syria and Iraq in large numbers.
The Middle East, previously viewed by Soviet Muslims as an unfamiliar, for-
eign world, has become a homeland for the post-Soviet Salafists, while the 
events taking place there are just as important as those in their home coun-
tries (and at times even more so). This evolution is especially symptomatic in 
the case of the Chechens, who traditionally had regarded themselves as being 
unique and distinctive, and viewed the Arabs, Afghans and Turks as inferior, 
and now make up the spearhead of the post-Soviet volunteers in Syria and Iraq, 
fighting side by side with representatives of other ethnicities in the ranks of 
joint militant groups. This was made possible by the ideological evolution – 
from nationalism to Jihadism – that has taken place in the Chechen militancy 
over the course of the last twenty years57.
Armed conflicts in the post-Soviet area were also an equally important facili-
tator of travels to jihad. In some of them Muslims fought under the banners of 
militant Islam (for example the IMU’s raids in Central Asia). In others their 
participation was motivated by other factors, but the Islamic component was 
nevertheless present (the civil war in Tajikistan, both of the Chechen wars). 
These conflicts played a formative role in both the ideological (for example the 
Islamisation of the Chechen independence movement) and the military (gain-
ing combat experience) dimensions. The Chechen conflict, which gradually 
evolved into the North Caucasian conflict (the struggle for the Caucasus Emir-
ate), due to its long-lasting character, scale and ideological evolution (from 
a war for national independence to jihad) was of great significance in this di-
mension. The rise of militant Islam was also, at least to a certain extent, in-
fluenced by Russia’s instrumental utilisation of it in the political power plays 
both domestically and in the post-Soviet area (for example the de facto support 
the Russian security services gave to the Salafi militant groups in Chechnya 
in 1996-1999, in order to destabilise the situation in the republic and gain an 
argument for a military intervention).
57 Further on the above mentioned evolution in: Maciej Falkowski, Chechnya: Between a Cauca-
sian Jihad and ‘hidden’ separatism, OSW Point of View, January 2007, http://www.osw.waw.pl/
sites/default/files/punkt_widzenia_13.pdf and Maciej Falkowski, On the periphery of global 
jihad. The North Caucasus: the illusion of stabilisation, OSW Point of View, November 2014, 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/pw_46_ang_kaukaz-polnocny_net.pdf
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The development of globally–thinking Salafi communities with strong sense 
of solidarity with the Islamic Word, as well as the existence of the battle-hard-
ened Islamic veterans of the post-Soviet conflicts, created the human resourc-
es base for the recruitment of those leaving for the Middle East. The existence 
of this social base served as the foundation for the phenomenon of mass depar-
tures for jihad.
2. exceptionality of syria in the Muslim perception
The participation of volunteers from the former USSR in the conflict in Middle 
East would not have achieved its large-scale character, if not for the special 
place that Iraq and especially Syria (more specifically Sham – the Levant – the 
region encompassing Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine) hold in the mind-
set of Sunni Muslims worldwide. Both of these states are regarded by Muslims 
as among the most important and holy places, subordinated only to Mecca and 
Medina (viewed through this lens, Afghanistan is a remote periphery of the 
Islamic world). It was Damascus (7th-8th centuries) and Baghdad (8th-13th cen-
turies) that hosted the caliphate – the idealised Islamic state, which Islamic 
fundamentalists worldwide dream of restoring. The uniqueness of Syria is also 
caused by the Hadiths58, according to which one of the many signs forecasting 
the apocalyptic times will be a war in this country, and also from here a new 
period of the advance of Islam will begin59. Similarly, it is in Syria or Iraq, that 
the second coming of prophet Isa (Jesus) will take place, preceding the Day of 
Judgement. It is of real importance that the transcendence and special historic 
character of the jihad in Syria is deliberately emphasised in the propaganda 
aimed at recruiting volunteers for jihad, both by the organisations fighting 
there and by radical preachers supportive of it (for example Dagestan’s Abu 
Omar Sasitlinsky).
Syria also has close ties with the Northern Caucasus. In the 19th century tens 
of thousands of the so-called muhajirs – Caucasian emigrants (predominantly 
Chechens, Circassians and Dagestanis) settled in this part of the Ottoman Em-
pire after voluntarily or being ejected from the Russian-conquered Caucasus. 
Their communities, and links with the Caucasus, survive to the present day. 
The fact that Syria was one of the most popular destinations for studying abroad 
amongst the Caucasus’s youth, is also of great importance. The reasons for that 
58 Religious texts recalling the life of the Prophet Mohammad – along with the Koran they are 
Islam’s main basis for legal norms and traditions. 
59 For example Bukhari 6592, Tirmidhi 2243, Ibn Majah 4088. 
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were, paradoxically, the good Soviet, and later Russian, relations with Assad-
ruled Syria, which was viewed by Moscow as a country where moderate Islam 
is dominant, hence the Russian authorities did not obstruct those wishing to go 
there to study. The effect of this was the establishment of a new, several thou-
sand strong Caucasian diaspora in Syria (the largest being the Chechen and Dag-
estani ones), mainly in Damascus and Aleppo. Some of these communities had 
a Salafi character, which is why the first Caucasian volunteers who joined the 
jihad originated from them. The inhabitants of the Caucasus also frequently en-
gaged in low-level trade and smuggling in Syria, for example during the Hajj (the 
buses with pilgrims, mainly from Dagestan, often travelled to Saudi Arabia via 
Syria, especially after the beginning of the war in Iraq in 2003).
One of the reasons for such a large scale of the described phenomenon is un-
doubtedly the unprecedented and dynamic character of the events taking place 
in the Middle East over the last couple of years. The Arab Spring, which began 
with the revolution in Tunisia and which was watched closely by post-Soviet 
Muslims, was viewed as the beginning of Islamic world’s awakening, rousing 
it from the centuries-long stagnation and its dependence on the West. The pro-
longed war in Syria became, in the perception of most of the Salafi milieus, 
a “true” and “pure” jihad, which is to be supported by every pious Muslim, ac-
cording to his capabilities60.
The logistical issues also aid the departures to Syria. Getting there is not a prob-
lem for the inhabitants of most of the post-Soviet countries, with Turkey being 
the transit state. It has liberal visa policy, does not hinder crossing its border 
with Syria, and has, to put it mildly, an ambiguous policy towards the radical 
Islamic opposition in Syria. With regard to transportation, the Caucasus, Rus-
sia and Central Asia are also well-connected with Turkey.
3. jihadist propaganda
The decisions to depart for Syria are most often made under the influence of Ji-
hadist propaganda, which due to efficient utilisation of modern technologies (for 
example YouTube, social media, Twitter etc.) is abundant online (including Rus-
sian Islamic websites). The materials published there on the one hand depict the 
suffering inflicted on the Syrian people by the Assad regime, and on the other 
boast of the successes, heroism and „glory” of the militants. This propaganda 
60 While the jihad in the Caucasus was not so unanimously supported by the religious author-
ities, there is general consent regarding the validity of the jihad in Syria. 
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has a very strong effect on the potential volunteers – it is clear and easily under-
standable, because its authors are either their countrymen, or Jihadists from the 
other Post-Soviet states, possessing a similar cultural code and speaking Rus-
sian, a language still understood by most of the inhabitants of the former USSR.
4. political reasons in the countries of origin
The origins of the departures for the jihad in Syria lie also, to some extent, in 
the political situation, which is true above all in the case of the Northern Cau-
casus. Frequent departures for Syria from this region are mostly the result of 
the jihad in the Caucasus itself being snuffed out, which was in part caused by 
brutal repressions conducted by the Russian security forces and the policies 
of Chechnya’s president Ramzan Kadyrov (a combination of military, political 
and propaganda methods), which led to the militancy being marginalised and 
the situation being stabilised. The lack of perspectives for the prolonged armed 
struggle in the Caucasus as well as the degradation of the Caucasian militan-
cy inclines both active militants and new volunteers to depart61. In the case 
of Chechens, the anti-Russian dimension of the war in Syria is also of some 
significance (the continuation of the struggle against Russia, through fighting 
Bashar al-Assad’s regime which Russia supports).
In a broader sense, one condition that indirectly fuels the departures are the 
authoritarian political systems in some of the post-Soviet states, which also 
includes repressions against the independent Muslim groups, above all the 
Salafists (the Central Asian states, mainly Uzbekistan, as well as Azerbaijan 
and Russia, especially the republics of the Northern Caucasus). The persecu-
tions are rarely the direct cause of the departures, they rather have the effect 
of radicalising Muslims, which creates the necessary social basis for future re-
cruits. Azerbaijan is a classic example – intensifying authoritarianism chan-
nels social unrest and frustration into Islamic (mainly Sunni) radicalism62.
5. solidarity with co-believers and religious duty
An important factor which serves as a motivation for departure to Syria is the 
solidarity with the jihadists and civilian victims of the conflict, an Islamic 
version of the struggle “for our freedom and yours”. In many Salafi circles, 
61 Further in Maciej Falkowski, Illusion…, op. cit.
62 http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=56032&reloadFlag=1
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especially the extremely radical ones, the sense of legal religious duty is equal-
ly important (jihad as a religious commandment), and failure to fulfil it is es-
sentially a sin. It is important to remember that armed jihad is regarded as 
the duty of every Muslim, but the key issue is defining whether or not a par-
ticular conflict has the status of jihad. Due to the structure of Islam (the lack 
of a single authority respected by all, or at least a majority of Muslims) this is 
a problematic issue, usually settled at the level of particular currents or even 
their branches (for example not every Salafist views the jihad in the Caucasus 
as mandatory)63. 
dilemmas of the jihadists in the caucasus
The dispute about the jihad in Syria did not omit the Islamic clandestine 
militancy in the Caucasus, but nor did it concern whether it is an “actual” 
jihad (there was consensus regarding this). The leaders and militants of 
the Caucasus Emirate, as well as those who considered volunteering faced 
a dilemma regarding whether they are permitted to leave for the jihad in 
Syria when there is an ongoing war in the Caucasus. The militants’ leaders 
(above all the already deceased Dokka Umarov) held that for the inhabit-
ants of the Caucasus, the jihad in their homeland is of greater importance 
(a claim they supported by verdicts of selected scholars) and forbade depar-
ture to the Middle East64. Later on, facing the massive exodus of militants 
and new recruits to Syria, they had to revise the explicit ban, in order not to 
lose their credibility in the eyes of their supporters. The final ruling stated 
that if a Caucasian Muslim does not have the possibility to support the jihad 
in the Caucasus, then he can leave for Syria (the decision was especially 
important for the Chechen refugees residing in Europe)65.
Similarly, the proclamation of the Islamic state by ISIS and the nomina-
tion of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the caliph (June 2014) caused dissent in the 
63 Two types of jihad exist: offensive (declared by the Caliph in the name of the entire state) 
and defensive. The latter can take place only in lands inhabited by Muslims, and the deci-
sion concerning participation in it is de facto individually considered by every Muslim (ob-
viously in reality the dominant view within the group is important). The religious authori-
ties are of key importance in this matter – the issue of jihad’s mandatory status is also based 
on their (often contradictory) opinions. One however must also bear in mind that a Muslim 
can participate in a war which does not have the status of jihad, but in this case it is not ob-
ligatory. 
64 http://nohchipress.info/2012/11/6995
65 http://alisnad.com/?p=834
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ranks of militants, with even the Caucasian volunteers fighting in Syria 
and Iraq being divided on this issue. Immediately prior to the proclama-
tion, the leader of the Caucasus Emirate Aliaskhab Kebekov had spoken 
critically about ISIS, calling for the Caucasian volunteers to remain inde-
pendent and not interfere in the disputed between the groups fighting in 
Syria (in reality – between ISIS and the al-Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra). 
His explicit, categorical rulings and lack of moderation cost him his au-
thority among the militants in the Caucasus and led to a deepening of the 
divisions between the Caucasian groups in the Middle East. The outcome of 
this was a schism inside the Caucasus Emirate (November-December 2014) 
with a substantial part of the militant groups in Dagestan and Chechnya 
swearing allegiance to the leader of Islamic State.
6. personal motivations. social causes
The individual character of the departures to Syria makes it necessary to ex-
amine the personal motivations which play the decisive role in the decision-
making process before leaving. In this context the ideological issue is of sig-
nificant importance. In some cases they are the decisive, especially with 
regard to wealthy individuals with families, a successful professional career 
or rich, influential parents, who nevertheless decide to leave their previous 
life and depart for Syria. In such cases the decision to leave is often preceded 
by converting or returning to Islam, the reason for which can most often be 
seen in existential dilemmas (a crisis of values, the search for the meaning 
of life) or tragedies. The scale of the phenomenon (conversion to Islam) is in-
creasing, especially in Russia (estimates vary from several hundred even up to 
ten thousand people), where social crisis has catastrophic dimensions (crisis 
of family, a high divorce rate, drug addiction, alcoholism, suicide, orphaned 
or abandoned children, ubiquitous violence etc.)66. One example of a person 
leaving a prosperous life in a post-Soviet state to join the jihad can be seen in 
the actions of colonel Gulmurod Khalimov – commander of Tajikistan’s OMON 
(Special-Purpose Militia Units), who in April 2015 left for Syria and joined the 
ranks of IS67. During his professional career he held a number of high-ranking 
66 According to the Russian Orthodox Church’s data it is about 300 people, while Islamic or-
ganisations claim there are 10,000 converts. In both of the cases these are estimates. http://
samara.orthodoxy.ru/Smi/Npg/051_12.html and http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=17618 
67 http://www.avesta.tj/security/32994-polkovnik-gulmurod-halimov-obyavlen-v-mezh-
dunarodnyy-rozysk.html
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posts and participated in training abroad (including in Russia and the USA), 
while his departure for Syria was preceded by his return to Islam68.
The actual motivation of a substantial part of the volunteers is rather frustra-
tion caused by poverty, unemployment, a lack of perspectives, the impossibil-
ity of self-fulfilment. It is often young people who decide to leave. On the one 
hand they have little to lose, on the other they stand little chance of finding 
a good job, having a successful career, saving money or even starting family of 
their own (in traditional societies of the Caucasus and Central Asia marriage 
must be preceded by achieving a social status allowing a man to provide for his 
wife and children). In this regard, the groups of increased risk are the internal 
(from the rural areas to big cities) and foreign migrants (for example the Cen-
tral Asian labour migrants in Russia or Turkey), as well as Chechen refugees in 
Europe and Turkey.
The departure for jihad, while being extremely dangerous, is a chance to see 
the world, gain glory, to prove one’s manhood and courage. In patriarchal so-
cieties, with a highly developed cult of manhood (especially in the Caucasus), 
this is of utmost importance. For many jihad is also a chance to liberate one-
self from the oppressive social and family settings caused by a matrix of tradi-
tions, schemes and obedience towards one’s elders. Another important factor 
is also the desire to avoid the generation clash (this is especially important in 
case of new converts to Islam since their parents are most often Soviet-raised 
people, who treat religion with dislike or even open hostility). Despite the tre-
mendous risk, jihad also is an opportunity to gain riches through such means 
as the spoils of war, the seizure of estates in the conquered territories, or by 
smuggling to and from Turkey. Many Jihadists also start families in Syria and 
Iraq, either marrying local women, militants’ widows, or female followers of 
the radical Islam from their countries, who like the men, but not so frequent-
ly, also leave for the conflict zone69 (for example the daughter of Asu Dudur-
kayev, head of the Chechnya’s migration office, who left with her fiancé to Syria 
against her father’s will70). According to the Salafists’ interpretation of sharia, 
68 Khalimov’s statement after joining IS, available at: https://sendvid.com/priqxge4 
69 The phenomenon must take place on a large scale – for example the Jihadists from the for-
mer USSR states are establishing schools teaching in Russian in the areas seized by them 
(including in Islamic State’s capital – the Syrian city of Raqqah). 
70 After death of her husband Seda Dudurkaeva became the wife of Omar al-Shishani. http://
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/10/27/the-secret-life-of-an-isis-warlord.html
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the militants also can acquire sex slaves (including non-Muslims) – women im-
prisoned during the fighting71.
the case of pankisi
One region where the mass departures for Syria are caused mainly by the 
social problems is the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, inhabited by about six 
to eight thousand Chechens (Kists). The key to understanding why such 
a large proportion of Pankisi’s population have participated in the jihad 
(100–200 people), aside from the ideological issues, is the difficult economic 
situation (a large unemployment rate, the lack of employment outside the 
undeveloped agriculture sector), the frustration of young people caused by 
it, as well as a severe generation clash (between the Salafi youth and the 
older generations). As in the other regions, the departures would not be 
possible without the prior development of Salafism in Pankisi. It first ap-
peared in the region along with a mass influx of the refugees and Chech-
en militants looking for refuge from the Russian forces during the second 
Chechen war (after 1999). Under their influence, the dynamic process of re-
Chechenisation and Islamisation of the secularised and Georgianised Kists 
began (since the beginning of the 19th century, Kists made up a small com-
munity in Georgia isolated from Chechnya; Islam did not play an important 
role there). This process was especially visible among the younger genera-
tion. It was Syria which became the main destination of jihad for Pankisi’s 
inhabitants, which was in part caused by the actions of the Russian side 
(sealing the Russian-Georgian border by increasing the amount of border 
posts, planting land mines along the mountain passes etc.), which made it 
virtually impossible for the Kists to participate in the jihad in the Northern 
Caucasus. Abandoning the Northern Caucasian jihad also contributed to 
weakening the Islamic militancy there and a stabilisation of the situation 
in Chechnya during Ramzan Kadyrov’s dictatorship.
7. War as a way of life
For a certain category of those departing to Syria and Iraq it is a continuation 
of their previous militant activities. It is true mainly in the case of the “profes-
sional” Chechen militants, for whom war has become a way of life. The choice 
71 The issue is discussed (and justified) at length in Islamic State’s online journal – Dabiq (is-
sue IX), available at: https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/the-islamic-state-e2809cd-
c481biq-magazine-9e280b3.pdf. 
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of Syria and Iraq was not dictated by the ideological reasons – they would prob-
ably leave to any other part of the Islamic world where a similar conflict is tak-
ing place. Those with such motivation, however, seem to be a minority72.
72 Not only Jihadists fighting in Syria are the “products” of the Chechen wars. Individuals 
shaped by the war, whose life paths were slightly different, also end up in Donbas, where they 
fight on both the Ukrainian side (the so-called “Dzokhar Dudayev Battalion” established by 
the famous commander Isa Munayev, currently led by Adam Usmayev, and the Sheikh Man-
sour Battalion comprised of Salafists) and the Russian side (Chechens, often former militants, 
serving in the units subordinate to Chechnya’s president Ramzan Kadyrov). 
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iii. proFile oF the post-soviet Militants in syria and iraq
1. size and ethnic composition
It is highly difficult, due to obvious reasons, to provide an exact number of mil-
itants from the former USSR states currently fighting in Syria and Iraq. While 
both official and unofficial estimates are often provided (either by some of the 
governments, or by the post-Soviet, Western and Middle Eastern journalists 
and analysts), there are certain doubts regarding their credibility. Such esti-
mates are also difficult to verify. A compilation of the available data allows for 
an estimation of the number of the militants from the entire post-Soviet area at 
around 4,000. This breaks down into individual countries as following:
•	 Tajikistan – officially 300 people73, unofficially higher74;
•	 Kyrgyzstan – officially 20075, probably more than that (both ethnic Kyrgyz 
and Uzbeks) 76;
•	 Uzbekistan – no official data, unofficial estimates vary significantly, the 
following data is presented: 50 people in the Jabhat al-Nusra group77, two 
battalions78, 50079 or even 3,000 people80;
•	 Turkmenistan – no official data, unofficially up to 360 people81, probably 
less than that;
73 Statement by Akram Amonov, deputy head of the Tajik intelligence services (GKNB): http://
news.tj/ru/news/gknb-v-sirii-voyuyut-primerno-300-grazhdan-tadzhikistana
74 For example the case of the Chorqishloq village – http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan-
village-suspected-jihadists-syria-iraq/26616794.html
75 Statement by Rakhat Suleymanov, spokesman of the Kyrgyz intelligence services (GKNB): 
http://kyrtag.kg/news/bolee-200-grazhdan-kyrgyzstana-nakhodyatsya-v-zone-boevykh-
deystviy-v-sirii-gknb/
76 http://www.vb.kg/doc/288117_s_nachala_2014_goda_vyiavili_28_vyehavshih_v_siriu_
kyrgyzstancev.html
77 http://rus.azattyk.org/content/kyrgzystan_sirya_central_asia_juhad/25150081.html
78 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42674&no_cache=1
79 http://ca-snj.blogspot.com/2014/03/blog-post_2701.html
80 http://www.uznews.net/ru/politics/26288-uzbekov-zovut-na-dzhihad-i-k-modzhahedam-v-siriju
81 http://www.rferl.org/content/turkmenistan-achilles-heel-central-asian-security/25265841.html
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•	 Kazakhstan – officially: over 300 people82, unofficially probably more, includ-
ing many militants who depart with their families83 (for example fragmen-
tary data about 40 people only from the towns of Jezkazgan and Satbayev84);
•	 Russia – officially 1,700 people85, unofficially much higher (over 2,000), 
mainly Chechens (up to 1,000 people86, including Chechen refugees resid-
ing in Europe who remain Russian citizens), Dagestanis (officially 20087, 
unofficially probably about 500 to 1,000) and Ingush (50-7088), as well as 
individual cases from the other regions (the remaining republics of the 
Northern Caucasus, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan);
•	 Azerbaijan – no official data, police statistics from various districts add up 
to 107 people89, according to unofficial data from 10090 to 25091;
•	 Georgia – no official data, unofficially from 5092 to 200 people93;
•	 Crimea – no official data, unofficially from around a dozen94 to 400 people95; 
probably around 100 people96.
82 Statement by Nurtay Abykayev, head of the Kazakh intelligence services (KNB): http://knb.
kz/ru/archive/article.htm?id=10376986@egNews
83 For example propaganda film about 150 Kazakh jihadists: http://www.alalam.ir/news/1526261
84 http://rus.azattyq.org/content/kazakhs-syria-youtube/25143647.html
85 Statement by Alexander Bortnikov, head of FSB: http://www.rferl.org/content/islamic-
state-russian-nationals-syria-iraq/26869105.html
86 http://www.jamestown.org/regions/middleeast/single/?tx_ttnews[pointer]=2&tx_
ttnews[tt_news]=41861&tx_ttnews[backPid]=49&cHash=1a9cd3c6400175a9b81a8268c
ea71818#.VGO40mNnCZE; http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/chech-
en-isis-fighters-under-omar-alshishani-threaten-to-take-fight-to-putin-9787809.html
87 Statement by Andrey Konin, head of FSB in Dagestan; http://newsland.com/news/detail/
id/1206831/
88 http://slonus2012.livejournal.com/129359.html
89 http://www.zerkalo.az/2014/zaderzhanyi-eshhe-dva-modzhaheda-vernuvshihsya-iz-sirii/
90 http://www.contact.az/docs/2013/Politics/102900055545ru.htm
91 http://contact.az/docs/2014/Want%20to%20Say/011100065006ru.htm
92 Kakheti Information Centre – http://www.civil.ge/rus/article.php?id=26473
93 http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/international/2013/11/131120_chechens_syria_georgia
94 http://eaworldview.com/2014/02/syria-testimonials-russian-speaking-jihadis-crimean-
tatar-suicide-bomber/
95 http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41136&cH
ash=d873c9e97210acb9b505cdadb5ffd5b8
96 http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303795904579431290464167718
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In total the number of volunteers from all of the post-Soviet states oscillates at 
around four to five thousand people.
While the estimates are usually inaccurate and often reflect not so much the 
number of militants currently fighting in Syria and Iraq, but rather the num-
ber of people who were in the Jihadist’ ranks at some point from 2011, they still 
make it possible to evaluate the scale of the phenomenon. If one juxtaposes the 
number of militants with the overall Muslim population in particular states 
and regions, it would lead to the conclusion that it is a marginal problem, es-
pecially with regard to Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan. Usually, not 
more than 0.005% of the Muslim inhabitants of particular states participate in 
jihad, which is equal to 50-60 people per million Muslims (similar to Kosovo 
– 57 people per million). It places the region’s states behind many countries of 
Western Europe, the Middle East and the Maghreb, where these indicators are 
higher (for example in Denmark it is about 400 people per million, in Norway 
350, the United Kingdom 214, France 200, Tunisia 272, Saudi Arabia 83, and Jor-
dan 223), but still ahead of countries such as Turkey (13) or Indonesia (0.5) 97.
country/region Militants departures per million of Muslim population
Former USSR 4,000-5,000 50-62
United Kingdom 600 214
France 1,200 200
Germany 600 140
Tunisia 3,000 272
Saudi Arabia 2,500 83
Jordan 1,500 223
Turkey 1,000 13
97 Based on authors’ own calculations and: http://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2014/09/syria-
foreign-jihadis/, http://www.rferl.org/contentinfographics/infographics/26584940.html 
as well as http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/17/world/europe/europe-arrests-terrorism-
links.html?_r=0
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The situation is completely different in the case of Chechnya, Dagestan and 
the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, where the numbers are significantly higher. 
When it comes the entire, two million strong, Chechen population (the Cau-
casus, Russia, Europe, the Middle East), around 0.05%, or about 250-500 peo-
ple per million participate in jihad. The numbers are even higher when it 
comes to Chechens residing in the Pankisi – about 1.25% or hypothetically 
12,500 per million. It is the highest indicator amongst all Muslim commu-
nities worldwide. Also the participation of Dagestanis is significant (about 
0.01% and 160 people per million).
Juxtaposition of the number of militants from the Post-Soviet states with num-
ber of those from other countries puts the region in the middle (if the former 
USSR is treated as a whole) or at the bottom of the list (each state separately). 
For comparison, the number of militants from Tunisia is estimated at above 
3,000, and 2,500 from Saudi Arabia, 1,500 from Jordan, 1,000 from Turkey, 900 
from Lebanon, 1,200 from France, 600 from Libya, 600 from the United King-
dom, 440 from Belgium, 250 from Austria and Holland, and 600 from Germa-
ny98. Here again the fighters from the Northern Caucasus stand out, with their 
numbers at 1,500, making them almost a third of all the post-Soviet militants 
in Syria and Iraq.
If, however, the Post-Soviet area is treated as a whole, it ranks only behind the 
Middle East and Maghreb (around 6,000 people each), equal to Western Eu-
rope (about 3,000-4,000). Looking at the estimates of the overall number of 
the foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq (about 15,000-20,00099), it can be stated 
that the militants from the former USSR, who constitute up to 15–20% of them, 
are over-represented, compared with the share of post-Soviet Muslims in the 
overall number of people professing Islam globally (around 80 million from 1.5 
billion Muslims, 5–6%). Only a comparison of this kind allows for an evaluation 
of the real scale of the phenomenon described: the post-Soviet Jihadists are 
clearly over-represented amongst the foreign militants fighting in Syria and 
Iraq. This, however, does not change the fact that the phenomenon of leaving 
for Syria is still, compared to the overall Muslim population, a marginal one in 
all the countries of the region. An exception to that are Chechens (regardless of 
98 Ibid. 
99 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/09/cia-triples-number-islamic-state-
fighters-201491232912623733.html; http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/
islamic-state-50000-fighters-syria-2014819184258421392.html; http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2014/oct/30/foreign-jihadist-iraq-syria-unprecedented-un-isis
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their place of residence) and, on a smaller scale, Dagestanis, whose departures 
for Syria can be described as an important social phenomenon.
In the ethnic dimension, the post-Soviet volunteers fighting in Syria and Iraq 
constitute a diverse mosaic, reflecting the ethnic diversity of the former USSR. 
Amongst them are members of ethnicities present in the Caucasus (Chechens, 
Ingush, ethnic minorities from Dagestan, Azerbaijanis), Central Asia (Uzbeks, 
Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, Turkmens), as well as those from the other largely Muslim 
ethnicities, who are present on a smaller scale (Crimean and Kazan Tatars, 
Bashkirs and others). Despite the fact that on the post-Soviet area the ethnic 
factor traditionally plays an important political role, it is of little significance 
in regard to relations between the militants in the Middle East. Many units 
present there, were however de facto formed along ethnic lines, but this was 
mostly due to practical reasons (natural formation basing on kinsmen, ease of 
communication and contacts with the home country, and. in the case of some 
Chechens – a brotherhood of arms formed during the wars in Caucasus). Fur-
thermore, there are no units hermetically created basing only on the members 
of one particular ethnic group: in most of them not only militants from the 
various ethnicities of the post-Soviet area fight side by side, but also those from 
the other Muslim states, as well as from Syria and Iraq.
2. Main groups and leaders
The post-Soviet volunteers fighting in Syria and Iraq are members of both large 
organisations (such as Jabhat al-Nusra or Islamic State) and of several militant 
groups of their own, which are interconnected and most often sponsored by 
the larger ones.
During the first period of the civil war in Syria most of the militants fought 
in the ranks of the local groups and factions, first of all Jabhat al-Nusra (Syr-
ian Al-Qaeda affiliate). It was caused by the fact, that during the initial period, 
the post-Soviet militants were recruited mainly from the Caucasian diaspora 
in Syria, meaning that most of them having some command of Arabic so they 
could serve in the Arab-speaking units. With the influx of volunteers from 
Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, none of whom speak Arabic, there is 
on the one hand the need to organise militants into language-based opera-
tional units (which enabled effective communication inside the unit), on the 
other one they have gained sufficient size and importance to establish their 
own groups. Such groups were created not so much on an ideological or ethnic 
basis, but rather due to their leaders’ ambitions and aspirations. They are not 
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fully independent sovereign – they usually have sponsors – most often either 
al-Nusra or Islamic State. Their form and affiliations are not permanent – rifts 
and personal conflicts between their leaders occur on a regular basis.
The most important groups, in which the post-Soviet militants are present, in-
clude:
 − islamic state (formerly isis). It has over a thousand volunteers from the 
former Soviet Union in its ranks. The most important militant group in-
side IS is the thousand strong Katibat al-Aqsa, led by the Georgian Chechen 
Omar Shishani (real name – Tarkhan Batirashvili). Two smaller militant 
groups are also most probably under Batirashvili’s command – Yarmuk 
Battalion led by Akhmed Shishani (Akhmed Chatayev)100, and Mujahidin 
Battalion headed by Khattab Shishani (real name unknown)101. All of these 
groups are fighting in northern and north-eastern Syria. Formally they are 
part of IS, and not only volunteers from the Caucasus are present in their 
ranks (though they are still a majority), but also from Central Asia (mainly 
Kazakhstan)102 and other Muslim states. The post-Soviet contingent ap-
peared in IS in November 2013, when Omar Shishani, along with a substan-
tial part of his followers, transferred from the Army of Emigrants and Sup-
porters (JMA) to Islamic State, while several months later he also swore 
allegiance to the caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Omar Shishani’s group is 
the strongest post-Soviet militant group, both in terms of the number of 
militants as well as its military capabilities. Its strength is partly based on 
the prestige associated with belonging to the victorious Islamic State, the 
availability of equipment and supplies provided by IS103, its charismatic and 
well-known leader Omar Shishani, and effective propaganda. This latter 
activity is undertaken in multiple dimensions, both towards the potential 
recruits, as well as against the ideological and political adversaries (for ex-
100 Akhmed Chatayev is a native of Chechnya, but for an extended period of time he lived in the 
Pankisi Gorge. He was involved in the Lopota Gorge incident in 2012 in Georgia (skirmishes 
between Chechen militants and Georgian security forces, the causes of which are still un-
explained). Subsequently he was arrested by the Georgian authorities, but acquitted in 
court in Tbilisi in January 2013, after which he probably left for Austria, and from there to 
Syria; ihttp://www.rferl.org/content/russia-lopota-gorge-incident-islamic-state-syr-
ia/26869379.html
101 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tbdcidmum30
102 http://www.rferl.org/content/islamic-state-kazakhstan-child-militants-video/26752339.
html and https://archive.org/details/HMC_race
103 Providing supplies for the militants and their families, rather than directly financing them. 
More in chapter 4.3 Other areas of operations. 
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ample against the Caucasus Emirate, which is regarded as its competition). 
The propaganda materials are professionally manufactured – Shishani’s 
group is aided by Islamic State’s propaganda department – the Al Hayat Me-
dia Centre104. The group’s main propagandist is Abu Jihad Shishani, while 
the main medium is the www.fisyria.com website105.
 −  jaish al-Muhajireen wal-ansar (jMa; army of Migrants and helpers). 
This group includes up to a thousand militants from the Caucasus, Cen-
tral Asia, and Western Europe and the Balkans. As with Islamic State it 
was included by the United States on its list of terrorist organisations. JMA 
is linked with the Jabhat al-Nusra organisation, and it simultaneously up-
holds the authority of the Caucasus Emirate (many militants are formally 
bound by oath of allegiance to the emir of the Caucasus), but does not have 
any influence on its operations. JMA is in conflict with Omar Shishani’s 
group, however it does not engage overtly in combating Islamic State. The 
group was formed in March 2013 as a result of the merger of Omar Shisha-
ni’s group formed a year earlier – Katibat al-Muhajireen (Migrant’s Brigade) 
and two smaller groups: Jaish Muhammad and Katib Khattab. Following 
Omar Shishani’s departure for IS in November 2013, Salahuddin Shishani 
(Feyzullah Margoshvili) became the group’s leader106. Currently the organi-
sation is led by Abu Ibrahim Khorasani, and his deputy is Omar Dagestani. 
Starting from July 2014, JMA along with three other groups107 forms Jabhat 
Ansar al-Din (Supporters of Religion Front) – an alliance of independent 
groups distancing themselves from the conflict between the al-Nusra (de-
spite being affiliated with it) and IS108. The main combat operations’ area 
104 IS propaganda unit, which is engaged in the production and distribution of propaganda ma-
terials in several languages (including Arabic, English, French and Russian). Similar units 
exist in most of Islamic terrorist organisations worldwide, but the audio-visual materials 
produced by IS are produced with unprecedented professional craftsmanship. Materials 
portraying the post-Soviet militants are usually voiced in Russian, which facilitates reach-
ing out to the post-Soviet audience. For example: http://videos.videopress.com/UwXee3Hs/
the-islamic-state-22uncovering-an-enemy-within22_dvd.mp4
105 Real name Islam Atabiyev. Further in textbox Propagators of Jihad in Chapter 4.1 Recruit-
ment and arrival. 
106 http://eaworldview.com/2013/12/syria-salahuddin-shishani-new-leader-jaish-al-muhajireen-
wal-ansar-enmity-isis/
107 Except for JMA the members of alliance include: Harakat Fajr ash-Sham al-Islamiya (inde-
pendent Syrian organisation from Aleppo), Harakat Sham al-Islam (comprised mainly of Ji-
hadists from Morocco) and al Katiba al-Khadra, small group of Saudi veterans of wars in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq, which in October of 2014 merged into JMA. https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=rWN8XfpGJZ8
108 http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=22253
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of JMA is Aleppo and its surroundings (the group controls several villages, 
where it constitutes authority). JMA is also actively engaged in propagan-
da efforts: it has a website of its own109, a propaganda film centre (Akhbar 
Sham – The Strength of the Levant), and is active on social media, which 
facilitates reaching out to new recruits. An oft recurring theme of JMA’s 
propaganda is its lack of participation in the internecine fight between the 
Jihadist organisations and its allegiance to the Caucasus Emirate (for ex-
ample JMA uses IK’s flag)110.
 − junud al-sham (soldiers of the levant) – an independent group estab-
lished in 2012, aligned with Jabhat al-Nusra and JMA. Its main areas of op-
erations include the Aleppo and Latakia governorates, where it participates 
in fighting111. Junud al-Sham’s Emir is Muslim Abu Walid Shishani (Murad 
Margoshvili) – a veteran of both Chechen wars and a native of the Pankisi 
Gorge. The group is actively engaged in propaganda efforts – criticising 
other organisations for their internecine infighting and displaying its lead-
er, who remains very popular in the Caucasus and amongst the Chechen 
refugees in Europe112. In its ranks, Junud al-Sham hosts mainly Jihadis from 
the Caucasus, but includes volunteers from other states, and even a small 
number of Syrians are present113. The organisation also possesses its own 
training infrastructure114.
 −  “tarkhan’s group” – a small group of several dozen militants aligned with 
the previous two organisations and led by Tarkhan Gaziyev – until recently 
one of most prominent figures of the Chechen militancy. Most likely the 
group was created by Chechen militants loyal to Gaziyev, who left Chechn-
ya for Syria in 2013115. The group takes part in fighting in Latakia and in the 
proximity of Aleppo116. It is not active in the propaganda dimension.
109 http://www.akhbarsham.info/
110 For example: https://ia802604.us.archive.org/5/items/RazjasnenieAmiraDmaSalahuddi-
naShishaniVSvjaziSPoezdkojVGorodRakka/jma_emir_explanation_raqqa_visit_2014.mp4
111 http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/03/chechen_al_qaeda_com.php
112 Junud ash-Sham’s Twitter page: https://twitter.com/junuds and https://twitter.com/ju-
nuds_ru
113 http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=22563#more-22563
114 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ue2Jn7LkmU0
115 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pt93qBr_DeU and http://www.adamalla.com/show-
thread.php?t=9443&page=7
116 http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=21901#more-21901
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 −  jamaat Khalifat (caliphate community) – a small Chechen group (80-
90 people)117 under the command of Abdul Hakim Shishani (real name un-
known), who fought in Chechnya until 2008 when he at first left abroad 
for medical treatment, and then departed to Syria118. Jamaat Khalifat oper-
ates in the Latakia governorate. Initially it was part of the Ansar al-Sham 
group119, while currently it is most probably part of the Jamaat Ahadun 
Ahad coalition (Group of the One and Single)120.
 − ansar al-sham (helpers of the levant) – a Syrian militant group formed 
in 2012 in Latakia by a local entrepreneur and a veteran of the war in Af-
ghanistan – Abu Omar al-Jamila. The supreme commander of the group’s 
militant wing is a Chechen – Abu Musa Shishani (real name unknown)121. 
The group may number as many as two and a half thousand militants122, 
most of whom are Syrians. It is engaged in combat operations in the Latakia 
and Idlib governorates123. Despite only a small fraction of Ansar al-Sham’s 
militants being post-Soviet, the group has a website in Russian124 and is ac-
tive in social media125. The group is part of the Jabhat al-Islamiya (Islamic 
Front) alliance established in November 2013.
 − jamaat sabri – a small group (between one and two hundred people) estab-
lished in 2012 by an Uzbek – Abdullah al-Tashkenti. Following Abdullah’s 
death in the beginning of 2014 (during an attempt to storm Aleppo prison)126 
the organisation has been headed by Emir Khalid (real name unknown). 
Jamaat Sabri has participated in fighting in Aleppo and its environs along-
side al-Nusra and JMA, has developed training infrastructure of its own127 
and engaged in propaganda efforts128. In March 2014 the group, through its 
117 http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=22664#more-22664
118 http://kavkazone.com/testkit/index.php?tab1=hashtag&query=%D0%A8%D0%B0%D0%B
C%D0%B5&lang=turkish
119 http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=22950
120 http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=22380#more-22380
121 http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=55066
122 http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=21582
123 http://iswsyria.blogspot.com/2014/04/rebels-reopen-latakia-front.html
124 http://khilafa.org/
125 https://twitter.com/khilafa_org
126 http://eaworldview.com/2014/02/syria-brief-guide-chechen-north-caucasian-factions-syria/
127 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t7ZfpBD0uDU
128 Jamaat Sabri’s profile on the YouTube website: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCiC-
whvLt9b-Dn5r7SINv-bA
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contacts with Omar Shishani and Abu Jihad Shishani, joined IS, retaining 
its independence within the organisation129. Jamaat Sabri is predominantly 
an Uzbek group, but it members are also militants from other Central Asian 
states (mainly Tajikistan), Dagestan, the Arab countries (mainly Lebanon’s 
Sunnis) as well as a small number of volunteers from Western Europe.
 − jamaat imam Bukhari (imam Bukhari’s community) – an Uzbek group 
with up to several hundred members, active in Aleppo and its environs, 
probably aligned with Jabhat al-Nusra130. It is almost exclusively made up 
of Uzbeks, while the group’s backbone consists of former militants of the 
Central Asian organisations fighting in Pakistan and Afghanistan (the Is-
lamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihad Union). Its leader is 
an Uzbek, Sheikh Salahuddin (real name unknown), a veteran of clashes 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to Salahuddin, Jamaat is bound by 
oath to the leader of the Afghan Taliban – Mullah Omar – and was estab-
lished in accordance with him131; this seems unlikely (the group was prob-
ably established based on IMU and IJU militants who, due to worsening 
conditions in Pakistan’s Waziristan, left these organisations and joined the 
more prospective jihad in Syria132). Jamaat Imam Bukhari is active in the 
recruitment and training of volunteers from Central Asia (mainly Uzbeks 
from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan), possesses a training infrastructure of 
its own in the Aleppo governorate, and actively engages in multiple propa-
ganda ventures (the group has a website in Uzbek133 and is active on social 
media134).
The civil war in Syria and the participation of militants from former USSR 
states in it resulted in the appearance of many charismatic and well known 
leaders amongst them (as had taken place earlier in Chechnya, for example in 
the case of Shamil Basayev or Ruslan Gelayev). They serve not only as political 
or military leaders, but also play an important propaganda role, being magnets 
129 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m-01LOFCiAc
130 http://www.rferl.org/content/islamic-state-uzbek-militant-faction-syria-tali ban / 266 86 
992.html
131 http://albuxoriy.com/Video_v6929.html
132 Members of these organisations, who remained in Pakistan and Afghanistan, spoke of 
a group of militants who left to fight in Syria due to poor financial/living conditions present 
in Waziristan. http://sodiqlar.info/rus/index.php?newsid=1790
133 http://albuxoriy.com/
134 On Twitter website: https://twitter.com/albuxoriycom, as well as on YouTube: https://
www.youtube.com/channel/UCE2mx4rmfqoSRuei0RkBzwA
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for attracting new volunteers. Furthermore, the case of Arab volunteers fight-
ing in Afghanistan in the 1980s shows that, such individuals can constitute 
a threat long after the conflict they initially took part in ended135. The most im-
portant leaders of the post-Soviet militants in Syria and Iraq include:
 − omar shishani (tarkhan Batirashvili) – born in 1986 in Birkiani vil-
lage in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge into a mixed family (his father is Georgian, 
and his mother a Kist). While Ruslan Gelayev’s militants were in the gorge 
(1999-2002) he was in contact with them136. In 2006 he was drafted into the 
Georgian army, later on becoming a career soldier. He served in a recon-
naissance unit and took part in the Georgian-Russian war in 2008. After 
the war he was dismissed from the army due to tuberculosis and in 2010 he 
was arrested for the illegal possession of firearms137. It was probably while 
serving a prison sentence that he became a radical Salafist. Following pa-
role in 2011 he left for Turkey and then to Syria, where he created the Kati-
bat al-Muhajireen group. After establishment of the Army of Migrants and 
Helpers (JMA) he became its leader138. In 2013 along with a substantial part 
of militants subordinated to him, Batirashvili left to ISIS, which resulted 
in a split in JMA139. While in ISIS and IS he became the organisation’s chief 
military leader in Syria and was in charge of its forces, for example during 
the fight for Kobane140.
 − salahuddin shishani (Feyzullah Margoshvili) – native of Pankisi Gorge 
in Georgia. He took part in the jihad in the Northern Caucasus in the ranks 
of the Caucasus Emirate141. After migrating to Syria he joined the Army of 
Migrants and Helpers. He opposed its integration into ISIS. Until June 2015 
he was the emir of JMA142. For unknown reasons he was ousted from power 
and imprisoned by his militants.
135 First of all Al-Qaeda which was established by some of them, but also participation of the 
Algerian veterans of Afghanistan in the war in Bosnia. 
136 http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/249731/
137 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28217590
138 http://chechen.org/archives/1845
139 http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303309504579181962177007316
140 http://www.rferl.org/content/georgian-killed-fighting-with-islamic-state/26731657.html
141 http://syriadirect.org/main/36-interviews/1733-chechen-militants-more-prestigious-
to-fight-for-islamic-state
142 http://www.akhbarsham.info/2014/01/16/11/
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 − abdul Karim Krymskiy (real name unknown) – until June of 2015 dep-
uty emir (naib) of Jaish al-Muhajireen wal Ansar, currently also impris-
oned. He is a Crimean Tatar, and one of the few non-Chechen commanders 
amongst the leaders of the organisations which include Jihadists from the 
former USSR states143.
 − Muslim abu Walid shishani (Murad Margoshvili) – born in 1972 in 
Pankisi Gorge. He served in the Soviet Army in an air defence unit sta-
tioned in Mongolia. He took part in both of the Chechen wars144. During 
the first war he fought in the unit of the Saudi Jihadist Khattab. During the 
second Chechen war he was a local commander. He was arrested in 2003 
but was acquitted by Supreme Court of Ingushetia under unclear circum-
stances 2006145. After his release Margoshvili left for Pankisi from where 
he tried to re-join the jihad in the Northern Caucasus but without success. 
In 2012 he left for Syria, where he established the Junud ash-Sham group146.
 − tarkhan gaziyev – born in 1965 in Chechnya. He is a veteran of the both 
Chechen wars. During the second war he was appointed the commander of 
the south-western front, and in 2007 also the head of the security service of 
the Caucasus Emirate. In 2010 Gaziyev, along with other IK commanders, re-
nounced his oath towards Eemir of IK Dokku Umarov147. In 2013 he left for Syria, 
most probably along with his unit, and formed a militant group of his own148.
3. role in the ecosystem of jihad
The civil war in Syria ongoing since 2011 has created a complex environment 
of mutual links, animosities and tactical alliances between the groups and or-
ganisations participating in it. The system of correlations, which can be de-
scribed as a peculiar ecosystem of jihad, is dynamic and opaque – its shape is 
affected both by factors relatively easy to verify (for example the military situ-
ation or open rivalry between particular groups) and by an array of settings 
which are difficult to examine, such as the personal conflicts between leaders, 
143 http://www.akhbarsham.info/2014/03/02/15/
144 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iPBGvwkSibw
145 http://politkovskaya.novayagazeta.ru/pub/2006/2006-16.shtml
146 http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=22051
147 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pt93qBr_DeU
148 http://jihadology.net/2014/06/04/the-clear-banner-the-clash-over-real-jihad-in-syria-
isis-vs-the-caucasus-emirate/
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covert alliances, outside influence or local animosities. At the same time, it is 
possible to determine and describe certain general mechanisms taking place 
during interactions between the above mentioned groups, including the mili-
tants from the post-Soviet states.
First of all, any smaller group fighting in Syria and Iraq (all post-Soviet Jihadist 
groups can be regarded as such) must find a market niche of their own in the 
ecosystem of jihad. This process consists of several elements, such as: choosing 
a patron from among the larger organisations, adjusting the group’s possibili-
ties to meet the needs of the latter, and, finally, proving the group’s usefulness. 
Only two organisations can currently play the role of patron (i.e. they possess 
adequate resources, including financial, control a large enough territory and 
enjoy minimal support from outside actors); these are the rivalling Jabhat al-
Nusra and Islamic State. The potentials of these organisations are not equal 
–Islamic State is a much more powerful player, therefore it can provide much 
better conditions for volunteers and smaller groups without limiting their sub-
jectivity. The patron-subcontractor relations are mutually beneficial – the pa-
tron organisations strengthen themselves by gaining new units comprised of 
foreign volunteers and receive aid in the recruitment and training of militants, 
while smaller groups receive material (infrastructural and financial) support 
and a certain legitimisation of their activities (for example an assigned area of 
responsibility). In reality it means that larger groups govern the actions of the 
smaller ones, aligning themselves with them. In some cases this results in the 
patrons taking almost total control over them. For smaller groups this coop-
eration creates the risk of them losing their identity, but it is the only possible 
option enabling further activity (mainly due to financial factors)149.
All groups of post-Soviet Jihadists in Syria have patrons – either Islamic State 
or Jabhat al-Nusra. Within Islamic State there are both: a large group of mili-
tants from the former USSR which nominally does not have distinct structures, 
yet enjoys significant freedom of actions150, and several groups functioning un-
der their own name (for example Azerbaijani Jamaat151, Jamaat Sabri152, Jamaat 
149 However, it is obviously not limited to these factors – the rivalry between large groups also 
results in smaller radical Islamic groups fighting in Syria and Iraq becoming polarised, 
hence the need to align with one side. 
150 First of all the group led by Omar Shishani. 
151 Small group established by Azerbaijani Jihadists, operating within IS, but having an emir 
of its own (Emir Mohammad): http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=21872
152 Small Uzbek group. In March of 2014 it joined ISIS: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m-
01LOFCiAc
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Yarmuk). Despite Omar Shishani being IS’s military commander for northern 
Syria, and the post-Soviet militants being more active than the rest, they do 
not have much influence on how Islamic State’s policy is formed, and none of 
their leaders (including Omar Shishani) are present in IS’s shura (council)153. 
The groups aligned with Jabhat al-Nusra, operating mainly in north-western 
Syria (Aleppo, Latakia and Idlib governorates), are more independent and dis-
tinct from their patron. The largest of these groups is the Army of Emigrants 
and Supporters and Junud al-Sham.
Both the groups operating under the patronage of IS and those under al-Nusra 
are active in recruiting new volunteers, propaganda efforts, and combat ac-
tions in the areas chosen by patron organisation, and – in some cases – the 
management of territory controlled in Syria (more in chapter IV).
The second important mechanism, present in almost all groups regardless of 
their actual importance and strength, is that they undertaking actions aimed 
at stressing their individuality and independence in relation to the other mili-
tant groups and patron organisations. This is especially visible in the informa-
tion and propaganda dimensions. These actions are caused first of all by the 
need to secure the group’s position inside the local power balance, which in 
return translates to the influx of volunteers, financing, the share in the spoils 
of war etc. Besides propaganda, it also shows itself in the rivalry between par-
ticular groups and leaders, in occurrences of their insubordination and when 
they exaggerate their strength and achievements (for example when one 
group/leader claims success in a battle when several groups took part in it).
Thirdly, a characteristic feature of jihad in Syria (to a much lesser extent 
than in Iraq) is the constant rivalry, tensions, and often even clashes between 
various militant groups, caused by ideological, theological and political dis-
putes (for example the issue of the validity of Islamic State’s proclamation of 
the Caliphate), as well as personal conflicts, fighting over spheres of influ-
ence etc. Examples of these conflicts include tensions between Islamic State 
and Jabhat al-Nusra, as well as between the latter and the Free Syrian Army. 
Post-Soviet militants, who are either spread across various factions or form 
groups of their own, naturally participate in the above tensions (especially 
militants from Caucasus). This also leads to conflicts between them (for exam-
ple between Omar Shishani’s group within Islamic State and the Jaish Ansar 
153 http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/11/profiling%20islam-
ic%20state%20lister/en_whos_who.pdf
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wal Muhajireen, which recognises the authority of the emir of the Caucasus). 
Despite grave differences and fierce disputes in the informational sphere (for 
example between Islamic State’s militants from the Caucasus and the groups 
remaining in the Caucasus Emirate), conflicts between the post-Soviet units 
take place on a limited scale. There are no reports of fratricidal infighting or 
ethnic tensions between the militants from the various post-Soviet ethnici-
ties, who in their home countries are often in conflict with each other (for ex-
ample between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, or Chechens and Dagestanis), or between 
the post-Soviet volunteers and the militants from other regions. The feeling 
of community is dominant, as well as the feeling of being in a group (within 
particular organisations) and Jihadi solidarity (fighting the “infidel”), as well 
as a more widely, peculiarly defined Muslim unity, which is based on the inter-
nationalist ideology of the global jihad.
Furthermore, despite being divided and engaged in rivalry between their pa-
tron groups, the Jihadists from the former USSR states constitute an informal 
community, the basis of which is the similar cultural code, mentality, the sys-
tem of mutually-comprehensible Soviet-based references, and also the Russian 
language – which just as in the case of Salafists in the former USSR area, serves 
as a lingua franca and is the language of jihad. It is not only the language of 
communication in Syria and Iraq (the majority of the post-Soviet volunteers 
have no proficiency in Arabic), but also the language of propaganda and re-
cruitment, allowing for contact with the countries of origin. Almost all of the 
websites and profiles in the social media are in Russian. Other languages, such 
as Chechen, Uzbek, Azeri or Tajik, are utilised to a much lesser extent, mainly 
to reinforce the propaganda’s message when the target audience is a specific 
ethnic group in the country of origin.
The informal community of post-Soviet Jihadists is at times used by their pa-
tron organisations as a channel of communication. One example of this is the 
failed negotiation attempts between Islamic State and al-Nusra (November of 
2014), the aim of which was to end the conflict between these organisations154. 
During the talks both sides were represented by Chechens: JMA’s emir, Sala-
huddin Shishani (for Jabhat al-Nusra) and Omar Shishani (for Islamic State)155. 
It shows both the level of hostility between al-Nusra and Islamic State (the lack 
154 http://www.beladusham.com/0798.html
155 https://ia802604.us.archive.org/5/items/RazjasnenieAmiraDmaSalahuddinaShishaniVS-
vjaziSPoezdkojVGorodRakka/jma_emir_explanation_raqqa_visit_2014.mp4
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of direct negotiations, the need to employ Chechens as intermediaries), and the 
large amount of trust they have for post-Soviet Jihadists.
Despite the internationalist character of the jihad in Syria, Chechens stand out 
from the rest of the volunteers from the former USSR states. This is true with 
regard to both their self-perception (the sense of uniqueness), as well as how 
they are perceived by the other militants. They are perceived (and this is in line 
with how they view themselves) as the vanguard of not only the post-Soviet 
militants, but the entire jihadist milieu. Reasons for the high esteem in which 
the Chechens are held are not based on their ideological or intellectual superi-
ority (amongst Chechens, including those in the Middle East, the Caucasus and 
Europe, there are no widely acclaimed or popular religious authorities) but 
rather the perception of them as being exceptionally experienced, battle-hard-
ened, brave and ruthless. This perception of Chechens in the Islamic world is 
a result of the Chechen wars, which were followed by Muslims worldwide lead-
ing to the rise of Chechens’ authority. It is also of great importance that many 
Chechens are present among the Jihadist group’s leaders in Syria. They often 
direct successful attacks (mainly in Aleppo and its proximity). The “Chechen 
brand” is so popular and carries such positive connotations, that many mili-
tants from the Caucasus, without being ethnic Chechens, use the “Shishani” 
(Chechen) pseudonym in order to increase their authority amongst other mili-
tants (for example Omar Shishani himself (whose father is Georgian) or his 
aide – Abu Jihad Shishani, who is an ethnic Karachay156.
156 https://chechensinsyria.wordpress.com/2014/02/18/syria-umar-shishanis-right-hand-
man-slams-jabhat-al-nusra-treachery/ and http://kavkazpress.ru/archives/67349
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iv. Methods oF operation oF the post-soviet 
Militants in syria and iraq
1. recruitment and arrival
Migrants from the former USSR states have been joining the jihad in Syria since 
the first months of the civil war there (which began in the spring of 2011, after two 
month of brutally suppressed protests of the Syrian opposition, which were part 
of the Arab Spring). The first volunteers were members of the Northern Caucasian 
diaspora in Syria (mainly Chechens and Dagestanis), which prior to the conflict 
counted several thousand people157. It was comprised mainly of students, who were 
either studying Arabic or Islamic theological studies in the Syrian universities, or 
those who after graduating from university, decided to stay in Syria, usually due 
to ideological reasons (Salafists, who did not plan on returning to their countries 
of origin)158. Many of these people also arranged for their wives-to-be to travel to 
Syria from their home countries, and started families there.
The next group of recruits were post-Soviet Muslims resident in neighbouring 
countries, such as Turkey, Jordan and Egypt. Most often they were students (for 
example Rustam Gelayev, who was a student in Egypt and son of well-known 
Chechen commander Ruslan Gelayev; Rustam was killed during fighting in 
Aleppo in August 2012), Chechen migrants living in the Middle East states (for 
example Ruslan Machalikashvili aka Emir Sayfullah, who arrived to Syria from 
Turkey, then became leader of one of the Caucasian groups in northern Syria and 
was killed during the storming of Aleppo prison in February 2014), and migrant 
workers in Turkey (mainly Central Asians). Later on also members of the Chech-
en diaspora in Europe started arriving in Syria. They were mainly refugees, who 
first began appearing in Europe in the 1990s, and there were many former mili-
tants among them, who had decided to leave Chechnya – either due to the lack of 
possibilities to continue the fight, or due to fearing possible repressions159.
157 Not including the old diaspora, a hundred thousand strong and to a large extent assimilated 
(about 100,000 Circassians, 7,000 Dagestanis and 4,000 thousand Chechens) – the descend-
ants of the so-called Caucasian Muhajirs, which settled in the territory of the then Ottoman 
Empire at the turn of 19th and 20th centuries after the Caucasian War and the quelling sever-
al highlander rebellions by Russia. 
158 Similar diasporas exist also in Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia – the biggest one 
amongst them is in Egypt. 
159 The Chechen diaspora in Europe is about 100,000 strong, amongst which most reside in 
France (about 30,000), Austria (25,000), Belgium (17,000), Poland (10,000), Norway (10,000) 
and Denmark (1,000). 
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Only at the turn of 2012 and 2013 did the influx of volunteers from the post-So-
viet area (Central Asian states, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Crimea and Russia, above 
all the Northern Caucasus) begin on a larger scale. A substantial amount of the 
volunteers were labour migrants, mainly from Central Asia, working in the 
Russian Federation. They were mainly people motivated by religious reasons 
(not necessarily members of the Salafi communities) who, under the influence 
of on-line propaganda decided to leave.
Almost all volunteers from the post-Soviet states arrive in Syria via Turkey. 
This is caused both by the ease of getting across the Turkish-Syrian border 
which, despite the conflict, remains open, and also by the ease of getting from 
the countries of origin to Turkey itself. Ankara has a very liberal visa policy 
(from among the former USSR states, only citizens of Armenia must obtain 
a visa to enter the territory of Turkey), and to cross its borders only have a val-
id passport is required. Travelling through Turkey is also facilitated by it being 
an important transport hub between Europe and the Middle East, as well as 
between the former USSR area and the Middle East, which millions of people 
pass through annually, an amount which makes it impossible to control them. 
Additionally, the Turkish authorities do not cause obstructions for individu-
als travelling to jihad in Syria, or those returning from there: militants quite 
freely cross the Syrian-Turkish border, albeit without their weapons, travel-
ling to Turkey in order to replenish supplies, transport recruits to Syria, rest, 
for business or private reasons (meetings with family, travelling to home coun-
tries). Furthermore, on several occasions Turkey has been accused of actually 
aiding volunteers bound for Syria to fight the Damascus regime.
Travelling to Syria via Turkey is also facilitated by the communication net-
work that developed between this country and the post-Soviet area. There are 
direct flights to Turkey from all the countries of the region, while the connec-
tions include not only those with the capitals of Southern Caucasus or Central 
Asian states, but even with cities such as Grozny, Makhachkala, Mineralnye 
Vody etc. Additionally, from Georgia and Azerbaijan there is a land route to 
Turkey (including numerous bus connections).
The basic tool for recruitment is Internet propaganda, including delivered 
through the social media websites (Facebook160, Twitter161, Vkontakte162) and 
160 https://www.facebook.com/jihad.sham.muaskar
161 https://twitter.com/junuds_ru
162 http://vk.com/syriaru
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YouTube163. Militants, individuals responsible for propaganda in particular 
groups (for example Islam Atabiyev aka Abu Jihad Shishani in Islamic State), as 
well as jihad’s supporters (who may reside either in the conflict zone, Turkey, 
Europe, or even the post-Soviet states) upload various materials there (pho-
tographs, articles, films) which are intended to persuade Muslims to make 
the decision to leave. Due to the poor knowledge of Arabic prevalent among 
post-Soviet Muslims (including Salafists), propaganda materials published in 
Russian are of key importance (for example on the www.fisyria.com website), 
which are produced chiefly by the post-Soviet militants themselves. What at-
tracts many recruits is the fact that leaders of many groups active in Syria and 
Iraq are migrants from the post-Soviet states, mostly Chechens. The activity of 
well-known, radical preachers from the post-Soviet area (most of whom cur-
rently reside outside the former USSR) also increases the popularity of the no-
tion of jihad. They either openly call for Muslims to join the war their sermons 
or they hint at it. Amongst them the most important ones include Dagestan’s 
Omar Sasitlinsky (Asrapil Ahmednabayev) and Nadir Abu Khalid, Tatarstan 
born Salman Bulgarsky (Ayrat Vakhitov) or Chechen Abu Yusuf Shishani (real 
name unknown).
propagators of jihad
abu jihad shishani (real name Islam Atabiyev, born in 1983) – native of 
Karachay-Cherkessia; between 2003 and 2006 he studied at the al-Azhar 
University in Cairo; upon returning he became involved in the local struc-
tures of the Caucasus Emirate (the so-called Vilayat of Kabarda, Balkaria 
and Karachay); arrested in 2009 and sentenced to a year in prison; after be-
ing released in 2011 he left for Syria, where he aligned with Omar Shishani; 
Abu Jihad at first fought in the ranks of the Army of Emigrants and Sup-
porters, afterwards together with Omar Shishani he joined ISIS; currently 
he is the unofficial spokesperson of the Caucasian militants within the Is-
lamic State, and is responsible for propaganda released in Russian164; he is 
the author of numerous video messages, in which he calls for post-Soviet 
Muslims to join the jihad in the Middle East and criticises the Caucasus 
Emirate165 (he was probably a co-organiser of the schism which took place 
in the Emirate in late 2014).
163 https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCE2mx4rmfqoSRuei0RkBzwA
164 M.in. poprzez portal www.fisyria.com
165 http://fisyria.info/2014/12/09/Собаки-лают-караван-идет/
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abu omar sasitlinsky (real name Israpil Ahmednabayev, born in 1980) – 
is a native of Novosasitly, a village close to Dagestan’s Khasavyurt. He stud-
ied at Islamic universities in Syria and Egypt. During the second half of the 
2000s he returned to Dagestan, where he became the leader of a Salafist 
community in Novosasitly and one of the most active and popular Salafi 
preachers in the republic. He built a madrassa in his home village and es-
tablished an Islamic non-governmental organisation engaged in fundrais-
ing and other activities.
Due to his authority and knowledge of sharia, thousands of people sought 
his council and opinion, as well as his help for example in solving family 
conflicts. His views are extremely radical: he calls for a de facto non-recog-
nition of secular authorities. He does not, though support armed struggle 
in the Caucasus. After the civil war in Syria began, he started raising funds 
for humanitarian aid for Syrian refugees, and visited Turkey and Syria sev-
eral times. He delivered fervent anti-Shia sermons about Syria, which led 
to an increased level of interest about the situation in this country amongst 
the public in Dagestan and, as a consequence, to volunteers departing166. In 
2014 due to fear of arrest he left for Istanbul, where he became one of the 
leaders of Caucasus diaspora, continuing his preaching and charity work.
nadir abu Khalid (real name Nadir Medetov) – born in 1984 in Makhach-
kala (Dagestan); he received his education in an Islamic institute in Kabar-
dino-Balkaria, then he attended sharia studies in Egypt and Saudi Arabia; 
after finishing his studies he returned to Dagestan, where he engaged in 
preaching (delivered sermons in one of the Salafi mosques in Makhachka-
la, recorded his statements and uploaded them to the Internet); his sermons 
were very popular among young people in Dagestan, and gained increas-
ing popularity in the entire former USSR; in October of 2014 he was ar-
rested and accused of the illegal possession of firearms (which were prob-
ably planted on him by the security forces); several days later the court 
put him under house arrest; in May 2015 under unclear circumstances 
Medetov appeared in Syria; he swore an oath to the leader of Islamic State 
and called for his supporters to migrate to IS.
salman Bulgarsky (real name Ayrat Vakhitov; born in 1980) – is a native of 
Naberezhnye Chelny, a town in Tatarstan where a Salafi community exists; 
166 Akhmednabiyev’s sermons can be found on his private profile on VKontakte social network 
http://vk.com/abuumar_sasitlinski
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
57
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
9/
20
15
between 1999 and 2001 he fought in Afghanistan on the side of the Taliban; 
he was arrested there by US forces and between 2002 and 2003 was impris-
oned in Guantanamo Bay; after returning to Tatarstan he became a Salafi 
leader in Naberezhnye Chelny and a known Salafi preacher across Russia; 
during the second half of the 2000s due to fear of arrest (he was accused of 
organising terrorist attacks in Tatarstan) he left for Afghanistan, and in 
2011 for Syria, where he is engaged in online jihad propaganda167.
Lone emissaries, who recruit volunteers directly, are probably operating in the 
post-Soviet states. However the oft-seen media information about the exist-
ence of an organised recruitment networks or cells belonging to a particular 
group (for example the Islamic State) on the post-Soviet area does not seem 
likely. In times of universal access to the Internet, which not only enables the 
call for jihad to be delivered to the post-Soviet Muslims masses, but also to di-
rectly communicate with potential recruits, such actions would be redundant 
and carry unnecessary risk. It is simply easier to recruit remotely, without in-
curring additional costs or the risk of being arrested, having local recruitment 
structures dismantled by the security services etc. (the situation does however 
appear to be different in Western Europe where, due to the democratic charac-
ter of the states and the need for the security services to abide by legal regula-
tions, the emissaries can operate more easily168). In the Northern Caucasus an 
additional obstruction to this activity is the hostility of the Caucasus Emirate’s 
structures to departures to Syria and Iraq. Numerous accounts of militants 
in Syria suggest that the most common procedure is instructing new volun-
teers on logistic issues remotely. Only after travelling to Turkey by themselves 
are the volunteers joined by the emissaries of the particular groups, who help 
them cross the Turkish-Syrian border.
2. combat
Armed combat is the most fundamental form of operation of the post-Soviet 
Jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq, as well as the main goal of militants arriv-
ing there. All of the above mentioned groups take an active part in combat 
against the Syrian government forces or the Kurdish forces hostile to Jihadists 
167 For example https://twitter.com/salmanbulgar 
168 One example of an emissary recruiting a volunteer is the case of the Chechen imam from the 
Austrian city of Graz who, prior to his arrest in June of 2014, recruited future Jihadists from 
the local Chechen diaspora: http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/06/05/
Austria-arrests-suspect-for-Syrian-war-recruitment.html
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(especially against Islamic State). Post-Soviet militants have participated in nu-
merous skirmishes in Syria and several operations in Iraq. The battles in which 
they were fought took place mainly in northern Syria, with the largest ones in-
cluding the fights in Aleppo, the siege and assault of the Menagh air base and 
attempts to capture Kobane. The participation of particular groups in battle is 
dependent on their patron and the territory which the latter controls; for ex-
ample JMA takes part mainly in the urban warfare in Aleppo and its environs, 
while Islamic State units loyal to Omar Shishani are stationed above all in north-
eastern Syria (they took part, among others, in the assault on Kobane), rarely 
fighting against government forces and Kurdish militants (peshmerga) in Iraq 
(yet they did participate in seizing Mosul in June 2014)169. Post-Soviet militants 
(excluding those at the initial period of war) are not present however in the bat-
tlefields of southern Syria (Quneitra, Daraa or Suwayda governorates), where 
some of the most intense battles of the Syrian civil war took place. The rea-
sons for this include both logistical aspects (the difficulty of travelling from the 
border with Turkey in northern Syria to the southern frontline) and political/
military ones – the larger role of the non-radical Syrian opposition groups there 
(above all the Free Syrian Army – supplied and aided by the West via Jordan) 170.
Post-Soviet Jihadists use similar methods and tactics to other radical Islamic 
militant groups in their combat actions. A distinctive trait is their diversity 
of methods: Post-Soviet militants take place in symmetrical regular combat, 
guerrilla or other asymmetric operations, and engage in terrorist activity.
The first category includes the participation of Omar Shishani’s group in 
ISIS’s spectacular successes in 2014171 and JMA’s (and other smaller groups’ 
aligned with Jabhat al-Nusra) operations in Aleppo. These encompass both 
manoeuvre warfare operations, utilising motorised, mobile units advancing 
without its rear support units (ISIS’s successes or Junud al-Sham seizing Kes-
sab town during the so-called al-Anfal offensive in March 2014172), as well as 
169 http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/ginger-jihadist-mosul-omar-al-shishani-chechen-gener-
al-1452232; It seems to show Islamic State’s reluctance to use foreign fighters in Iraq, where 
it is supported by the local, radicalised Sunni forces http://www.understandingwar.org/
report/islamic-state-counter-strategy-counter-state
170 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22285555
171 More on ISIS’s successes in: Krzysztof Strachota, The crisis in Iraq and the twists and turns 
of Turkish Middle East policy, OSW Commentary, 30.07.2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-07-30/crisis-iraq-and-twists-and-turns-turkish-mid-
dle-east-policy
172 Executed by Jabhat al-Nusra in Latakia.
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position warfare in urban settings (for example JMA’s and Jamaat Sabri’s at-
tempts to seize the prison in Aleppo173). Similar to other groups, the militants 
from the former USSR states prior to carrying out an operation conduct a pre-
operational assessment and planning, resembling one which is employed by 
regular armies – it uses intelligence from on the ground reconnaissance, as 
well as digital technologies, which until recently were not available to ter-
rorist organisations, for example good quality satellite imagery, available 
from online satellite maps.
The groups with volunteers from the post-Soviet countries also use guerrilla, 
asymmetrical and terrorist tactics on a wide scale. Undoubtedly the organisa-
tions fighting in Syria and Iraq carry out attacks aimed at the civilian popula-
tion, yet most of their attacks which make use of terrorist tactics (for exam-
ple suicide bombings) are conducted against military targets. One widespread 
asymmetric/terrorist tactic (depending on the nature of the target) is the as-
sault of fortified enemy positions – military outposts or government institu-
tions – with suicide bombers used as battering rams174. The aim of such actions 
is not only to achieve an immediate military objective (securing a location, the 
liquidation of enemy fortified positions etc.), but also to exert negative psycho-
logical pressure on the enemy (lowering his morale and breaking the will to 
fight by showing one’s determination and ruthlessness). One example of such 
actions conducted by the post-Soviet militants can be the assault (preceded by 
a year-long siege) on the Syrian air base in Menagh near Aleppo, which be-
gan with the destruction of the base’s gate by explosives-filled truck driven by 
a JMA suicide bomber175.
The post-Soviet Jihadists are also engaged in actions aimed at maintaining con-
trol over seized territory. This at times includes the limited administration of 
such an area (discussed further in the next chapter) and carrying out punitive 
operations against real or perceived enemies. Many of these actions take the 
form of war crimes, for example mass executions of prisoners of war (Syrian 
and Iraqi soldiers, or members of the Kurdish armed groups), conducted main-
ly by Islamic State, but also by the forces aligned with al-Nusra (Chechens have 
173 http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=22428
174 Examples of this include: the attack on Aleppo prison in September of 2014, or Islamic 
State’s attack on the Syrian base in Deir ez-Zor in the eastern part of the country. http://edi-
tion.cnn.com/2014/09/09/world/meast/uk-syria-suicide-bomber/ and http://english.al-
akhbar.com/node/22775
175 http://www.rferl.org/content/umar-shishani-military-prowess-islamic-state/26677545.html
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participated in IS mass executions of prisoners of war176). Counterintelligence 
operations are also carried out, with their objective being both exposing the 
Assad regime’s spies amongst the civilian population on seized territory (for 
example JMA’s actions in Aleppo – the arrest and execution of alleged agents of 
the Damascus authorities)177 and preventing the infiltration of their own ranks 
by intelligence services agents of the countries of origin (for example the arrest 
and killing of two Russian spies in Omar Shishani’s group178).
Conducting combat training and securing supplies and weapons are important 
elements of the armed groups’ activities. Military training is the domain of 
the militants who previously fought in the Caucasus179, or in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan180. The core of the post-Soviet militant groups is comprised of veter-
ans either of the clandestine militancy (for example Tarkhan Gaziyev, who for 
years was commander of one of the Caucasus Emirate’s sectors in Chechnya) 
or the armed forces of the countries of origin (for example Omar Shishani)181, 
who train new recruits using methods resembling those in regular armies. 
All volunteers prior to joining the combat units must undergo month-long ba-
sic training, followed by specialised training lasting up to several months182. 
During the training recruits are indoctrinated, but the emphasis is typically 
placed on military training (from drills and physical exercises, through ex-
pertise in using various types of weapons, to live-fire tactical training, the 
176 http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/03/isis_executes_civili.php
177 http://www.akhbarsham.info/2015/02/10/108/
178 Sergey Ashimov and Jambulat Mamayev, citizens of Russia and Kazakhstan respectively, 
who admitted to being recruited by the Russian intelligence services and performing a mis-
sion, the objective of which was to gather information about the post-Soviet volunteers 
fighting in Syria and Iraq, as well as their leaders (above all Omar Shishani). Both were shot 
by a teenage Kazakh boy – a student of an IS school for post-Soviet militants’ children: 
http://videos.videopress.com/UwXee3Hs/the-islamic-state-22uncovering-an-enemy-
within22_dvd.mp4
179 For example the Chechen special unit under the command of Ruslan Gelayev during the 
first Chechen war. 
180 According to accounts of American special forces soldiers fighting in Northern Afghani-
stan, IMU militants trained in the movement’s camps in Pakistan, due to their tactics and 
equipment were a much more dangerous enemy than the Taliban. Based on: http://small-
warsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/386-feitt.pdf
181 Above all volunteers from the Central Asian states (inhabitants of the Caucasus are rarely 
drafted to military service), who underwent compulsory military service in their countries 
– while obviously the level of military training in these countries is usually not very high, 
they still constitute an added value, in comparison to volunteers with no prior military ex-
perience. 
182 Based on materials published by post-Soviet militants in Syria. For example: https://ar-
chive.org/details/HMC_race 
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aim of which is to develop coordination and cohesion within the future units). 
Low rank commanders do not receive additional training – they are usually 
recruited from among experienced militants who have proven their skills on 
the battlefield and who speak Arabic183.
The weaponry used by the militants from the former USSR states is similar to 
that used by other groups. Their arsenal includes a wide range of Soviet (from 
Syrian army warehouses) and American made (left by the fleeing Iraqi army 
during Islamic State’s offensive in 2014) small arms and light weapons, includ-
ing portable anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems. The above mentioned groups 
also possess modern communication equipment, night vision goggles, bullet-
proof vests, Kevlar helmets (war trophies from Iraq) and means of transporta-
tion – usually civilian SUVs and trucks armed with machine guns.
The post-Soviet militants fighting in Syria are additionally equipped with large 
firearms and light artillery (chiefly mortars). In this aspect Omar Shishani’s 
group differs from other groups of the post-Soviet Jihadists – during some of 
the battles (for example the failed assault on Kobane) the first group had heavy 
military weaponry at its disposal, for example howitzers, armed personnel 
carriers or tanks (most often manned by Arab crews) 184. It is noteworthy that 
despite the presence of individuals with the required skills and experience to 
operate such weaponry among the post-Soviet militants, Islamic State did not 
transfer it to them on a permanent basis. This does not necessarily show a lack 
of trust towards the volunteers from the former USSR states, but rather the 
Iraqi character of the group – Islamic State is based above all on Iraqi Sunnis 
and it is they who make up the organisation’s core185.
3. other areas of operation
Besides combat and activities related to it (recruitment and training), the post-
Soviet militants’ groups are active in several other dimensions, such as: se-
curing financing, organising the rear infrastructure for the militants (some of 
which arrive in Syria with their families) or control over the seized territories. 
They are of no less importance for the functioning of the above groups, and 
183 Based on information present in short biographies and statements of members of the above-
mentioned groups. 
184 Based on materials published by IS and groups linked to it taking part in the assault on Kobane. 
185 http://www.understandingwar.org/report/islamic-state-counter-strategy-counter-state
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characterising them is necessary to understand the phenomenon of post-Sovi-
et militants in Syria.
The most important and area of non-combat operations of the above mentioned 
groups and potentially the one with the most far-reaching consequences is 
organising rear infrastructure for the militants fighting in their ranks. It is 
important to remember that for a substantial part of the volunteers arriving 
in Syria, jihad is only one part of their motivation. The Hijra – the religiously 
motivated migration from countries where Muslims are being persecuted to 
territories where sharia is the law of the land – is equally important186. That is 
the reason why volunteers migrate to Syria along with their families, viewing 
this country as a long term settlement. It is not a new phenomenon in the post-
Soviet area – militants from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Islamic 
Jihad Union have stayed for so long (since 1999) in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
that a new generation of Jihadists has been raised there187. Currently a similar 
tendency may be observed amongst the post-Soviet volunteers fighting in Syria 
and Iraq, especially those linked to Islamic State. This means that the issue of 
organising the required rear infrastructure for the militants is important, and 
the terrorist organisations need to establish this infrastructure for new vol-
unteers in order to attract them (or at least to persuade them of its existence).
Several aspects are involved in organising the rear for the militants: securing 
financing and the required infrastructure, for example housing (also for the 
families), as well as providing care for militants’ families during their absence 
or death.
Financing for the post-Soviet militants’ groups comes from several sources: 
directly from the patron organisation (especially in the case of IS), the spoils 
of war and the business activities of the group, which most often is linked to 
smuggling people and goods between Syria and Turkey (mainly in the case of 
smaller groups aligned with Jabhat al-Nusra). Financing the groups does not 
necessarily mean directly providing them with financial resources; it is rather 
done through material aid and by supplying the groups with the goods neces-
sary for them to continue fighting and supporting militants and their fami-
lies. This is true also in the case of Islamic State, which possesses the largest 
186 More in the next chapter. 
187 The adult children of IMU’s militants took part in, for example, the attack on the Karachi 
airport in June of 2014: http://tribune.com.pk/story/720324/uzbek-fighters-involved-in-
karachi-airport-siege-militants/
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
63
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
9/
20
15
financial resources, in part due to seizing assets from the banks of Mosul after 
capturing the city (estimated from US$ 425 million188 to as much as US$ 2 bil-
lion189) and revenue generated by smuggling oil to Turkey190.
Securing the necessary infrastructure for militants and their families is done 
in strict coordination with the patron organisations. It is more important in the 
case of groups fighting under the banner of Islamic State (which actively calls 
for all Muslims to migrate to the territories of the Caliphate)191 than in the case 
of smaller, independent organisations, whose members travel in Syria without 
their families (although there were lone cases of JMA militants arriving with 
their families192). The migration of entire families is more common among vol-
unteers from the Central Asian states (mainly Kazakhstan) and significantly 
rarer amongst those from the Caucasus193. After arriving in Syria the volun-
teers are quartered in the town where the main base of the particular group is 
located. Men participate in training, women stay at home, and children attend 
schools run by the group, where they are taught Arabic, basic Islamic texts and 
undergo basic military training. The fact that a special Russian language ma-
drassa for children of the militants from former USSR states194 was established 
in the “capital” of Islamic State – Raqqah – shows the scale of such migrations. 
Militants’ families are sustained through the material aid provided by the 
armed group or patron organisation. In the case of a militant’s death, his fam-
ily is still taken care of, but widows usually marry again quickly (marrying 
a widow, especially the wife of a fallen militant, is dictated by religious rites).
A new phenomenon amongst post-Soviet radical Islamic militant groups is the 
departures to Syria of lone women, who go there in order to marry militants. 
It is most widespread in the Caucasus and Kyrgyzstan. The migration takes 
place upon invitation from a previously acquainted (via social network web-
sites) Jihadist, whom the woman plans to marry. Volunteers fighting in Syria 
and Iraq can marry or bring their wife-to-be from their countries of origin only 
188 http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/06/12/isis-just-stole-
425-million-and-became-the-worlds-richest-terrorist-group/
189 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/16/terrifying-rise-of-isis-iraq-executions
190 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6c269c4e-5ace-11e4-b449-00144feab7de.html
191 More in the next chapter and footnote 211.
192 http://www.akhbarsham.info/2015/02/05/107/
193 Based on above mentioned organisations’ materials, for example: https://archive.org/de-
tails/HMC_race
194 Ibid.
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after participating in combat for at least a year, or as a reward for significant 
achievements on the battlefield195. The same is true in the case of sex slaves 
(especially in IS) – non-Muslim women who were taken captive. They are dis-
tributed amongst the militants as a reward for achievements, or simply sold.
Besides activities linked to securing a group’s logistic needs, post-Soviet Jihad-
ists are also engaged in basic administration on the territories they have seized 
in Syria (in Iraq IS usually relies on the existing local arrangements). These are 
not comprehensive measures and most often consist of controlling these areas, 
including using brutal methods (terrorising the population, executions etc.). 
At times in order to guarantee the population’s obedience, the inhabitants are 
persuaded or forced to swear an oath of loyalty to group’s leaders (this tactic 
is used by for example JMA in the proximity of Aleppo) 196. On an ad hoc basis, 
Jihadists from the former USSR also distribute humanitarian aid. The example 
of Iraq, where Islamic State has been operating longer than in Syria, shows 
that groups willing to maintain local administration prefer to make use of the 
existing local arrangements and personnel (securing control over them and 
enforcing their loyalty), rather than using foreign militants for this purpose197.
195 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30573385
196 Based on: http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=21230 and http://www.chechensinsyria.
com/?p=22368
197 In the seized territories in Iraq, IS allows some of the Iraqi administration to continue func-
tioning – local, apolitical institutions, especially those dealing with strategic infrastruc-
ture, such as waterworks, electric power plants etc. For more about ISIS’s, and later IS’s, ad-
ministration of the territories seized in Iraq in 2014 see: http://www.understandingwar.
org/sites/default/files/Defeating%20ISIS_0.pdf
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
65
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
9/
20
15
v. the inFluence oF War Migration  
on the post-soviet area – jihad in the Middle east 
and threats For the region
The subject of the mass departures of post-Soviet Muslims to Syria and Iraq is 
often brought up in statements of government representatives (mainly Rus-
sian and Central Asian) as well as in the local media. The issue is also being 
raised on the forum of regional organisations, especially those active in the 
security dimension (for example the Collective Security Treaty Organisation 
– the CSTO or Shanghai Cooperation Organisation – SCO). The tone of the state-
ments is almost always alarmist and comes down to underlining the alleged 
risks associated with the hypothetical return of the militants. A frequently re-
curring theme is the civil war in Syria and Iraq, as well as the establishment of 
Islamic State – all as a result of mistakes America’s Middle East policy, or even 
as an effect of Washington’s deliberate actions aimed at destabilisation (IS as 
an “American project”) 198. The hysteria which began in the Russian media after 
militants seized the government military base in the Syrian town of Tabqa can 
serve as example that illustrates the use of the issue of Islamic State as a scare 
factor; they uploaded a video in which Islamic militants presented the seized 
Russian weaponry (delivered by Moscow to Bashar al-Assad’s regime), spoke 
in Arabic and threatened Vladimir Putin with “the liberation of Chechnya and 
the entire Caucasus”199. In the Russian media this unremarkable private state-
ment made by an Arab militant was being presented as Islamic State’s “official” 
warning to the Russian Federation. A similar tone was used while spreading 
the information about an alleged attack on Russia by “thousands of militants”, 
which was supposedly voiced by Omar Shishani in conversation with his fa-
ther, who lives in the Pankisi Gorge200.
Analysing the phenomenon of post-Soviet Jihadists’ war migration and the sit-
uation in the countries of origin leads, however, to diametrically different con-
clusions. Paradoxically, the described phenomenon not only fails to constitute 
a threat to security in the post-Soviet area, it even stabilises the situation in 
198 The popular news programme Vesti Nedeli broadcast by the Russian state television Rossiya 
channel is one example of this narrative, for example the 19th of October 2014 programme, 
available at: http://vesti7.ru/archive/index?edate=19.10.2014#21181. See also: http://www.
ng.ru/cis/2014-10-21/1_asia.html
199 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZc3etLP-38
200 http://www.aif.ru/society/safety/1357241; http://www.km.ru/world/2014/10/09/islamist-
skie-ekstremisty-i-terroristy/749443-polevoi-komandir-igil-prigrozil-rossii
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the countries of origin. The main short term effect of the conflict in the Middle 
East is the exodus of the most radical Muslims (and in the case of the North-
ern Caucasus – also active militants). War migration from the former USSR 
states, especially from those where Salafism and radical Islam are strongest, is 
therefore playing the role of a security valve – and is de facto beneficial for the 
authorities and the official Muslim clergy apparatus collaborating with them. 
While in the long term perspective, participation in jihad can strengthen some 
milieus ideologically, its immediate effect is to weaken Salafist communities, 
whose power and popularity, especially amongst young people, is growing, 
and who are viewed by official Islam as their main ideological rivals. Jihadists’ 
propaganda also serves as an unexpected ally of the authorities – as their aim is 
not only to recruit volunteers for fighting, but also call for all Muslims to reset-
tle along with their families to the territory of Islamic State.
The at least neutral relation of the authorities of many of the region’s states to-
wards volunteers departing for Syria can be seen in the concentration of the se-
curity services on individuals returning from Turkey and the Middle East, with 
little attention focused on those departing to this area (those departing, as op-
posed to those arriving, are much less often and much less thoroughly controlled 
and interrogated when crossing the border). It is not rare for the law enforce-
ment services to intervene only after appeals from a volunteer’s family, which 
desperately seeks methods to prevent them from departing201. Individuals re-
turning from jihad or suspected of participation in the war in the Middle East 
face harsh consequences (frequent cases of arrests and trials, often resulting in 
prison sentences202), despite the fact that the legislation of some of the states does 
not treat participation in armed conflict abroad as a crime (for example in Rus-
sia in order to convict an individual for taking part in jihad, it is necessary to 
prove that he acted against the interests of the Russian Federation203). There is 
also no information regarding the intelligence services of the post-Soviet states 
attempting to neutralise the alleged threats stemming from Jihadists, for exam-
ple through the liquidation of the leaders of armed groups or those responsible 
for recruitment and logistics on Turkish territory. Meanwhile similar meas-
ures, aimed for example against opposition activists in Central Asian states or 
201 http://izvestiya.az/nov/9650
202 http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/250956/; http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/236388/; 
http://www.doshdu.ru/novosti/v-rossii-osuzhden-uchastnik-siriiskoi-voiny
203 Article 208 of the Russian Federation penal code: participation in an armed group on a ter-
ritory of a foreign state, illegal from the legal viewpoint of that state, conducted against the 
interests of Russian Federation.
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Chechen separatist leaders, have been used multiple times in the past (for ex-
ample the assassination of the Chechen leader Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev in 2004 
in Qatar by Russian agents, or of Tajik opposition figure Umarali Quvvatov in 
Istanbul in March 2015). This obviously does not exclude the fact that the intel-
ligence agencies of the post-Soviet states (first of all Russia) are most probably at-
tempting to infiltrate the groups comprised of volunteers from the former USSR, 
similarly as is the case with the clandestine militancy in the Caucasus. Factors 
which facilitate Russia to do so include continuing diplomatic presence in Syria 
and support from the Syrian regime, as well as the possibility to use the network 
of agents active for years amongst the militants in the Caucasus.
Another stabilising effect of the jihad in Syria is the fact that Salafists – and 
more widely Muslim – communities have shifted their focus from the situation 
around Islam in their country or region towards the Middle East. While the 
interest in the conflict does lead to a radicalisation of views, the consequences 
of it do not usually involve undertaking armed/terrorist actions domestically, 
but rather migration to Syria. This stems from the radicals’ pragmatism and an 
accurate diagnosis of the situation in their countries, where in the next several 
years the chances of jihad starting, not to mention it succeeding, are minute. 
Many of them also refrain from armed or terrorist activity on the territory of 
their states paradoxically due to religious reasons (the lack of a mandate or 
even an explicit ban on launching jihad in particular circumstances, according 
to a majority of Muslim scholars).
It is symptomatic that alongside deepening instability in Syria and Iraq, there 
was no rise of threats associated with radical Islam (terrorist attacks, armed 
protests etc.) and in the case of the Northern Caucasus, a stabilisation took 
place (when compared to previous years). The Caucasus remains the most 
unstable region of the former USSR, however the intensity and frequency of 
clashes in the region has tangibly decreased. One of the main reasons for this is 
Islamic radicals’ perception of the jihad in the Middle East as being a priority, 
while the one in the Caucasus not. In combination with no chances for military 
success, brutal repressions conducted by the federal forces and Chechnya’s 
president Ramzan Kadyrov, as well as an improvement of the economic situa-
tion in Chechnya, it led to an exodus of militants to Syria and a rerouting of the 
stream of recruits from the Caucasus and Europe (from among the Chechen 
refugees) there204.
204 More in: Maciej Falkowski, op. cit.
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The most often stated main proof of the destabilising influence of the jihad in 
Syria is the prospect of the possible return of the militants to launch militancy 
or terrorist attacks205. Through this lens, Syria is a training camp for the vol-
unteers, whose actual goal is to initiate jihad in their countries of origin, using 
their training, experience and contacts with the terrorist international. Some 
sources even claim, that an unwritten agreement between Islamic State and 
the Caucasus Emirate exists, which is the basis for the exchange of militants 
(in reality these two organisations are in severe conflict), and that IS is to com-
mission emissaries to various post-Soviet countries and establish cells there206.
The special services of some of the post-Soviet states (for example Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan) try to prove that the threat from Islamic State is real, for ex-
ample by releasing information on the arrests of returning militants or foiled 
attacks (usually on the eve of summits of post-Soviet heads of state or impor-
tant international visits). Russian and Central Asian media also publish texts 
about IS militants’ plans to wage jihad in Central Asia and the alleged concen-
tration of these militants in Afghanistan near the border with Turkmenistan 
and Tajikistan. This information can hardly be called credible, rather the goal 
of disseminating it is to create an atmosphere of threat from militant Islam and 
to show one’s – alleged – effectiveness in combating terrorism207. Probably the 
incidents widely discussed in the media concerned with flying the IS flag – in 
Tashkent (on one of the bridges in the city centre in September 2014) or during 
the opposition rally in Baku (12th of October 2014) – were also provocations by 
the special services, aimed at discrediting opponents or finding an excuse to 
detain them208.
In reality, the perspective of militants fighting in Syria and Iraq returning en 
masse to the former USSR states is not likely, while the character of the de-
partures and the foreseeable progression of the situation in the Middle East 
205 For example: http://www.aif.ru/politics/world/1357947, http://www.fergananews.com/ar-
ticles/8283 and http://www.rg.ru/2014/09/26/sovbez-site.html
206 http://www.pravda.ru/news/world/formerussr/other/06-10-2014/1229832-igil-0/ and 
http://inosmi.ru/almadapaper_net/20140912/222959767.html
207 The information disseminated by the Ministry of Interior of Tajikistan on the eve of head of 
FSB Nikolai Patrushev’s visit to Dushanbe (October 2014) was particularly improbable, i.e. 
that thirteen people, who were planning to carry out terrorist attacks (for example to de-
stroy tunnels along the Dushanbe – Khojent road) and then to depart for jihad in Syria, have 
been detained: http://rus.ozodi.mobi/a/26644567.html
208 http://www.rferl.org/content/uzbekistan-islamic-state-flag-tajikistan-syria-iraq/26565807.
html; http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan-islamic-state-extremism-demonstration-
isis/26635106.html
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as well as in the post-Soviet countries themselves, all suggest that departures 
for Syria should be viewed as a true migration. That does not exclude isolated 
returns (which are already taking place), but individuals who decide to do so 
are disillusioned by jihad or underwent a mental breakdown. It can hardly be 
expected that such individuals constitute a security threat.
One of the reasons for that large scale return is unlikely is the very high fa-
tality rate amongst the militants, in whose ranks young, inexperienced peo-
ple dominate209. For most of the volunteers departure for jihad is a one way 
ticket, as they do realise that due to the consequences they could face (legal 
trial, probable prison sentence, repressions by the authorities), the perspec-
tive of returning to a normal life is unlikely. The stories of militants who 
decided to return prove that – the consequences from the authorities were 
severe, and this is especially the case in Russia, Azerbaijan and the Central 
Asian states. While many of the region’s states are weak, corrupt and chal-
lenged by a whole array of internal problems, their security apparatuses, 
which are based on Soviet experiences, function effectively when it comes to 
surveillance of society and monitoring the transfer of people and, in the case 
of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, exerting full control over an individual 
(for example through a system of denunciation or exit visas in place there). 
In this situation, the probability of an unnoticed return and attempt to live 
a peaceful life is extremely low.
The fact that entire families leave for the Middle East also shows the migra-
tory character of the travels to Syria210. Many militants take their wives with 
them, or get candidates for wives from their countries of origin to join them. 
This is caused by the theological explanation of the “Hijra” (propagated by 
Islamic State and accepted by many Salafi communities to be in line with the 
Koran and Sunnah), i.e. the necessity to emigrate from territories governed 
by infidels, where it is impossible to live according to sharia, to a land where 
Islamic law is in force211. According to this interpretation, some of the emi-
grants are guided not so much by the duty to participate in jihad, but rather 
by the commandment to perform Hijra. In this case, it is hard to count on 
them returning.
209 The case of Azerbaijan. 
210 http://kavkazpress.ru/archives/21687; http://news.nur.kz/286765.html
211 For example the English language propaganda magazine of the Islamic State – Dabiq – the 3rd 
edition was dedicated to this matter: Dabiq. A call to Hijra, August 2014, https://pl.scribd.
com/doc/239137271/Dabiq-Call-to-Hijrah
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The motive which militants most often quoted when returning to their coun-
tries of origin is their intention to spread the jihad to the territory of the for-
mer USSR (mainly the Caucasus and Central Asia), to stir uprisings and to 
conduct terrorist attacks. This scenario, while being resonant in the media, is 
unlikely to materialise. It is on the one hand aimed at realising political goals 
(combating the opposition, consolidating power in face of a threat etc.), and 
on the other, it is a result of overestimating the threat stemming from Islamic 
fundamentalism and militant Islam for the post-Soviet area212. In reality jihad 
in the region lacks wider perspectives: the states are sufficiently strong, moti-
vated, and are sufficiently competent to deal with the threat of militant Islam 
and they are prepared to use brutal methods in doing so. Nor is the necessary 
social base present (Jihadist slogans are supported by a marginal part of the 
society, even in the Northern Caucasus). So far also the predictions of Islamic 
revolutions in the Fergana Valley, Tajikistan and Dagestan, forecast since the 
1990s, have not materialised.
The scenario of return would by theoretically possible in the case of a seri-
ous destabilisation of the situation in one of the post-Soviet states. In the short 
and medium term perspective, however, an internal crisis causing existential 
threats (civil war, the collapse of the state structures, internal chaos) still seems 
less likely than the conservation of the current situation (even in Uzbekistan or 
Tajikistan), and it is only in such conditions that militant Islam would be capa-
ble of attempting to achieve its goals. During the last quarter century which has 
passed since the fall of the USSR, the post-Soviet states (unless their disintegra-
tion was in Russia’s interest) have proven their durability. The gloomy forecast 
did not materialise even in the case of the weakest states – Tajikistan and Kyr-
gyzstan, which can be described as “failing states”, and whose transformation 
into “failed” ones was predicted on numerous occasions213.
Opening a new “front” in the Caucasus or Central Asia by Islamic State also 
does not seem likely (nor can the pledges of allegiance to the caliph by some of 
212 More in: Krzysztof Strachota, Maciej Falkowski, Jihad vs. The New Great Game. Paradoxes 
of militant Islamic threats in Central Asia, OSW Point of View, January 2010, http://www.
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/policy-briefs/2010-01-27/jihad-vs-new-great-game-paradoxes-
militant-islamic-threats
213 For example: Tajikistan: On the Road to Failure?, International Crisis Group, Asia Report 
No. 162 (12th of February 2009); http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/central-
asia/tajikistan/162_tajikistan___on_the_road_to_failure.ashx; and Johan Engvall Flirting 
with State Failure. Power and Politics in Kyrgyzstan since Independence, Central Asia – 
Caucasus Institute, July 2011.
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the armed groups’ leaders in Dagestan and Chechnya be interpreted in these 
categories; more in the next chapter). Despite the present military, state build-
ing and propaganda achievements (the increase in popularity in the Islamic 
world), it is not a foregone conclusion that Islamic State will remain in its cur-
rent form (control over a large territory and administration of it). Further-
more, even if Islamic State morphs into a lasting geopolitical element of the 
Middle East, it is hard to imagine a scenario, in which it would be in the Ca-
liphate’s interest to launch a jihad in the post-Soviet area. This would mean 
a direct confrontation with Russia, which is not desirable for Jihadists. Despite 
its support for the Assad regime, Moscow is not a strategic adversary of Islamic 
State, whose main enemies include Shias (including Iran), the Middle Eastern 
regimes (the Sauds in Saudi Arabia, the Hashemites in Jordan etc.) and in the 
later perspective also the West. Being concentrated on the Middle East, Islamic 
State regards the post-Soviet area as Islam’s periphery, and views its utility 
only in supplying its own ranks with new recruits (including battle-hardened 
militants from the Caucasus). For this reason, it is more likely that the ten-
sions (caused mainly by rivalry over recruits) between such organisations as 
the Caucasus Emirate or IJU and Islamic State will deepen, rather than these 
organisations will be directly subordinated to Islamic State.
Also from the Russian perspective Islamic State (and similar organisations) 
does not constitute a serious threat, furthermore they can generate strategic 
benefits for Moscow by: accumulating the most active Salafists from the post-
Soviet area, diverting US attention from the post-Soviet area, and creating 
a possibility for the American forces to be strategically tethered to the Mid-
dle East. Spreading chaos in the Middle Eastern region may additionally cause 
a rise in the oil price on the global markets. For these reasons open conflict 
between Moscow and Raqqah seems improbable.
Over the next few years the situation in the Middle East will probably deteri-
orate further and the region will descend into wars and chaos. Therefore, the 
majority of the post-Soviet militants will probably stay in the Middle East per-
manently, turning in to professional Jihadists, who (just as veterans of the war 
against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan) will travel from one hotspot to another. 
A precedent from the post-Soviet area which illustrates this phenomenon well 
involves the militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, who at the end of 
the 1990s fled from Central Asia, migrating to Afghanistan and Pakistan, where 
they became part of the global jihad. While the prospect of their return to Cen-
tral Asia is still brought up, so far it has failed to materialise, and it seems that it 
will be possible only when a serious crisis occurs in the region.
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While the threats originating from the Jihadists fighting in the Middle East, 
and Islamic State itself, are minor, both of these factors will play a certain po-
litical role in the post-Soviet area. Similarly as in the case of the IMU, the above 
issues will be held up as a bogeyman by the region’s authoritarian regimes in 
order to strengthen their authority, increase control over society, neutralise 
political opponents and combat the Islam which is independent from the gov-
ernment. They may also serve as a handy tool in Russian geopolitical power-
plays for control of the post-Soviet area (as an explanation for the need for 
tighter security ties between particular states and Moscow in the face of the 
militant Islam threat). It is even more probable, since already certain Russian 
actions, statements from politicians and media propaganda fit into the above 
logic (for example raising the issue of alleged threats for Russia stemming from 
the Jihadists from the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia fighting in the Middle East) 214.
214 One example of the use of the above issue in Russian propaganda is an article published in 
October of 2014 in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, which suggested an array of threats to Russia from 
the Islamic State, which in turn was portrayed as being a de facto American project aimed at 
Russia: http://www.ng.ru/cis/2014-10-21/1_asia.html
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
73
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
9/
20
15
vi. actual islaM-related challenges  
in the post-soviet area
Little evidence shows that the problem of post-Soviet Jihadists fighting in the 
Middle East will have a significant influence on the security and stability of 
the post-Soviet area. However Islam, including militant Islam, is an important 
factor influencing particular states and regions. The level and character of the 
influence and challenges that the region’s states face differs depending on the 
geopolitical settings, the internal situation and the socio-religious specifics.
1. northern caucasus
The Northern Caucasus is the region where Islam plays the biggest socio-polit-
ical role not merely on the scale of the Russian Federation, but also of the entire 
former USSR. The specifics of the Northern Caucasus include the dynamically 
growing Salafism (above all in Dagestan) and the fact that it is the only place in 
the post-Soviet area where Jihad is de facto underway. While militant Islam is 
the most visible current in Caucasian Islam, viewing the situation (including the 
religious one) in the region only through this lens, does not reflect the reality on 
the ground. In the religious sphere, as in the ethnic dimension, the Northern 
Caucasus is an extraordinarily diverse region – above all in terms of the inter-
nal Islamic subdivisions (very strong Sufism, peaceful Salafism, folk and offi-
cial Islam, and cultural Islam in the western part of the region). It is noteworthy 
that currents other than Salafism and militant Islam generate problems of equal 
gravity, also in the security dimension (for example Dagestani Sufi brotherhoods 
have their own armed groups, which participate in local disputes and conflicts).
When analysing the situation in the Northern Caucasus it is important to con-
sider the divide between its eastern and western parts. In the west (Adygea, 
Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Northern Ossetia) Islam is more 
diluted, and society is secularised and was subjected to Russification. In the 
heavily Islamised east (Dagestan, Ingushetia, Chechnya), Islam is one of the 
key elements of social and political life, and the sole socio-political, or even 
civilisational, concept alternative to the Russian state. Taking into considera-
tion the level of Islam’s presence in the public life, it is possible to claim that the 
Eastern Caucasus republics should be called Islamic ones. This is not reflected 
in their legislation, though.
The most important process, which has been underway at a varied pace in all of 
the region’s republics after the fall of USSR, is the consequent re-Islamisation 
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of public life. Except for the cultural/ritual aspects (obeying the religious com-
mandments and rituals is becoming increasingly common) and the institu-
tional aspects (the establishment of new mosques, Islamic schools, universities 
and media), its important element is a progressing shariatisation (a spontane-
ous diffusion of the Islamic law into the legal framework, except in Chechnya, 
where it was inspired by the authorities215) and an increasingly strong pres-
ence of Islam in the politics (politicians accommodating or even appealing to 
religion, the role of official and informal leaders and religious milieus/groups 
in political life, etc. 216).
Salafism is burgeoning in the entire region, especially amongst young people. 
This process takes place both in the eastern and western parts of the region, 
and its intensity is strongest in the republic of Dagestan with its three million 
population. The radicalisation of youth is taking place despite federal and local 
repressions (which vary in severity depending on time217) and efforts under-
taken by the official Islamic clergy and Sufi groups (these latter are intercon-
nected with official Islam). In Chechnya, which is ruled in a dictatorial man-
ner by President Ramzan Kadyrov, a peculiar situation is in place – Sufi Islam 
is de facto the official Islam (a local branch of the Qadiriya order, which was 
established in the 12th century in Baghdad, and initiated in the Caucasus by 
a 19th century Chechen Sheikh Kunta-haji Kishiev). Other forms of Islam are 
either limited or even combated (for example: the present informal coercion to 
participate in Qadiriya rites, especially Dhikr; the persecution of men growing 
Salafi-style beards and women wearing hijabs, which are thought to be Salafi 
215 For example sharia courts, which settle private law disputes, operate in all of the republic’s 
regions; the informal order for women employed in public institutions and studying at uni-
versity to wear head scarfs; substantial limits imposed on the sale of alcohol, Chechen author-
ities’ de facto support of polygamy (which is theoretically penalised under Russian law). 
216 Besides Chechnya, an especially strong influence of political Islam can be seen in Dagestan. 
Despite there being no Islamic political parties active there, many Dagestani politicians re-
fer to Islam. Other Islamic actors also play an important political role. These include both 
the Sufi leaders, who gather informal religious, political and business groups around them-
selves, often with their own armed wing (militants); and the official clergy within the Spir-
itual Board of Dagestan’s Muslims (SBDM). 
217 In 2010 an unprecedented, formalised Sufi-Salafi dialogue was initiated by the Dagestani 
leader Magomedsalam Magomedov. Representatives of the SBDM and Salafi organisation 
Association of Ahlus Sunna Scholars took part reoccurring meetings and theological de-
bates. The dialog helped to partially calm the situation in Dagestan. It was halted due Krem-
lin’s pressure following the death of key Dagestani Sufi leader – Sheikh Said Effendi Chir-
keyski (who was killed in an attack probably executed by the militants in August of 2012), 
and forced resignation of Magomedov, whose successor was a radical opponent of soft poli-
cies – Ramazan Abdulatipov. A new wave of repressions took place afterwards, moving in 
line with other radical steps undertaken in the security sphere prior to the Sochi Olympics. 
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etc.). Salafists are being persecuted and forced to conceal their beliefs. An en-
during element of the religious situation, in place since the 1990s, is the severe 
conflict between the Sufi brotherhoods and Salafists, with both of the sides re-
sorting to violence on multiple occasions. In the Salafi-Sufi conflict, the state 
is visibly supporting the Sufi groups. The conflict between Sufis and Salafists 
is simultaneously a conflict between generations, with Sufis perceiving them-
selves as defenders of the tradition, while the Salafists regard them as heretics 
and polytheists.
Despite the persecutions, most of the Salafi communities in the Northern 
Caucasus are of a peaceful character, with their ties to the clandestine mili-
tancy not being evident (these rather have an individual character, also in the 
case of joining the jihad in the Caucasus or in Syria). Nevertheless, the Cau-
casus’s Salafists (especially in Dagestan) do not conceal their ultimate goal of 
establishing sharia rule in the region. This is not, however, synonymous with 
breaking off from the Russian Federation. The situation is especially unique in 
Dagestan. In the other republics the Salafi communities exclusively take the 
form of informal circles, concentrated in towns and larger villages, at times 
gathered around a particular local leader or mosque, while in Dagestan an ad-
ditional dimension of Salafism is present in the form of “Salafi villages”. These 
are villages spread around the entire republic, and all or a majority of their 
inhabitants are Salafists. In these villages it is the sharia, rather than the state 
legislation, which is the de facto law of land. The inhabitants try to avoid any 
contacts with the state (in extreme cases, they don’t even accept pensions or 
other social benefits from the “infidel” state) 218.
The Islamic clandestine militancy (the scattered armed groups operating un-
der the banner of the Caucasus Emirate or the Islamic State), as with the Salafi 
groups, has become a lasting element of the region’s political landscape. It is so 
deeply covert, and in some republics sufficiently rooted in the local mafia/po-
litical settings (demanding ransom from businessmen and officials, organising 
attacks based on orders from local politicians etc.) and is supported by a nar-
row group of followers and family, that it seems impossible to entirely root it 
out. On the other hand, the militants are too weak to go beyond the tactic they 
218 Examples of such villages include Gimry, Vremenniy (Untsukulsky district), Gubden 
(Karabudakhkentskiy district) or Novosasitly (Khasavyurt district). These Salafi commu-
nities were established due to both ideological factors, and the socio-economic factors (cor-
ruption, inefficiency of the authorities etc.). 
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have used for years of limited guerrilla/terrorist warfare219, and launch an 
armed conflict on a larger scale (not to mention attempts to exert control over 
a given area). This is caused by the militants’ weakness (a lack of experienced 
leaders, exhaustion from the many years of war), the strength and efficiency 
of the Russian and local security forces which make use of brutal methods to 
combat the militancy, as well as a lack of sufficient social support (the majority 
of the society does not support Jihadists’ slogans, but does view their fight for 
social justice favourably. This, though, for the militants themselves is insepa-
rably linked to establishment of an Islamic state). While recently the militants 
ceased to conduct terrorist attacks on a larger scale (according to the instruc-
tions issued by the Caucasus Emirate’s leader Aliaskhab Kebekov in 2014220), it 
cannot be ruled out that they will return to this tactic in the future.
Both the Salafism and the Islamic militancy in the Northern Caucasus are 
phenomena which formed locally, in line with the logic of the socio-political 
processes in the region. External influence, including events taking place in 
the Islamic world, can affect them but do not have the final word on whether 
they come into existence or on their vector of development. Jihad in the Middle 
East, the exodus of volunteers from the Caucasus or the establishment of an 
Islamic State in Syria and Iraq are of interest to the militants or, more broadly, 
to Muslims in the Caucasus, but they do not have a direct influence on these 
phenomena. Furthermore, they currently are a stabilising factor in the region, 
since they result in divisions within the Islamic clandestine militancy (dis-
putes regarding swearing an oath to the self-proclaimed caliph, the priority of 
jihad in the Caucasus versus the one in Syria).
It also important in the local context to examine the rift which took place in 
the Islamic militancy (end of 2014) and the appearance in the region of units 
pledging loyalty to Islamic State (about a dozen armed groups in Dagestan and 
Chechnya221). The renunciation of loyalty towards the emir of the Caucasus 
219 Current operations of the militants in the Caucasus – contrary to the situation several years 
ago, when they were capable of carrying out larger attacks – consist mainly of organising 
individual acts of terror (killing members of the security forces and administration, lead-
ers of the Sufi brotherhoods, official Islam’s clerics; attacks on stores selling alcohol and 
brothels, exhorting ransoms from business people). 
220 http://golosislama.ru/news.php?id=24196; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mtDHhSbTxFg; 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8GTfot8hBEs
221 Those pledging an oath to the Caliph include: the Emir of Chechnya Aslan Byutukayev, the 
so-called supreme commander of Dagestan Rustam Asilderov (Emir Abu Muhammad), 
Emirs of Makhachkala, Khasavyurt, Kyzylyurt, southern Dagestan and several Chechen 
commanders (for example the influential commander Makhran Saidov). 
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took place not as a result of IS actions in the region, but rather due to a serious 
crisis which the Caucasus Emirate has been going through for last few years 
(problems with financing, a lack of experienced commanders, the low author-
ity of its leaders, the loss of social support, the decimation of it militants at the 
hands of the Russian security forces, the exodus of recruits to the Middle East). 
Pledging loyalty to the caliph was not only a sign of the fascination Caucasian 
militants have for ISIS successes, but also an act of despair stemming from 
worsening conditions. Inspiration from the post-Soviet militants within IS’s 
ranks is of some – but not decisive – influence. These stoked the rift, hoping to 
strengthen their own position within Islamic State’s structures (by establish-
ing units in their home region loyal to the caliph). Despite the Russian authori-
ties claiming that the above mentioned events constitute a direct threat for 
Russia, there is not much evidence suggesting Islamic State’s interest in wag-
ing or supporting jihad in the Caucasus. Pledging an oath of allegiance to the 
caliph most probably had only a declarative character, and in reality will not 
influence the events in the region. Its only tangible (and, from Russia’s view-
point, beneficial) consequence will be a deepening of the divisions within the 
militancy in the Caucasus which, in return, will lead to a further weakening 
of the militants222.
The situation in Russia itself and the Russian policy towards the region has 
a much bigger influence over the Northern Caucasus. Maintaining economic 
and political stability in the Russian Federation, as well as the continuity of 
the Kremlin regime, will be synonymous with the conservation of the current 
situation in the Northern Caucasus (the region’s permanent, but controllable 
instability). A serious economic crisis and/or political turmoil in Russia lead-
ing to a weakening of the Kremlin’s control over the region would spell an in-
stant deterioration of the situation in the Caucasus (open ethnic conflicts, an 
explosion of Islamic radicalism) and a probable escalation of violence, espe-
cially when bearing in mind that the Caucasus can be used instrumentally for 
power plays on the Russian political scene (as it was in the 1990s). An optimis-
tic scenario sees the situation in the region stabilising and the processes (the 
growing civilisational gap between the Caucasus and Russia, re-Islamisation, 
de-Russification) which have been underway there for the last twenty years 
will moving back due to the Caucasus’s integration with the rest of the Russian 
Federation and attempts to solve the systemic socio-political and economic 
222 Renouncing loyalty to the Emir of the Caucasus by a substantial part of the militants stirred 
heated debate amongst the supporters of the Caucasus Emirate and Islamic State, both those 
in the Caucasus and the Middle East. 
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problems. This seems impossible, though, due to lack of political will, concepts 
and resources to carry out such a plan.
2. azerbaijan
Azerbaijan’s distinctive trait, that differentiates it from other post-Soviet 
states inhabited by Muslims, is the coexistence of Shias and Sunnis there, with 
proportions between the two denominations difficult to unambiguously esti-
mate. Traditionally Azerbaijan was dominated by Shias, but the Soviet her-
itage caused a considerable part of Azerbaijanis (if not the majority of them) 
to declare themselves as simply being Muslims, and to view the divisions and 
conflicts between Shia and Sunni Islam negatively. Furthermore, after the col-
lapse of the USSR, a dynamic growth, or even expansion, of the Sunni commu-
nities can be observed. Shias dominate in the south of the country and on the 
Absheron Peninsula, while the Sunni are dominant in the country’s north and 
west223. The division between Sunnis and Shias is not the only one within Azer-
baijan’s Islam, which can be characterised by extraordinary internal diversity: 
from radical communities and Shia organisations, through Sufi brotherhoods 
and movements inspired and supported by Turkey (mainly the followers of the 
Fethullah Gülen movement, known in Azerbaijan as the “Nursist”), to radical 
Salafi communities.
Despite such diversity, Azerbaijani Islam is not beleaguered by internal con-
flicts. The reason for this is the socio-political settings. Azerbaijan is a secular 
country, ruled by a secular establishment which views Islam as a threat for 
the stability of the state and of the ruling elite, and simultaneously is strong 
enough to control and the religious movements and to keep them on a short 
leash, often by use of repressions. The stance of Azerbaijani society is also of 
great importance – on the whole society is distanced to religion, treating Islam 
as only one part of the much more important ethnic identity (this is in line 
with the national state ideology promoted by the authorities).
Nevertheless, the role of the Islamic factor is growing in Azerbaijan. There 
are several reasons for this phenomenon: a continuing Islamisation, which is 
a response to the ideological crisis after the fall of the USSR, Turkish (above 
223 Sociological survey conducted by Azerbaijani analyst, social activist and human rights de-
fender – Arif Yunusov, showed that 57.6% of individuals questioned described themselves as 
being simply Muslims, 29.6% as being Shia and 8.9% as Sunni. More in: Arif Yunusov, Islam 
in Azerbaijan, Baku 2004, page 310.
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all the Fethullah Gülen movement) and, to a lesser extent, Iranian activity, 
disenchantment with the West, whose policies are viewed by Azerbaijanis as 
being cynical (valuing energy cooperation with Baku more than democratic 
principles). The consequences of the authoritarian regime being tightened are 
of great importance; it is accompanied by repressions against all independent 
groups and milieus (not only Islamic ones, but also democratic and pro-Euro-
pean ones). The lack of possibility to express protest under the conditions of 
a police state causes social frustration, the main cause of which is the negative 
economic situation (the unequal distribution of wealth between society and 
the elite from the export of hydrocarbons), is often channelled into religion. 
The growth of independent Islamic circles is also the result of a lack of trust 
towards the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Caucasus and its low authority 
(which, just as its Soviet predecessor, aspires to have authority over Muslims 
in the entire Caucasus, which is in reality limited to Azerbaijan); it is in fact 
a government institution.
Shia organisations and communities are developing mainly in the country’s 
south and on the Absheron Peninsula (several Shia villages, centred on Nard-
aran, who are well-known for their radicalism). This traditionally devout and 
pro-Iranian part of society tries not only to live according to sharia law, but has 
also on numerous occasions showed an interest in socio-political issues (for 
example the 2010 protests in Nardaran over the ban on wearing head scarves 
in schools) 224. Based on this community, and probably inspired by Iran, the Is-
lamic Party of Azerbaijan was established in the 1990s. In 2003 it was declared 
illegal by the authorities. Besides that, there are several independent Shia 
Imams active Azerbaijan (for example Ilgar Ibrahimoglu) and organisations, 
which are clearly oriented towards Iran (several of their leaders studied there). 
It precisely the real or perceived connection with Iran that hinders the growth 
of Shia organisations and institutions: both the authorities and a substantial 
part of society regard Shias as a fifth column of Iran—a country which most 
Azerbaijanis view negatively.
The moderate Turkish socio-political/religious Fethullah Gülen movement is 
an important Islamic group in Azerbaijan225. It developed dynamically in the 
1990s (opening its own schools, business activity, financing the construction 
224 http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/12/10/idINIndia-53485920101210
225 More on the Fethullah Gülen movement: Marek Matusiak, The great leap. Turkey under Er-
dogan, OSW Point of view, June 2015 available at: http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
point-view/2015-05-27/great-leap-turkey-under-erdogan 
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of new mosques and religious schools, creating an informal network of sup-
porters, including high government officials and military circles) due to the 
enthusiasm present in Azerbaijan (shared also by the authorities) towards co-
operation with Turkey. Baku’s relations towards the movement, and more gen-
erally towards Turkish social, religious and cultural activities in Azerbaijan, 
took a downward turn when the AKP came to power in Ankara in 2002. It was 
caused by fears of the dissemination of the AKP’s Islamic agenda in Azerbaijan, 
and resulted in the rise of an animus not only towards Turkey as such, but also 
towards the institutions associated with Turkey (including the Gülen move-
ment). Repressions targeting institutions and individuals linked the Gülen 
movement visibly increased by the end of 2013 when in Turkey itself an open 
conflict between Erdogan and Gülen erupted. These actions did not thus meet 
with a negative reaction from Ankara226.
Salafi communities are also growing dynamically, with numbers estimated at 
between 10-25,000 people across the country227. They are concentrated mainly 
in Baku (groups linked to the two, currently closed, mosques – the so called 
Lezgin mosque and Abu Bakr mosque, led by charismatic leader Qamet Suley-
manov), as well as in northern and north-western Azerbaijan, where Sunnis 
dominate (Zaqatala, Qakh, Khachmaz, Qusar, Quba, Sheki). The growth of 
Salafism in regions bordering Russia is closely linked to the proximity of Dag-
estan and the problem of ethnic minorities living in north Azerbaijan (Lezgins, 
Avars, Tzakhurs, Rutuls; about 3-400,000 thousand people in total), who in the 
face of a forced Azerbaijanisation policy and ethnically motivated persecu-
tions, turn to Salafism and Islamic radicalism (mainly young people). The city 
of Sumgait (400 inhabitants, located about 30 kilometres north of Baku) is an-
other important centre of Salafism in Azerbaijan. Here the social problems are 
the bedrock for Salafism (for example unemployment). These were caused by 
the closures of petrochemical factories operating during Soviet times. The set-
tlement of the socially marginalised refugees from the Karabakh conflict zone 
is another cause of the Salafism’s growth there228.
226 The culmination of the actions aimed against the Fethullah Gülen movement was the state 
closing Gülen-linked schools in Azerbaijan (beginning of 2014); http://www.hurriyetdaily-
news.com/azerbaijan-shuts-down-gulen-linked-schools-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=67988&
NewsCatID=355. More on the Gülen movement in Azerbaijan: http://www.hudson.org/
research/9864-the-gulen-movement-in-azerbaijan
227 http://almanac.afpc.org/Azerbaijan
228 Sumgait has also a small community of the so-called Harijis, whose Salafi views are much 
more radical than those of the general Salafi public (for example they do not recognise the 
state’s laws and view participation in the global jihad as mandatory). In 2013 clashes be-
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Militant Islam is also present in Azerbaijan, but its scale pales in comparison 
to that of the Northern Caucasus. From the beginning of the 2000s several mi-
nor armed incidents took place in the country (for example clashes with the 
security forces and attacks on them in the north of the country, a grenade at-
tack on the Abu Bakr mosque in Baku in 2008). Most of them were perpetrated 
by radicals who splintered from the group formed around Qamet Suleymanov 
and militants who previously fought in the Northern Caucasus (for example Il-
gar Mollachiev). In 2008 they tried to establish (probably with assistance from 
Dagestani militants) armed groups in northern Azerbaijan (the so called Forest 
Brothers) and Sumgait, but they were dismantled during a police operation. 
Several hundred Azerbaijani Muslims, starting from 1999, have also fought 
in the Northern Caucasus, as well as in Afghanistan and Pakistan (between 
1999 and 2013 at least 33 citizens of Azerbaijan were killed while fighting in the 
Northern Caucasus, and 23 in Afghanistan; in total around 200-250 Azerbaija-
nis have fought in Afghanistan) 229.
The Islamic factor (including the participation of Azerbaijanis in jihad in the 
Middle East), has limited influence due to the society’s distancing towards so-
cially and politically active Islam and the secular character of the Azerbaijani 
state and regime. It does not thus constitute a serious challenge for Azerbai-
jan’s security and stability. Potential Islam-related threats are secondary, as 
they are derived from threats of a political nature. In the internal dimension, 
the risk of the destructive activation of Islamic groups (including militant Is-
lam) and conflict breaking out between particular Islamic currents (especially 
between the Shias and Sunnis230), seems possibly only were there to be a seri-
ous political crisis (caused for example by social unrest). In the external di-
mension, the Islamic factor can be exploited by outside actors (mainly Russia 
and Iran) to destabilise the situation in Azerbaijan and/or influence country’s 
foreign policy.
A particularly large risk is associated with Russian policy towards Azerbaijan. 
Russia is trying to rebuild its position in the post-Soviet area, and in the case 
of Azerbaijan its goal is to pressure Baku into cooperation with Moscow (for 
tween the Salafists and Harijis broke out, based on a dispute regarding the mandatory sta-
tus of participating in the jihad in Syria. So far, however, the Harijis have not carried out 
any armed or terrorist attacks in Sumgait itself. They are under constant surveillance by 
the Azerbaijani security services: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68341
229 http://jihadology.net/2014/01/28/guest-post-azerbaijani-foreign-fighters-in-syria
230 http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/03/18/syrian-crisis-view-from-azerbaijan
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example in the energy sphere), and in the maximum scenario – for Azerbaijan 
to participate in the Eurasian integration projects. Besides the political pres-
sure and proposals of mutually beneficial concessions (for example Eurasian 
integration in exchange for a settlement of the Karabakh conflict on Baku’s 
terms), Moscow can make use of a wide range of leverage. Along with the Kara-
bakh issue (provoking of renewed hostilities), the threat of militant Islam can 
be a tool which Russia could relatively easily use, combining the Islamic factor 
with the Lezgin problem (separatism). Despite the commonly held belief to the 
contrary, Moscow would not create a serious threat for its own territory by 
undertaking such measures231.
To some extent, Baku’s fears regarding Iran’s actions may be commensurate 
to the threat posed by the latter (in the past Iran has undertaken a number of 
actions aimed at developing its influence over Azerbaijan’s Shias). However, 
with regard to the internal situation in Azerbaijan, Iran has less leverage than 
Moscow. Islamic State’s goals do not include destabilisation of the situation in 
the Caucasus and thus also does not constitute a threat to Azerbaijan.
The Azerbaijani authorities seem aware of the above threats but, due to their 
constant fear of social unrest, breaking out and viewing the world through the 
lens of an embattled mentality (fears regarding Russia, a West-inspired “Maid-
an”, Iran and Turkey), the preventive policies they apply (repressions against 
independent Islamic movements) bring effects opposite to those desired i.e. 
they lead to the radicalisation of Muslim communities and their shift to clan-
destine activities.
3. georgia
The situation of Muslims in Georgia is unique when compared to all of the oth-
er states of the Caucasus and Central Asia (excluding Armenia, where no local 
Muslim community exists). Muslims in Georgia constitute a minority. Fur-
thermore they function in a state and society, in which the influence of religion 
(Eastern Orthodox) is one of the strongest in the post-Soviet area. Georgian 
Muslims live mainly in Kvemo Kartli (Azeris), Adjara (Georgians professing 
231 Raising the Lezgin issue (even if interconnected with the Islamic factor) would not threaten 
increased destabilisation in Dagestan. On the contrary, the support given to the Azerbaijani 
Lezgins would provide Moscow with enormous support in Dagestan and mobilisation of its 
inhabitants against Azerbaijan (anti-Azerbaijani sentiment is very strong in Dagestan). 
Furthermore, the case of Russian actions in Donbas shows that Russia does not view zones 
of instability close to its borders as a threat to its internal security. 
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Islam) and Kakheti (Chechens in the Pankisi Gorge, Azeris and Avars). Small 
Muslim communities are also present in Tbilisi (about 20,000 people) and the 
breakaway region of Abkhazia (several thousand people) which is not con-
trolled by the Georgian authorities. In total, there are about 450,000 Muslims 
in Georgia, which equates to around 10% of the population232.
The situation of Muslims in the above mentioned regions differs, as do the prob-
lems – both those they face and those generated by Islam itself. On a nation-
wide level there are two major Islam-related challenges: the risk of tensions 
between Muslims and Christians escalating, and the risk of external actors 
(Russia, Turkey and Iran) playing the Islamic card to intervene in Georgia’s in-
ternal affairs to strengthen their position in the Southern Caucasus. The first 
problem is present first of all in Adjara and, on a local level, in selected villages 
in other parts of the country (for example Guria or Samtskhe-Javakheti), to 
which since the Soviet times Adjara’s Muslims have been relocated from the 
regions in Adjara which were at risk of mud slides (which threatened entire 
villages). Conflicts between the Eastern Orthodox Christians and Muslims 
usually erupt over the building of a mosque, minaret or public Islamic celebra-
tions. It is noteworthy that after the Georgian Dream coalition rose to power 
(2012-2013) such conflicts visibly intensified233. Pressure is exerted on Muslims 
living in Adjara by the Georgian Eastern Orthodox Church, the Christian ma-
jority (Muslims make up approximately only 30% of Adjara’s population) and, 
in a concealed manner, also by the authorities (the Church’s privileged posi-
tion, the lack of financial support for Muslim communities). This results on the 
one hand in Adjara’s Muslims converting to Christianity (the process began af-
ter the fall of the USSR), and on the other with the radicalisation of some them. 
However, in Adjara there are no Salafi communities, nor is there any credible 
evidence that shows Jihadists from Adjara fighting in the Middle East.
232 http://kavpolit.com/musulmanskaya-obshhina-gruzii-k-voprosu-upravleniya-i-religi-
oznoj-praktiki/ and https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/295315/March_14_Islam_in_Georgia_final.doc
233 The biggest incident of this sort was the conflict surrounding the building of a minaret in the 
Chela village of Samtskhe-Javakheti in 2013. For more see: http://dfwatch.net/minaret-con-
flict-in-chela-georgia-still-unresolved-23762. Plans to build a new mosque in Batumi also 
generate problems: http://dfwatch.net/adjara-changes-its-decision-to-allow-new-mosque-
in-batumi-60860. Incidents occurred also in Kobuleti (protests against opening of a new ma-
drassa: http://georgia.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/248998/) and Moha village in Samtskhe-
-Javakheti (protests of Muslims, who were against building a community centre in a place 
where a mosque destroyed by the Soviets once stood: http://georgia.kavkaz-uzel.ru/arti-
cles/248998/).
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Adjarian Muslims (regardless of where they live) are also an object of Tur-
key’s constant attention. Turkey supports the building of mosques, religious 
schools, propagates studying at Turkish universities (and madrassas), and 
also provides humanitarian and developmental aid (for example the reno-
vation of schools) for the Adjarian communities spread around the whole 
of Georgia. When Turkey’s position in Georgia is strengthened via these ac-
tions, it causes not only fears over Ankara’s actual intentions (accusations 
of making early preparations for territorial claims against Georgia) and the 
rise of anti-Turkish sentiment, but also a hostile attitude towards the Adjara’s 
Muslims among in Georgian society, who are generally viewed through the 
lens of monolithic ethnic-religious identity (the stereotype of a Georgian – 
Eastern Orthodox Christian)234.
Iran has a similar policy in place which is focused on the Azeri Shias in east-
ern Georgia. From the beginning of the 1990 several pro-Iranian organisations 
have been active in Kvemo Kartli and Tbilisi, Iran supports the construction 
of Shia mosques and madrassas, and provides scholarships for local youth to 
study in Iran (mainly in Qom and Mashhad). Pro-Iranian organisations in 
Marneuli (the informal capital of the Georgian Azeris) also attempted to politi-
cally activate the local Azerbaijani populations (for example through protests 
against the hijab ban in Azerbaijan). Iranian policy has so far achieved derisory 
results, mainly due to the low level of religiosity of the Georgian Azeris who in 
most part can be regarded as cultural Muslims. Iranian activity, however, runs 
against Azerbaijan’s interests – Baku too is attempting to operate within the 
Azeri minority in Georgia but, based on the ethnic factor (support for cultural 
activities, activation of the Azeri population, developing contacts with organi-
sations from Azerbaijan, support for the Azeri language in schools). Therefore 
the Azeri community in Georgia is a de facto battleground for Iranian-Azerbai-
jani rivalry.
As an attempt to limit the influence of Turkey, Iran and Azerbaijan on Geor-
gian Muslims, the Georgian authorities took steps to establish a Soviet model 
of “managing” the Muslim community – creating in 2011 the Spiritual Boards 
of the Muslims of Eastern and Western Georgia (which include both Shias and 
234 More on the situation in Adjara and the Muslim-Eastern Orthodox tensions: Giorgi Sani-
kidze, Edward W. Walker, Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia, University of Berkeley 
2004, http://iseees.berkeley.edu/bps/publications/2004_04-sani.pdf, Thomas Liles, Islam 
and Religious Transformation in Adjara, http://www.ecmi.de/uploads/tx_lfpubdb/Work-
ing_Paper_57_En.pdf
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Sunnis). One of the consequences of this was to transfer outside of the juris-
diction of the Board of Muslims of the Caucasus in Baku (a legacy of Soviet 
times) led by Allahshukur Pashazade. Both of the Georgian boards attempt to 
take over formal control of all Islamic communities and institutions (mosques, 
madrassas, media etc.), but despite support from the state, their efforts yield 
limited results.
The existence of a large Salafi community in the Pankisi Gorge (amongst the 
young Salafists are a majority) is a problem of a local character, as are the deep 
divisions between the Salafists and the older generation, which does not re-
gard religion as being important. The effect of the social processes taking place 
in Pankisi (if they are not interrupted by more severe shocks) will probably 
be the establishment of a sharia enclave in the gorge in several years, where 
Islamic law will be the de facto, but not formal, legal system. The existence of 
the enclave itself does not constitute a threat to state security (Chechens from 
Pankisi are loyal towards Georgia), however, the superimposition of the re-
ligious problem on the socio-economic ones (unemployment, the lack of per-
spectives, combined with large demographic growth) can be dangerous. The 
problem may further grow in the case of a weakening of the central govern-
ment’s power, took place prior to the Rose Revolution. In this scenario, Pankisi 
could transform into a “black hole” – a safe haven for organised crime and Is-
lamic terrorism.
In Georgia, except for Pankisi, several other small Salafi communities exist 
(for example in Kvemo Kartli, Kakheti, Tbilisi), but they are small and apo-
litical enough not to cause a challenge to the country’s stability. The situation 
could change only if the authorities were to begin repressing those communi-
ties. There is also a small Salafi community in Abkhazia, but due to Tbilisi’s 
lack of control over the republic, its existence does not influence the internal 
situation in Georgia.
It does not seem possible for Islam in Georgia to generate endogenous threats 
for the stability and security of the state, mainly because of the fact that the 
Muslim community in Georgia (including the Salafis) enjoys freedom of ac-
tions and is not subjected to restrictions imposed by the state; however, in 
contrast to the favoured orthodox Church, it also cannot count on its support. 
Being a minority, the Georgian Muslims are loyal towards the state, and the 
tensions between them (for example between Shias and Salafists) do not have 
the potential to develop into serious conflicts. Nor is there any evidence to sug-
gest, that the Jihadists returning to Georgia (mainly the inhabitants of Pankisi, 
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but also a small number of Azeris) can constitute a serious threat to the state’s 
security and stability.
The growing tensions between the Muslims and Christians are a much more 
serious challenge. These are to a large extent caused by the aggressive poli-
cies of the Georgian Eastern Orthodox Church and growing anti-Muslim sen-
timent in society. The level of risk is being elevated by the fact that such con-
flicts, similar to the situation in Pankisi or ethnic problems, can be potentially 
exploited by Russia to destabilise the internal situation in Georgia in order to 
derail Tbilisi’s pro-Western course and re-establish Russian influence in the 
country. A factor which even further increases the risk is the Church’s am-
biguous stance on Russia, and its anti-Western, anti-Turkish and anti-Islamic 
position.
4. Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan – politically the most stable and economically developed country 
in Central Asia – is not free from problems related to Islamic radicalism. Since 
the fall of the Soviet Union Salafism and Islamic fundamentalism (above all 
the Hizb ut-Tahrir movement) have developed there. In contrary to the region’s 
other states, during the first twenty years of independence Kazakhstan did 
not face any problems related to militant Islam. The situation changed only 
in 2011, when the country witnessed a series of terrorist attacks conducted by 
local radicalised Salafists235. Currently, in the context of Islam-related threats 
in Kazakhstan, the following problems occur: the possibility of a renewal of 
acts of Islamic terrorism, Kazakhstan’s citizens departing to fight in the ranks 
of Islamic terrorist organisations (mainly to Syria and Iraq), and the potential 
risk of religion-based social unrest.
The possibility of terrorist attacks repeating themselves is the most impor-
tant issue from Astana’s point of view. The problem itself is a real one – the 
social bedrock, in the form of radicalised Salafists, still exists in Kazakhstan, 
but their negative potential is currently neutralised by the departures to Syria 
and partially by Astana’s policy towards them. Kazakhstan’s authorities have 
a two-speed policy in this dimension: they use both “hard” methods, the aim of 
which is the immediate liquidation of a threat, applied to individuals suspect-
ed of terrorist activity; and also social actions, calculated to achieve a long term 
235 Described earlier in Chapter I – From the return to faith to jihad: Salafism and militant Is-
lam in the post-Soviet area in the textbox – The radicalisation of Salafists in Kazakhstan. 
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effect. The first way includes traditional methods used by the security forces 
of the post-Soviet states: mass arrests and convictions of individuals suspected 
of terrorism (at times based only on dubious trace evidence)236 and a harshen-
ing of the laws regulating the operations of religious communities237. On the 
other hand it is possible to observe soft methods advanced by the Agency for 
Religious Affairs (which is one of the main state institutions dealing with the 
issue of Islamic radicalism), such as tolerating, or even supporting, the activi-
ties of peaceful Salafists (some of whom have wider leverage on Salafists on the 
entire post-Soviet area, for example Rinat Abu Muhammad al-Kazakhstani238), 
increased activity of official Islamic institutions239 and the intense socialisa-
tion of individuals sentenced for extremism and terrorism240. The strategy 
chosen by Astana so far turned out to be successful (since 2012 there have been 
no attacks in Kazakhstan), but in the long term perspective its success will de-
pend on the coherence of the activities undertaken, the continuation of the soft 
stance towards the general Salafi public and refraining from measure which 
may antagonise this community towards the state.
The next challenge linked to Islamic radicalism in Kazakhstan are the depar-
tures of Kazakh volunteers to Syria and Iraq (and, to a much smaller extent, 
also to Afghanistan and Pakistan). This is not a new phenomenon – in the past 
Kazakhstan’s citizens did travel, on a smaller scale, to fight in the ranks of radi-
cal Islamic groups in the Caucasus241, as well as in Afghanistan and Pakistan242. 
Departures to Syria, therefore, do not constitute a new quality, but quantita-
tively it is a bigger phenomenon. The participation of Kazakh volunteers in the 
civil war in Syria – despite numerous speculations that their return may lead 
to a deterioration of the security situation243 – as in other states, acts largely as 
a stabilising factor (eliminating the most active individuals from the country). 
236 http://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/v-kazahstane-sotni-chelovek-sidyat-za-eks-
tremizm-i-terrorizm-229238/
237 http://www.rferl.org/content/kazakhstan_new_religious_law_islam_extremism/24341450.html
238 http://islamic.kz/tag/rinat-abu-muxammad/ 
239 Primarily of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Kazakhstan: http://muftyat.kz/ru 
240 Such actions, regardless of their efficiency, show Astana’s acknowledgement of the prob-
lems that such individuals might cause after they leave prison: http://tengrinews.kz/ka-
zakhstan_news/glava-mvd-rasskazal-pravdu-o-sostoyanii-spetsuchrejdeniy-kazahstana 
-263687/ 
241 Above all Chechens residing in Kazakhstan: http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/195407/ 
242 About 200 people, both ethnic Kazakhs and individuals of other ethnicities present in Ka-
zakhstan. See further in: The radical Islamic militants of Central Asia…, op. cit.
243 http://news.nur.kz/288156.html
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Both the return of Kazakh militants form Syria as such, and their possible par-
ticipation in acts of terror is rather unlikely – the attacks in 2011-2012 were 
conducted by local radicalised Salafists, not by Kazakh militants who previ-
ously fought in the ranks of terrorist organisations. Nevertheless, these depar-
tures are being viewed as a threat by Astana, with the authorities undertak-
ing a number of steps aimed at preventing them (for example simplifying the 
procedures needed to recognise an organisation as extremist and to block the 
websites used for recruiting)244.
One of the largest internal challenges for Kazakhstan’s stability, besides the 
unresolved issue of the succession of power after President Nursultan Naz-
arbayev, are the social tensions. While at present these are above all economic-
based social tensions, expressing themselves mainly in workers strikes (for 
example the events in Zhanaozen in December 2011), it is possible that similar 
conflicts may occur due to other reasons. Nor can it be ruled out that religion 
may become an ideology of social protest, which would certainly lead to an in-
creased role of Islamic fundamentalism.
5. Kyrgyzstan
The factor which distinguishes Kyrgyzstan from the rest of the region is the 
relative freedom of action enjoyed by the Islamic organisations operating in 
the country. The example of Kyrgyzstan shows that, when there are no mass 
repressions aimed at Islamic fundamentalists in place, the threats stemming 
from them decrease. Similarly – legally functioning independent, at times 
radical, organisations of a peaceful nature can be a counterbalance for radical 
Islamic militancy. The media and some politicians often raises the issue of the 
numerous departures for Syria, which occur mainly in the country’s south245. 
However they do not constitute a serious challenge to the state’s security (espe-
cially in comparison with other challenges which Kyrgyzstan faces246). Nor do 
244 http://infozakon.com/authorities-and-policy/447-nazarbaev-podpisal-zakon-po-usileni-
yu-mer-protiv-ekstremizma-i-terrorizma.html
245 http://www.vb.kg/doc/284803_pravozashitniki:_v_sirii_vouut_primerno_170_kyr-
gyzstancev.html
246 Kyrgyzstan has a wide array of structural security problems and challenges, which in-
clude: the state’s weakness and inefficiency, social and ethnic conflicts, tensions with 
neighbouring countries etc. More in: Maciej Falkowski, Józef Lang, Hostages to Moscow, 
clients of Beijing. Security in Central Asia as the role of the West diminishes, OSW Studies, 
November 2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2014-10-28/hostages-
to-moscow-clients-beijing-security-central-asia-role-west 
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they form a new quality (many volunteers from Kyrgyzstan have fought ear-
lier in Afghanistan and Pakistan). Radical Islamic militants can potentially be 
a threat to Kyrgyzstan but only if serious instability and a security crisis occur 
in the country. The Islamic factor, however, will serve as a catalyst for neither 
of those.
Fundamentalist and extreme Islamic organisations enjoy considerable free-
dom of action in Kyrgyzstan, which is related to both the democratic charac-
ter of the state, and the general weakness of its structures. There are many 
extreme Islamic organisations in operation in Kyrgyzstan. Tablighi Jamaat is 
one example of this. This organisation, while adhering to extreme Islam247 and 
actively seeking support amongst the political elite248, does not back armed 
struggle, instead focusing mainly on proselytising (it operates legally in many 
countries in Asia and Europe). In Central Asia Tablighi Jamaat is banned249. 
Kyrgyzstan is the exception to that rule, where the organisation has several 
thousand members250 and is de facto aiding to stabilise the situation – by gath-
ering together the active individuals, it lowers the level of radicalisation in the 
extreme part of the Muslim community251.
In Kyrgyzstan even the illegal fundamental organisations have larger freedom 
of action than in the other countries of the region. The largest such organisa-
tion – Hizb ut-Tahrir, prior to 2010 was operating in semi-overt manner, and 
while since that time the authorities have tightened the policies towards it (for 
example more frequent arrests of its members)252, it still does not reach the 
level of persecutions present in Uzbekistan or Tajikistan. This, however, does 
not mean that there are no persecutions taking place in Kyrgyzstan. Arrests 
of Islamic fundamentalists treated as alleged terrorists happen from time to 
time, but the goal of it is to stage actions which can be portrayed as the law 
enforcement structures combating terrorism. Due to an overrepresentation of 
Uzbeks amongst the Fundamentalists (for example in Hizb ut-Tahrir), the ac-
247 Not Salafism, but the Deobandi school – established in the 19th century in India, a sub-conti-
nental version of the 18th century Saudi Wahhabism. 
248 http://www.azattyk.org/content/kyrgyzstan_religion_deputy_security_nov2013/25188524.html
249 It is noteworthy that the organisation is also listed as being a terrorist organisation by the 
CSTO, whose members include Kyrgyzstan. 
250 http://www.islamsng.com/kgz/analytics/7471 
251 http://www.vb.kg/doc/219086_myftiy_kyrgyzstana_otvel_podozreniia_ot_dvijeniia_
tabligi_djamaat.html
252 http://www.rferl.org/content/hizb-ut-tahrir-kyrgyzstan-arrests/25016322.html
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
90
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
9/
20
15
tivities of the Kyrgyz security forces can be interpreted as targeting not only 
Islamic fundamentalism, but also the local Uzbek community.
The events in Kyrgyzstan also show the interaction between ethnic animosi-
ties and radical Islam and Salafism. In June 2010, when ethnic animosities 
between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz erupted into open conflict, the rare places where 
Salafists lived in compact neighbourhoods did not see clashes or pogroms 
taking place (there were even cases of Kyrgyz Salafists sheltering their Uz-
bek co-believers from the Kyrgyz militias). On the other hand, despite fears 
of the opposite happening, radical Islamic organisations, such as the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan, did not exploit the conflict to achieve their goals253, 
as their ranks include both Kyrgyz and Uzbeks254 – united by a common ide-
ology; this shows the limits of radical Islam with regards to exploiting the 
ethnic conflicts. The conflict in the country’s south also led to a rise in the in-
fluence of Salafism and other extreme Islamic currents, which are perceived 
by some as an ideology of peace, allowing the peaceful coexistence of the two 
communities. This in turn increased the already existing social bedrock (the 
country’s south is traditionally more religious) for radicalisation and depar-
tures for Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria and Iraq, in order to join the ranks of 
terrorist organisations there.
6. uzbekistan
Uzbekistan is an authoritarian state with a very strong and developed appara-
tus of control which views radical Islam as its main enemy. In practice, almost 
every occurrence, not only of Salafism, but also of piousness within the Hanafi 
school of Sunni Islam traditional to the region, is regarded as radicalism, and 
can result in persecution (including long prison sentences and torture) 255. In 
Uzbekistan there is no serious threat of radical Islam – the level of the security 
services’ control over society is immense, there are no radical Islamic organi-
sations active in the country, and almost all volunteers from Uzbekistan who 
joined the ranks of Islamic terrorist organisations in Afghanistan or Syria, 
were recruited on-line while working in Russia or Turkey.
253 The IMU limited its reaction to issuing a statement in which the movement condemned vio-
lence between Muslims in the Fergana Valley. 
254 During the conflict in south Kyrgyzstan the IMU’s Emir was an Uzbek – Usman Odil, while 
its chief military commander was an ethnic Kyrgyz – Abbas Mansur.
255 Human Rights Watch Report – http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/
uzbekistan?page=2
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
91
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
9/
20
15
The persecution of Muslims has been underway since Uzbekistan gained its 
independence, and it is interlinked with combating the opposition. In the 
1990s there were Islamic organisations256 and a secular opposition257 operat-
ing in the country, yet in the later period both of these were liquidated by 
the authorities. Despite this, the repressions (which also serve as an instru-
ment of control over society) increased. Every occurrence of the profession 
of Islam outside of the norms set by the state and the institutions it controls, 
can be qualified as extremism or terrorism258. In the past Uzbekistan has suf-
fered from the actions of Islamic radicalism (for example the second Batken 
crisis259), but during the last fifteen years only two attacks actually organ-
ised by Islamic terrorists took place there – all the other attacks were prob-
ably orchestrated as provocations by the authorities260. Up to several thou-
sand Uzbek citizens are fighting, or have fought in the past, in the ranks of 
terrorist organisations (above all the IMU), but this does not take place in 
Uzbekistan, but rather in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria. Even the policy 
of Uzbekistan’s government shows that Uzbek Islamic radicals do not cur-
rently constitute a threat to Uzbekistan itself – Uzbekistan is undertaking 
aggressive actions outside of its borders aimed at the anti-regime opposition 
(both those secular and moderately Islamic), but it has not undertaken simi-
lar steps against the Uzbek radicals’ terrorist organisations261.
256 For example the well-known Adolat in the Fergana Valley, also such organisations as Tauba 
or Islam Lashkarlary. Based on: Stanisław Zapaśnik, „Walczący islam” w Azji Centralnej…, 
op. cit., pages 79-80.
257 For example Muhammad Salih’s Erk (Freedom) party. 
258 For example praying outside of the mosques (in which a wide network of informers operates), 
possession of classical Islamic literature or recordings of sermons delivered even by non-fun-
damentalist Islamic scholars: http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1942 
259 Second Batken crisis – IMU militants’ raids, launched from the territory of Tajikistan, on 
Kyrgyzstan’s Batken province and fighting on a limited scale in Uzbekistan’s Surxondaryo 
province and Yangiabad region, in proximity of Tashkent, all in August of 2000. The fight-
ing led to dozens of fatalities and resulted in the IMU being forced to withdraw to Afghani-
stan. Further in footnote 36. 
260 Conducted by the Islamic Jihad Union in Bukhara and Tashkent in 2004: http://www.nefa-
foundation.org/file/FeaturedDocs/nefaijuoct08.pdf 
261 For example assassination attempt at opposition imam Obidhon Nazarov in 2012 in Sweden, 
where he resided as a political refugee; kidnapping of people from the territory of the Rus-
sian Federation: http://enews.fergananews.com/articles/2789 and http://www.uznews.
net/ru/human-rights/26684-v-moskve-pohitili-uzbeka-kotoryj-mnogo-znajet-o-gulnare-
karimovoj
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Despite large scale persecution262, Islam in Uzbekistan is developing (for ex-
ample the practice of religious rites is becoming increasingly popular263). One 
reason for this is Uzbekistan’s massive labour migration – mainly to Russia 
(2.5 million people264), but also to Turkey. Uzbeks are radicalised and decide 
to leave for Syria precisely while they are abroad. Under current conditions, 
the return of Uzbek militants from Syria or Afghanistan to Uzbekistan is im-
possible, due to the repressions they would face. Nevertheless, Uzbekistan’s 
authorities are exploiting the problem of the participation of its citizens in 
the war taking place outside of its borders to combat the opposition and to 
further tighten its grip on society. The only hypothetical situation in which 
Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism could start to play an important role 
in Uzbekistan is if a serious political and economic crisis were to occur there 
which would lead to the collapse of the state structures. A crisis of this kind 
is conceivable – the causes of it could be both the economic based social ten-
sions which have been suppressed for years, or the infighting within the elite 
and a conflict over the transition of power after President Islam Karimov, 
who has been in office since 1991. However, it currently seems that the secu-
rity services, which exert total control over society and the elite, would be 
able to cope with this situation and guide the state to a bloodless transition 
of power.
7. tajikistan
Tajikistan is often singled out as a state, in which Islam plays the most impor-
tant role, in contrast to other Central Asian states. It is the only state in the re-
gion where an Islamic political party, which until recently had seats in parlia-
ment, legally functions, and the level of practice of Islamic rites is probably the 
highest in the region. Simultaneously, a wide range of Islamic organisations, 
or even entire currents, are banned in Tajikistan, while the authorities take 
advantage of the issue of Islamic radicalism to combat the opposition and to 
tighten their grip on society; however, on a smaller scale than in Uzbekistan.
262 In Uzbekistan about 12,000 people are currently serving prison sentences for alleged religious 
extremism: http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/uzbekistan?page=2
263 http://fletcher.tufts.edu/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/praxis/xvi/Gaziev.pdf and http://www. 
alja ze era.com/indepth/features/2015/01/torture-death-uzbek-muslims-jail-20151 61 0254-
747 31 24.html 
264 Russian Federal Migration Service data – http://www.fms.gov.ru/about/statistics/data/de-
tails/54891/
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Political Islam has been present in Tajikistan since the beginning of its inde-
pendence. One of the sides of the civil war (1992-1997) was the Islamic Renais-
sance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) which, according to the 1997 Moscow peace 
agreements, was to co-participate in ruling the state. This party, currently led 
by Muhiddin Kabiri, presents a very moderate Islamic stance265; for years it 
played the role of a licensed opposition – until March of 2015 the IRPT had two 
members in the 63-seat lower chamber of parliament and it has offices in the 
entire country. On the local level, the IRPT’s more zealous activists are often 
persecuted by the local authorities266, and on the nationwide level, the party 
actually enjoys larger popular support than it polls in the elections267 and does 
not constitute a threat for the government. Despite this fact, the pressure ex-
erted on the IRPT by the authorities has been on the rise for the last two years, 
one examples of which is how Kabiri was banned from running in the presi-
dential election in 2013268, or how the party was not permitted to retain its seats 
in parliament in 2015269 (the elections in Tajikistan were not democratic, there-
fore it was a political decision, not a genuine outcome of the elections270). This 
shows a depletion of the party’s formula to act as the licensed opposition (the 
political rivalry fault line currently runs within the Kulob-origin ruling elite), 
and in future can lead to the radicalisation of some of its activists, especially 
those active on the local level.
While it is true that Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism are present in Ta-
jikistan, the events and groups which Dushanbe portrays as occurrences of it are 
not usually actually related to it. After the end of the civil war Tajikistan regularly 
witnessed clashes between government forces and armed groups with a declared 
Islamic character led by warlords who did not recognise the peace agreements. 
In most cases these conflicts were caused by political reasons, namely disputes 
between local warlords who controlled the situation in particular regions, and 
265 Secular modernisation of the state combined with the propagation of Islamic values. 
266 For example murder of the leader of IRPT structures in Khorugh: http://www.centrasia.ru/
newsA.php?st=1343416080
267 According to Kabiri himself, in 2010 the support oscillated at around 35-40%, the election 
which took place then in Tajikistan was declared as undemocratic by the OSCE: http://
news.tj/en/node/108135 and http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/69061?download=true
268 Pressure by the authorities on Kabiri, for example the attack on his deputy – Makhmadali 
Khait: http://tjinform.com/ru/news/20130422/06730.html and http://rus.azattyq.org/con-
tent/vibory-prezidenta-tadjikistan-kandidat-bobonazarova/25116733.html
269 http://www.avesta.tj/goverment/31046-vybory-partii-kabiri-zoyirova-i-shabdolova-osta-
lis-za-bortom.html
270 http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/tajikistan/143306?download=true
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the fact that the central government in Dushanbe which tried to extend its con-
trol over them (for example the clashes in the Rasht Valley in 2010271). There are 
serious doubts also in the case of arrests of the alleged members of terrorist or-
ganisations conspiring to commit attacks in Tajikistan, which suggests that the 
actions of the Tajik security forces are of an ostentatious nature272. That does not 
mean that Islamic terrorist organisations are not active in Tajikistan, but their 
activities are limited almost exclusively to the recruitment of volunteers, most 
of whom are recruited online during their stay in Russia (about 1.2 million Tajik 
labour migrants currently reside in the Russian Federation273). These actions are 
effective largely because a social bedrock for radicalisation exists in Tajikistan, 
in the form of structural poverty.
In the social dimension, the role of Islam in Tajikistan is increasing. This is 
visible for example in the number of mosques operating in the country (3,809), 
which is more than the number of schools274. The authorities actively combat 
not only occurrences of Islamic fundamentalism or extreme Islamic currents 
(both groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir or Tablighi Jamaat, and whole currents, 
such as Salafism, are illegal in Tajikistan275), but also the phenomenon of the Is-
lamisation of society. In 2011 President Emomali Rahmon approved legislation 
which hindered the practice of Islam (and also of other religions), for example 
by banning minors from entering mosques (and other places of worship) and 
forbidding travelling abroad to receive religious education276. This met with 
criticism from organisations defending the freedom of belief277. In Tajikistan 
itself, due to the mass migration of the most active individuals, the possibility 
of social unrest caused by the above actions of the authorities is small. The dis-
satisfied individuals will probably still choose departure for Syria or Afghani-
stan rather than launching the fight at home.
271 http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61971
272 Regular large-scale arrests (at times of dozens of people) of people suspected of conspiring 
to conduct terrorist attacks, especially prior to visits of foreign dignitaries in Tajikistan, or 
President Rahmon’s visits in country’s provinces. For example: http://lenta.ru/news/ 
2014/04/09/talco, http://ria.ru/world/20130921/964854932.html, http://www.fergananews.com 
/news.php?id=17863 or http://rus.ozodi.mobi/a/26644567.html
273 Russian Federal Migration Service data – http://www.fms.gov.ru/about/statistics/data/de-
tails/54891/ 
274 2012 data: http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan_mosques/24488099.html 
275 http://islamnews.tj/banned.html and http://www.centrasia.ru/news.php?st=1236149580
276 http://www.voanews.com/content/tajikistan-bans-minors-from-entering-mosq ues ----
- 126667408/168486.html
277 http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1553
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8. turkmenistan
Despite Turkmenistan being Central Asia’s most closed state, Islamic radical-
ism does exist there, as can be seen by the presence of Turkmen militants in 
the ranks of Islamic terrorist organisations in Afghanistan, Pakistan278 and 
Syria279. It is, however, a marginal phenomenon. As in the case of Uzbekistan 
or Tajikistan, the radicalisation takes place abroad, usually in Turkey, which is 
a traditional destination for Turkmen labour migrants. The links with Turkey 
also result in Syria being a more popular destination for the Turkmen radi-
cals than Afghanistan and Pakistan280. Despite the totalitarian character of the 
state, followers of extreme Islamic currents are not persecuted more than soci-
ety in general on condition that they do not reveal their beliefs. This is caused 
first of all by the marginal nature of this phenomenon in Turkmenistan, as 
a result of which the authorities do not perceive independent Islam, for exam-
ple Salafism, as being a serious threat, but rather merely one more example of 
social self-organisation (which Ashgabat does consider a threat).
It is unlikely that the role of Islam in general, and Islamic fundamentalism and 
radicalism in particular, will increase–mainly due to the vast emigration of 
active individuals281, the closed character of the state282, and immense social 
problems283.
278 Seen for example in IMU propaganda materials, which portrayed militants from Turkmeni-
stan fighting in Pakistan’s Waziristan: https://archive.org/details/QaboildaNimaGap3-qism
279 http://www.fergananews.com/news/20863
280 Up to several hundred Turkmens are participating in the war in Syria: http://www.rferl.
org/content/turkmenistan-achilles-heel-central-asian-security/25265841.html 
281 Due to the extremely low level of higher education and the high costs of bribes necessary to 
begin studies in Turkmenistan, up to ten thousand students leave the country annually, on-
ly some of whom return home after finishing their studies. 
282 Except for problems with leaving the country, an information blockade is in place – if in the 
other states of the region the radicalisation often happens via the Internet, in Turkmeni-
stan the access to the Internet itself is physically limited. 
283 The social problems include, a vast unemployment rate (reaching as much as 50%, especial-
ly in the rural areas and provinces) or mass drug abuse (lack of current data – in 2002 even 
up to 20% of the country’s population suffered from drug addiction, this number now is 
probably even higher – it is caused by the appalling social situation and the low price of the 
heroin brought from Afghanistan – about 1 dollar per portion): http://www.chrono-tm.
org/2012/02/v-turkmenii-okolo-50-naseleniya-ne-imeyut-rabotyi/, http://www.dw.de/
наркомания-в-туркмении-носит-масштабы-национального-бедствия/a-6363081, 
http://www.chrono-tm.org/2014/01/turkmenskiy-vsplesk-narkomanii/ and http://www.
centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1019641560 
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9. crimea
The Islamic issue in Crimea, including the problem of fundamentalism and 
radicalism, is naturally linked with the Tatar question. Crimean Tatars, who 
returned to the peninsula from their exile in Central Asia during the late So-
viet period and shortly after the fall of USSR, constitute about 12-14% (250-
300,000) of Crimea’s population284. In the political dimension they were, and 
continue to be, the most pro-Ukrainian group in Crimea, detested by the other 
sections of the peninsula’s society. While almost all Crimean Tatars are Mus-
lims (Hanafi school Sunnis), the tensions are caused first of all by the ethnic 
factor (Slavic population vs. Tatars) and the socio-economic factor (the own-
ership issue, competition from Tatars etc.), rather than by religious factors. 
Nevertheless, the Islamic issue is present there, and its importance rose after 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea which shattered the fragile stability of the issue 
of the Tatars. The problematic elements of the Islamic issue in Crimea include: 
religious tensions inside the Tatar community itself, the departures of Crime-
an volunteers to Syria, Russian policy towards the Tatars, especially towards 
Islamic fundamentalism, Tatars’ reactions towards the above policy, and more 
widely, towards the Russian annexation of the peninsula.
Prior to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the most problematic 
Islam-related aspect there were the religion-based conflicts within the Tatar 
community itself285. Contrary to Islamic radicalism, which appeared in Crimea 
on a marginal scale only with the war in Syria, extreme Islam had been pre-
sent in Crimea since the 1990s in the form of two, at times inter-diffused, 
movements286: Salafists and Hizb ut-Tahrir (which in the contrary to the rest 
of the post-Soviet area, operated legally in Ukraine). Hizb ut-Tahrir was wide-
spread, and its activities did not generate problems from the perspective of the 
state, nor did it cause serious conflicts within Crimea’s Muslim community287. 
284 According to the 2001 census – 243,000 people (12% of the peninsula’s population): 
http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/rus/results/nationality_population/nationality_popul1/
select_51/?botton=cens_db&box=5.1W&k_t=01&p=50&rz=1_1&rz_b=2_1%20%20%20%20
%20%20%20%20%20&n_page=3 
285 In addition to this political conflicts also took place: for example the rivalry between the 
Mejlis and Milli Firka. Further in: Tadeusz A. Olszański, Crimean Tatars after Russia’s an-
nexation of the Crimean Peninsula, OSW Commentary, 30.06.2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/
en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-07-02/crimean-tatars-after-russias-annexation-
crimean-peninsula. 
286 A Salafist can be a member or sympathiser of Hizb ut-Tahrir, but that does not translate to 
every member of the Hizb ut-Tahrir being a Salafist. 
287 Mejlis was not supportive of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s growth, viewing it as a rival: http://www.ng.ru/
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In the case of Salafism the situation was different. Its growth was met with 
resistance from the traditional, Hanafi clergy. Tensions existed also within the 
Salafi community itself, and mainly consisted of conflicts over the spheres of 
influence. At times even they even took the form of acts of violence (for exam-
ple the clashes in the Zhuravki in 2009)288.
Despite this the Russian media did circulate information, unsupported by 
credible evidence, about the alarming scale of Islamic radicalism in the repub-
lic. The only actual occurrence of it is the limited departures to Syria. There 
is no data about the exact number of the Crimean Tatars fighting in the ranks 
of Islamic terrorist organisations in Syria, but estimates claim it is between 
several dozen and 150-200 people289. Amongst the post-Soviet Jihadists’ lead-
ers there was one Crimean Tatar – the former deputy of the commander of the 
Army of Emigrants and Supporters – Abdul Karim al-Krymi (alternatively – 
Abdul Karim al-Ukraini), whose real name is unknown (as is his past). Con-
trary to the other post-Soviet states, departures from Crimea for Syria took 
place on a limited scale and were not in the focus ofof the authorities’ attention.
After Russia’s annexation of the Crimea the key problem with regard to the Islamic 
issue is the Russian policy towards Islam (and Tatars in general), as well as the re-
actions of the Tatar community (especially of the fundamentalists and Salafists).
Moscow, and also the local occupation authorities dominated by Crimean Rus-
sians, has an aggressive policy towards the Crimean Tatars, whom it views as 
a threat to Russian control over the peninsula, and Ukraine’s “fifth column”. This 
has led to persecutions of the Tatar community, especially of the leaders of politi-
cal and independent Muslim movements. Examples of such actions include raids 
on the Mejlis’ headquarters290, abductions and arrests of individuals291, and even 
the death in unclear circumstances of several Tatar activists, who were prob-
ably murdered by the new Russian authorities292. Russian policy towards Hizb 
cis/2013-10-07/1_crym.html and http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/
field/field_document/20141111TransnationalIslamMunster.pdf 
288 http://focus.ua/society/64741/
289 http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41136&cH
ash=d873c9e97210acb9b505cdadb5ffd5b8 and http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405
2702303795904579431290464167718 
290 http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine-abroad/radio-free-europeradio-liberty-cri-
mean-tatar-mejlis-raided-searched-by-police-photos-364800.html
291 http://www.khpg.org/pda/index.php?id=1414064636
292 http://www.rferl.org/content/crimea-tatar-killing-ukraine-russia-annexation-minori-
ty/25301602.html
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ut-Tahrir is also noteworthy. The organisation operated legally in Ukraine, and 
enjoyed popular support amongst the Crimean Tatar community (exact data is 
lacking, but probably several thousand people were members). In Russia Hizb 
ut-Tahrir is listed as a terrorist organisation and membership is punishable by 
law. The Russian authorities, guided by their own legislation and ignoring the 
current situation of Tatars in Crimea, began a wide scale campaign of persecu-
tion against Hizb ut-Tahrir. The significance of this issue for Moscow can be seen 
in the decision to nominate general Viktor Palagan to the post of the chief of the 
Crimean FSB – Palagan is a former FSB chief in Bashkortostan and successfully 
combated Hizb ut-Tahrir in this region of the Russian Federation293.
The observed trends suggest that the Crimean Tatar community’s reaction to 
the repression will firstly be emigration from Crimea – mainly to Ukraine, to 
a smaller extent to European Union states, and only in individual cases to the 
Middle East, including Syria. The establishment of Islamic militancy in Crimea 
seems highly unlikely. The reasons for this include:
 − The level of Russian control and surveillance over the peninsula, which is 
treated as a priority by Moscow;
 − The pacifist (rejecting armed struggle) character of Hizb ut-Tahrir;
 − Crimean Tatars’ realisation that they cannot count on actual external 
support – neither from the West, the Ukrainian government, nor Turkey 
(whose influence in Crimea is often overestimated, as is the significance of 
Crimea in its foreign policy).
This does not mean that Crimean Tatars will not undertake any armed strug-
gle at all. However, as is currently the case, it will not take place in Crimea 
itself. The most radical Salafists will probably still join the ranks of militants 
in Syria294, while others will fight on the Ukrainian side in Donbas. An example 
of this stance can be the so-called “Crimea” battalion295, comprised mainly of 
293 http://vesti-ukr.com/krym/49106-glavoj-upravlenija-fsb-v-krymu-naznachen-byvs-
hij-glavnyj-chekist-bashkirii
294 Viewing this jihad as being more important than anti-Russian actions. One example of this 
stance is the statement of Abdul Karim al-Krymi, who called for jihad to be waged first of all 
in Syria: http://www.akhbarshaam.info/2014/05/13/53/ 
295 In reality a formation maximally in size of a company: https://www.facebook.com/sotnja.
krym and http://vk.com/rotakrym 
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Crimean Tatars (including Salafists), who view the struggle against Russia not 
only as a patriotic, but also a religious duty296.
10. volga region
The Volga region, mainly the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, is the 
second largest, after the Northern Caucasus, Islamic area inside the Russian 
Federation (7.9 million people, out of which 4.24 million – 53.7% – are Muslims, 
mostly Tatars and Bashirs297). The Islamic issue is not the biggest problem of 
the Volga region. Extremist Islamic currents and Islamic fundamentalism are 
present in there, mainly in form of the few, yet growing, Salafi communities 
(with the largest one being in the city of Naberezhnye Chelny in Tatarstan), 
and the Hizb ut-Tahrir party (which is illegal in Russia). Islamic fundamental-
ism, despite alarmist information in Russian local and nationwide media, is 
rather a marginal phenomenon. The potential superimposition of the Islamic 
issue on the socio-political problems in the Volga region (including calls for au-
tonomy for Tatarstan), could lead to a destabilisation of the region, especially 
were there to be a serious political and economic crisis in Russia.
Salafism has developed in the Volga region since the 1990s but it has not gained 
the level of importance it has in other regions of the former USSR. Tatarstan 
witnessed tensions between the official Islamic clergy and the Salafists, and 
attacks even occurred. However, it is hard to determine whether they were 
caused by ideological or rather business/mafia-related conflicts. The assas-
sination attempts on Tatarstan’s mufti Ildus Faizov and his deputy Valiulla 
Yakupov in August 2012 may serve as examples of this298. These were initially 
blamed on members of the Salafi community299. A more realistic version was 
subsequently established, linking the attacks to criminal business disputes 
regarding the bribes for organising pilgrimages to Mecca (this is a common oc-
currence amongst the post-Soviet Islamic clergy)300. Hizb ut-Tahrir’s network 
in the Volga region is relatively widespread (in comparison with, for example, 
the Northern Caucasus). This can be seen for example in the presence of the 
296 Battalion “Crimea” statement: http://vk.com/rotakrym?z=photo-73502175_341494695%2Falbum-
73502175_00%2Frev 
297 2010 census data, available at: http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/pe re-
pis _itogi1612.htm 
298 As a result of which Yakupov died, and Faizov was seriously wounded. 
299 http://www.apn.ru/publications/article26923.htm
300 http://argumenti.ru/society/2012/07/191259
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group’s symbols during mass Islamic celebrations. The organisation’s activities 
are treated as a threat by local security structures. Frequent arrests and long 
prison sentences for its members are one of the results of their attentions301.
Occurrences of Islamic radicalism in the Volga region are limited to several 
departures of radicalised Salafists to Afghanistan (for example Salman Bul-
garsky) and Syria, as well as a few armed incidents in Tatarstan. Nevertheless, 
it is hard to unanimously link them to the activity of Islamic radicals. Such in-
cidents include the above mentioned attacks on Tatarstan’s muftis, the alleged 
establishment of a miniature clandestine militancy in 2012 in the form of one 
unit numbering several individuals (the only evidence for this was one video 
appeal uploaded to the Internet302 and it could also have been a provocation by 
the security services), a shoot-out during an FSB operation in Kazan in October 
of 2012, as a result of which two Salafists suspected of militant activity and an 
FSB agent were killed303, and also a similar operation of the security services in 
Chistopole in May 2014 (two suspects were killed during it) 304.
Despite of the fact that to date the Islam-related challenges in the Volga region 
has been limited in scale, the superimposition of the Islamic issue on other 
socio-political problems of the region may lead to it becoming more important 
(especially in Tatarstan). The most serious of the above problems include: eth-
nic tensions between Tatars and Russians305, the authoritarianism of the lo-
cal authorities, and the complicated relationship between Tatarstan and the 
central government306. The superimposition of the Islamic problem, for exam-
ple through the rise of the Islamic fundamentalism, onto currently existing 
challenges (for example the so-far controlled Tatar separatism) may in the long 
term perspective have a destabilising effect on the situation in this region.
301 For example: http://www.tatar-inform.ru/news/2014/10/15/426699/, also the organisation it-
self views Tatarstan as a difficult region for its operations (as it has previously viewed Uzbek-
istan: http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/PDF/EN/en_lflts_pdf/2014_01_28_Russia_EN.pdf 
302 https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=BH0_CVDy8oQ#!
303 http://www.gazeta.ru/social/2012/10/24/4823553.shtml
304 http://kazanfirst.ru/feed/20472
305 http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42402&c
Hash=86821ff6fcb447555e1d548ef9a50c2a
306 Further in: Jadwiga Rogoża, Federation without federalism. Relations between Moscow and 
the regions, OSW Study, April of 2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-stud-
ies/2014-05-07/federation-without-federalism-relations-between-moscow-and-regions 
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11. other regions
Islam, including its fundamentalist currents, is also present in the other re-
gions of the post-Soviet area, yet not in a concentrated and historically unin-
terrupted manner as in those described above. In any such list it is important 
to mention Moscow and Saint Petersburg which, due to influx of labour mi-
grants from Central Asia and Azerbaijan, as well as internal migration from 
the Northern Caucasus, are becoming centres of Islamic life. In these cities 
not only do the various Islamic currents present on the post-Soviet areas 
clash with each other, but their followers from the entire region themselves 
also have a chance to interact. Between two to even five million Muslims live 
and work in Moscow alone307. On the one hand this causes positive conditions 
for the growth of Islamic religious and intellectual life (numerous Islamic 
organisations and publishing houses operate there) and, on the other, it gen-
erates a wide range of tensions linked to the ethnic Russian population’s dis-
like of Muslims308, as well as institutional and infrastructural limitations 
(for example there are only four mosques in operation in Moscow, with the 
construction of a new one regularly postponed309). Additionally, this concen-
tration of Muslims creates a breeding ground for the spread of radical and 
fundamentalist ideas. Moscow is currently not only a target of occasional at-
tacks by radical Islamic terrorists from the Northern Caucasus, but is also 
one of the logistical centres for the departures to Syria and Iraq. It is in Mos-
cow, due to the availability of the ideology and the scale of the problems that 
labour migrants face, that the process of radicalising volunteers leaving for 
jihad takes place310.
In other regions of the Russian Federation, mainly due to the presence of labour 
migrants from Central Asia, similar processes take place on a smaller scale – 
the role of Islam is also increasing there. Salafi communities are in operation 
307 http://inosmi.ru/russia/20121101/201651752.html and http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?-
act= news&div=37816 
308 http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/16/russia-letter-un-special-rapportuer-human-rights 
-migrants-and-un-independent-expert-
309 http://izvestia.ru/news/533219
310 This is noticed even by the governments of the Central Asian states. Even prior to the civil 
war in Syria, labour migrants from Central Asia became radicalised in Moscow and later 
joined the ranks of the IMU and IJU in Pakistan and Afghanistan: http://www.avesta.tj/
security/29158-put-tadzhikskoy-molodezhi-v-siriyu-prolegaet-cherez-prospekt-mira.html 
and statements of the IMU members – http://www.jundurrahmon.com/jundulloh_filmlar/
ali_mergan_russian.avi
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and the process of radicalisation takes place there311. It is true mostly of the Eu-
ropean part of Russia, as well as western and central Siberia, where anywhere 
from several dozen to several hundreds of thousands of labour migrants from 
the Central Asian states live and work312. Small Salafi communities also exist 
in the other countries of the former USSR, in which Islam traditionally did not 
play an important role – for example in Belarus313.
One noteworthy phenomenon is that Russians and members of other tradi-
tionally non-Muslim ethnicities present in Russia occasionally convert to Is-
lam. This process began in the late 1980s-early 1990s, during the fall of the 
USSR and the collapse of the Soviet model of society, and it has intensified in 
the recent years. According to the converts themselves, Islam is a solution for 
all the social problems present in Russia, such as alcoholism, drug abuse, the 
crisis of the family etc.314 It is hard to pin down the exact scale of the phenom-
enon – the most probable estimates hold it to be at a level of 3,000 people315. 
The most well-known example of a Russian convert to Islam is Said Buryatsky 
(Aleksandr Tikhomirov) – ethnically half Russian, half Buryat, he converted 
to Islam, became one of the most influential leaders of the peaceful Salafists, 
and then joined the ranks of the Caucasus Emirate and was killed in a clash 
with Russian forces in 2010 in Ingushetia.
Considering the dynamic growth of Islam in general and Salafism in particular 
which has taken place during the last quarter of a century on the post-Soviet 
area, it seems prudent to suppose that there will be an increase in the number 
of regions where the Islamic issue, including radicalism and fundamentalism, 
is present in the socio-political life.
311 For example: http://irkutsk.rusplt.ru/index/zachem_v_irkutske_otkryvayutsya_kursy_
arabskogo_yazyka_i_osnov_islama-15201.html i http://www.ng.ru/ng_religii/2015-02-04/4_
siberia.html 
312 More on the Central Asian labour migrants in Siberia: Piotr Varnavski, Iz Azii v Sibir, ili 
v poiskakh „novogo sveta” (polozheniye migrantov iz Tsentralnoy Azii v Baykalskoy Sibiri), 
Ulan Ude 2013. 
313 Peaceful Salafi community with followers in the dozens, suffering from continuous repres-
sions from the Belarusian authorities: http://news.tut.by/society/432820.html and http://
charter97.org/ru/news/2015/1/11/134768/ 
314 The Russian nationalist Aleksandr Kovtun provides an example of this. He conducted a se-
ries of attacks in 2010 in the Primorsky Krai (Russian Far East). While in prison he convert-
ed to Islam, concluding that Islam is the solution to the problems of Russian society, such as 
alcoholism, drug abuse, or prostitution: http://www.aif.ru/incidents/18598, and http://um-
manews.com/minbar/9148--l-r.html.
315 http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=17618
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conclusions
The phenomenon of post-Soviet militants in Syria, due to its media potential 
and attractiveness, is a popular subject amongst journalists and analysts from 
both the post-Soviet area and the West. This is the case also because of the po-
litical usefulness of the issue, which is commonly exploited by the authorities 
of the particular states both in internal power struggles and on the interna-
tional arena. This leads to the problem being blown out of proportion and gen-
erates alarmist forecasts regarding the influence of the above phenomenon on 
the post-Soviet states. A similar mechanism is in place also in the case of mili-
tant Islam, Islamic fundamentalism, and even Islam in general in the former 
USSR, the role of which is often overestimated.
This does not mean that the problem of war migration or Islamic fundamental-
ism in the post-Soviet area should be ignored or played down. The influence 
and role of Islam are without a doubt on the rise there, and under appropriate 
circumstances, it actually may play an important role in shaping the political 
situation there (including the security sphere), both by itself and as a result of 
it being instrumentalised in political power plays.
Nevertheless, in order to properly judge the meaning of the Islamic issue and 
the phenomenon of radical Islam in the post-Soviet states, one should ascribe 
the proper proportions to them – place them in the social, economic and politi-
cal context present there. Islam in the post-Soviet area, even in such places as 
Dagestan or the Fergana Valley, does not function in a vacuum. Furthermore, 
the experiences of the last twenty five years show that militant Islam was al-
most always a secondary factor, one step behind the socio-political processes 
and events—not generating them, but rather reacting to them. Therefore the 
analysis of Islam’s role, as well as the current and future consequences of the 
war migration to Syria and Iraq, must be rooted in the political logic of the par-
ticular states and region as a whole.
All evidence shows that the war migration of citizens of the post-Soviet states, 
as is the case with Islamic fundamentalism and militant Islam, has become 
a permanent element of the religious, social and political landscape of the for-
mer USSR states inhabited by Muslims. This does not mean, though, that the 
Central Asian states, Azerbaijan or the Northern Caucasus should be viewed 
in the context of Islamic civilisation, in which religion plays an incomparably 
higher role in the socio-political processes. While in many cases Homo sovieti-
cus did in fact become Homo jihadicus, the inhabitants of the states formed on 
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the rubble of the USSR are still under a strong influence of the Soviet heritage 
and Russia’s influence in the civilizational sphere. A change in the current sit-
uation – if it ever takes place – requires not only a transition of multiple genera-
tions, but also colossal geopolitical and civilisational landslides. While these 
cannot be ruled out, nor can they currently be predicted. The post-Soviet Mus-
lims and the regions they inhabit, in the mental and civilizational dimensions, 
still remain halfway between the Islamic and the Soviet/Russian worlds.
Maciej FalKoWsKi, józeF lang
The text was closed in June 2015
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Map 3. Islam in the post-Soviet area
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Map 4. Approximate number of volunteers
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